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The Hamidian vision of an Ottoman nation revealed itself in the liminal stage of the 
territorial foreigner, existing between migration and legal assimilation. The national 
identity synthesis inherited by the State promoted naturalization. This thesis begins with 
historiographical problems associated with ‘foreigners’ in the Ottoman context (e.g. 
conflation of sentimental and legal foreigners, and domestic foreignizations). The study 
then traces the legal evolution of an Ottoman ‘individual,’ challenges ‘exclusivist’ 
interpretations of the Nationality Law, and evaluates the rationalizing framework’s 
utility for a national ideology that was expansionist by design. Istanbul is introduced as 
a lens through which one can observe the manners in which the polycentric State 
engaged with polynymity, wherein an analogy is discerned for the State’s interaction 
with citizens, i.e. all were granted social existence, but the State asserted ultimate 
ownership. The in/visibility of the Great Power foreigner in the city is argued to be 
relational to his/her home-state marginality. In this context, following an overview of 
visible foreigners whose versions of the city have become fundamental components of 
the intertext, this thesis contributes to recent scholarship focusing on nation-negating 
outcasts seeking alternative belongings through the example of a Great Power female 
convert who migrated to Istanbul. The final core topic engages with those who have 
become the decisive examples in debates surrounding the subordination of the Dar-ul-
Islam to Ottoman exclusivism. It is argued in this section that the ‘foreigner’ attribute 
that was designated to non-Ottoman Muslims did not deny eventual belonging. 
Preventing the proliferation of foreigners was the State’s priority, but it equally sought 
naturalization over exclusion. This thesis concludes with the argument that the 
Hamidian regime created a nation but refused to seal it. The act of sealing the nation 
would have necessitated a transfer of sovereignty. On the other hand, so long as the 
nation remained unsealed, it could also grow. The Hamidian regime was expansionist 
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The Fundamental Law 
... Article 8. All individuals who are under the 
allegiance of the Ottoman state are designated as 
Ottomans, without exception, irrespective of 
whichever religion or denomination to which they 
belong—and the quality of being an Ottoman is 
acquired and relinquished according to conditions 
that are determined by law.1 
Nation and Migration, the Dialogical Zone 
Modernity created the individual. In the nineteenth century, nationalist sentiment was 
one channel the individual found expression in. The appeal was (the semblance of) 
active participation in determining one’s (temporal) fate by proxy of states governed by 
representational selves. Upon the emergence of politically consequential individuals, 
states that had consolidated “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” 2  in 
premodernity resolved to weave individuals’ interests to the State’s welfare to maintain 
the former’s loyalty; nationalism was tailored to preserve practical and ideological 
supremacy. The Ottoman state, too, was actively involved in nation-formation over the 
course of its last century. The House of Osman confronted the urgency to maintain its 
status in the individualizing eyes of the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and polyglot 
constituency it had claimed authority over before the advent of the individual. One way 
the polycentric State met the challenge was by formulating an official nationalism. It 
subsequently proposed a nation. The following chapters consider how the late-Ottoman 
state participated in the construction of national identity through evaluating its reception 
of foreigners who actively and passively contributed to the making of ‘an Ottoman.’ 
These dynamics are observed in relation to how the status of foreigners was dictated 
from Istanbul over the course of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909); i.e. 
prior to the collapse of sultanic authority. The foreigner-prism reveals nuances that are 
blurred in self-referential analyses of Ottoman nation formation, especially regarding 
degrees of ‘exclusivism’ and ‘fusion of faith and state.’ Summarily, switching the focus 
from negotiations with and amongst the natural-born constituency to an outward-
looking one, in dialogue with alternative contrasted others, reveals that the Hamidian 
regime propagated expansionist nationalism and molded an unsealed nation. 
                                                
1  “Kanun-i Esasi” [of 1876], Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-yi Osmaniye: Kırk Yedinci Sene 
(Dersaadet: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1309 [1891/92]), 100. 
2 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 





Ottomanism and its Nation  
The Ottoman state undertook the project of nation formation some half a 
millennium after its establishment. Efforts to reconstruct the existing polity’s identity in 
national terms over the course of the State’s final century were driven by the will and 
necessity to adapt to the conditions of modernity. Inter- and intra-state dynamics 
dictated a structural ‘reorganization’ and the redefining of the State’s relationship with 
theretofore communalized subjects. Survival, intact, necessitated ‘reformulating’ the 
link between “fraternity, power and time.”3 Modernity demanded temporal power to be 
shared in a desacralized time amongst a fraternity that would become a collectivity of 
individuals, e.g. a nation. Beyond accommodating communal subjects as individual 
members of a newly forging collective, this additionally entailed the State attaining (at 
least the pretension of) consent to maintain hegemony. To fulfill this aim, the Ottoman 
State, too, formulated a customized legitimacy structure to fill the ‘void’ created by the 
deterioration of the ‘old belief-system’ that had previously perpetuated its power—the 
former ‘link’ reinforced its claim to authority. The State thus addressed the new 
circumstances by launching the venture of official nationalism. The ideology was 
engineered in a manner that would reinforce authority whilst addressing the 
individualizing collective, without whose loyalty power would be redundant. To this 
end, the ideology of Ottomanism was developed. It served the means of ‘mobilizing 
bias’ 4  to favor the State maintaining the ability to exercise power over its old 
constituency within the new liberalizing and rationalizing framework that had 
submerged the transnational field.  
Ottomanism and the making of its Ottoman nation were proactive enterprises. 
Insider and outsider recollections have, until recently, more frequently evaluated the 
efforts (neither nation nor nationalism were admitted an Ottoman existence, per se) as 
defensive and reactive imitations, and, ultimately, unpromising ventures. This trend was 
                                                
3  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso), 36.  
4 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz initiated the conversation on the ‘mobilization of bias’ as 
a component of the phenomenon of non-decision-making in the context of a two-dimensional 
power paradigm; see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Decisions and Non-Decisions: An 
Analytical Framework,” American Political Science Review 57 (September 1963): 632 – 642. 
While the ‘mobilization of bias’ itself has attained an independent conceptual existence, the 
number of dimensions of power within which it operates has been a source of contention; see, 
for example, Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974). Here, it is 





most pronounced in histories subscribing to Westernization and Decline Paradigms, 
which  
... served the purposes of, or perhaps was propelled by, a Western hegemonic 
agenda. This view fitted neatly into Enlightenment progress discourse, coalesced 
in Orientalist scholarship, and acquired further academic rigour in formulations 
such as the Marxian ‘Asiatic mode of production’ and ‘Oriental despotism’, and 
Weberian-inspired modernizationist and developmentist theories.5  
The unfeasibility of an Ottoman nation was not only a retrospective historiographical 
projection, it also failed to persuade contemporaries. Ottoman nation-creation coincided 
with the age in which scholars such as Ernest Renan, with a new “scientific attitude,”6 
contributed to the ‘Orient’ taking “on a discursive identity that made it unequal with the 
West.”7 The essentialized qualities of societies excluded from the freshly concocted 
Greco-Roman civilizational trajectory were not given the benefit of either the nature or 
capacity to be able to achieve legitimate nationhood. Renan’s “opinions were widely 
shared across Europe and beyond, helping to foster a derogatory attitude toward Islam 
and a sense of Western superiority which in turn legitimized European colonialism.”8 
His opinion about the (racialized and “defective”9) ‘Turkish’ nation was, simply, that it 
was not one. 
Half a century after the Ottoman state declared all subjects born into the allegiance 
of the House of Osman to be ‘Ottomans,’ Renan resolved to explain why a cohesive 
nation could not be produced. He claimed the Ottomans were not progressing “towards 
a fully national existence … [like France, Germany, England, Italy, and Spain, which 
had achieved] the fusion of the populations of which they are composed.”10 He located 
the specific obstacles for the ‘Turkish’ nation in the ruling class not having ever adopted 
the religion of those they conquered nor having forgotten their language.11 This, he 
regarded as critical, since, “forgetting, and … historical error are an essential factor in 
the creation of a nation.”12 Though the Ottomans did both forget and commit historical 
errors in the process of forging a nation, one concedes that their aim was never to create 
                                                
5 Dana Sajdi ed., Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth 
Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 4.  
6 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1995), 138. 
7 Ibid., 156 
8  Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: the History and Politics of 
Orientalism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 81.  
9 Ibid., 80.  
10 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Stuart Woolf ed., Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the 
Present: a Reader (London: Routledge, 1999), 49. 
11 Ibid. 





a nation according to the path imagined by Renan. Since Ottomanism was a civic rather 
than ethnic nationalism, a ‘fusion’ of indigenous cultures had not been the State’s 
dominant ambition. Instead, it sought political assimilation—a process that operated 
alongside and reinforced the ‘cultural fusion’ that was propagated (rather than occurring 
naturally) in the societies that Renan observes to have successfully manufactured 
nations. Neither could the Ottoman state have conceived of adopting the conquered 
religion. Its historical legitimacy was secured through upholding its Islamic 
associations; “[t]raditional Ottoman polity was fashioned essentially by a patrimonial 
authority called the Sultanate, Islamized by recognizing the Sharî‘a … and by assuming 
the charismatic title of the Caliphate, which was believed to be a succession to the 
Prophet’s headship of the community of Islam.” 13  The House of Osman did not 
envisage relinquishing these claims. This did not eliminate the possibility of creating a 
nation—also in the Hamidian era that has been denied the quest.  
The Hamidian regime successfully negotiated tradition and modernity with 
collective identity formation. What made the perpetually forming nation ultimately 
unattainable during the Hamidian era was the uncompromising absolutist framework—
i.e. Sultan Abdülhamid II created a nation but refused to seal it by conceding 
sovereignty to it. Because Ottomanism and the Ottoman nation have been evaluated as 
defensive projects that aimed to convince the domestic constituency of unity in the age 
of irredentist nationalism, there is still no consensus on the historical success of either. 
Regardless of the level of agency the Ottoman state ‘in decline’ has finally been granted 
in the historiography, Ottomanism continues to be dismissed as a proto-nationalism and 
is given even less credence as an official state venture in the Hamidian era.  
Nationalism in the nineteenth century has been viewed as an integral component of 
‘reform’ and ‘modernization’—the refined and less value-laden vestiges of ‘progress’ 
and ‘westernization’ that dominated “in the Euro-centric determinism of the post-WWII 
Modernity meta-narrative.”14 Despite the fact that nationalism has been discredited as 
one of the manifestations of progress, it remains intricately tied to a more neutral (and 
critique-able) modernity. One can therefore observe the success of Ottomanism echoed 
in evaluations of the State’s ability to dictate the terms of its reform process. Edhem 
Eldem, for example, touches upon both Ottoman agency and nationalism. Regarding the 
                                                
13 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1998), 9. 
14  Isa Blumi, Foundations of Modernity: Human Agency and the Imperial State (London: 





former, he argues that the State’s transformation is traceable to a process that was not “a 
deus ex machine type of western intervention …[but] had been initiated in the sixteenth 
century, and involved essentially a rationalization of bureaucratic structures aiming at 
the optimization of central control over the territories and resources of the empire.”15 
The process is not concluded to be linear, however, as he is skeptical of such active 
initiative in the Hamidian era, claiming that by “the second half of the nineteenth 
century … what had started as a rather active process of change gradually turned into 
passive compliance and allegiance to external criteria and dynamics.”16 Eldem discusses 
Ottomanism and an Ottoman nation in the same vein: “Ottoman identity supported by 
an imperialist nationalist ideology—Ottomanism—were doomed to failure as both the 
dominant nationalist tendencies of the century and the imperialist policies of the great 
powers systematically undermined such a unifying project.”17 The ‘failure’ is assumed 
to be a matter of fact by advent of the reign of Abdülhamid II; it is suggested that pan-
Islamism and pan-Turkism were the ideologies fomented in the Hamidian and Young 
Turk eras, respectively.  
The argument that some sort of pan-/Islamism supplanted Ottomanism by the final 
quarter of the nineteenth century is, in fact, not a deviation from the ‘Euro-centric 
metanarrative.’ While consistent with the recent “trend [...] to call later manifestations 
of Ottoman loyalty de facto Islamism,”18 the analysis remains preliminary to the (more) 
recent historiographical trend that considers ‘Islamism’ to have transcended the 
Hamidian into the Young Turk era, existing alongside the latter’s tendencies of 
Turkism. In other words, Young Turks sought to preserve Muslim hegemony. While the 
forces Edhem mentions certainly did ‘undermine’ the Ottoman national project, 
Ottomanism can be argued to have persisted in spite of them—even in the Hamidian 
era. Hamidian pan-/Islamism devoid of an over-arching Ottomanism is not persuasive 
when considerations of the process by which the State attempted to build its nation 
stretch beyond domestic resistance to its nationalist pitch. The latter approach has 
upheld the communalization of the constituency according to traditional categorizations 
(in a state of constant reactive dialogue with international pressure). The domestic self-
                                                
15  Edhem Eldem, “Istanbul: from imperial to peripheral capital,” in Edhem Eldem, Daniel 
Goffman and Bruce Masters eds., The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and 
Istanbul (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 197.  
16 Ibid., 199.  
17 Ibid., 200. 





referential analysis of the successes and failures of Ottomanism is necessary. For an age 
whose primary feature is the advent of the politically consequential individual, however, 
the conversation must also engage with national identity on an individual basis—
especially with regards to who was and was not considered a member of the Ottoman 
polity, by the Hamidian regime.  
In shifting the reference point from indigenous collective identity formations to 
modes of access to membership, the perspective of the changeable status of individuals 
in the eyes of the State serves to nuance conceptual Ottoman nationhood. It does so 
without displacing conclusions drawn about the nature of the State and the manner in 
which it faced the challenges of modernity, e.g. that Ottomanism, as “a form of identity 
politics...emerged as a tool of state expansion rather than a result of Westernization 
[but] did not take hold as a doctrine within crucial local factors.”19  That Ottoman 
nationalism was more ambitious than attaining local adherents is blurred when in self-
referential analyses. This is exacerbated when the local has often been assumed to have 
been compartmentalized according to clear-cut ethno-religious designations—a feature 
projected onto the self-attestations of the domestic constituency as well as the State’s 
gaze. Where traditional collective identity categorizations are employed, the project of 
what becomes rendered a pseudo-nation is presented in religious terminology. 
It is evident that the Ottoman state, and the Hamidian regime in particular, could 
not have been committed to a multi-religious and multi-ethnic civic nationalism if it was 
exclusivist and privileged a certain group within the constituency based on either of 
these factors. What emerges in the conversation about migration and nation-formation is 
the question of whether the Hamidian state’s attempts to control demographics through 
what appears to be the promotion a certain ‘type’ migrant (one that reinforced the 
sovereign’s claim to authority and power) occurring in simultaneity with abiding by the 
regulations of granting citizenship to all those that had met legally articulated criteria, 
regardless of ethno-religious persuasion (i.e. not actively excluding any individual from 
possible membership), has the potential to adjudicate the regime’s commitment to 
Ottomanism and the civic nation obsolete. This is precisely the debate that is lost when 
the nation-building project is conveyed as a domestic intra-national struggle between 
Muslims and ‘minorities’—who have more recently been termed ‘dominant’ and ‘non-
                                                





dominant’ members of the constituency.20  Within the parameters of the latter enquiry, 
the general consensus is that the State was not fully invested in a nation of ethno-
religiously neutral Ottomans. The articulated rhetoric is taken as a token gesture to 
appease the non-core constituency component of the masses and the Great Powers 
whose intrusion into the Ottoman field often occurred on the pretext of their defense. As 
such, so far as the Hamidian era is concerned, the dominant-non-dominant dynamic has 
overwhelmingly geared deliberations concerning the nature of the State to the protected 
place of Islam in governance, on Islam being privileged in collective identity formation, 
and the conflicts arising with those who Islam’s dominance could oppress. It will 
hereinafter be argued that official Hamidian negotiations of the Ottoman self contrasted 
with external others (e.g. foreigners) can be used as a means to test the universality of 
what has hitherto been established about the State’s self-referential constructions of its 
self in relation to itself. 
The Hamidian vision of the State and national identity has been argued to be 
exclusivist in favor of Sunni (-Hanefi) Ottomans. 21  The State’s negotiation of its 
identity against how it conceptualized foreigners does not conform to this conclusion 
that has come to be taken for granted. The argument is discernible in scholarship that 
consciously broke away from the literature that considered the Hamidian regime in 
reductive terms and has challenged the veracity of the representation-of-the-
representation-of the sovereign that was “painted by a bad orientalist painter.”22 The 
point of departure for revisionist histories generally accept that “[o]nly after the 
Ottoman Empire had shown unmistakable signs of dissolution was Abdül-Hamid 
singled out as the man responsible for its collapse.” 23  Thereafter, a coalition of 
“different men representing irreconcilable interests ... spoke out in the name of liberty 
and portrayed Abdül-Hamid as a tyrant.”24 Because a pervasive essentialist current in 
the nation-building era questioned the compatibility between Islam and progress from 
the nineteenth-century through the middle of the twentieth, the idea of Hamidian 
progress was easily dismissible on account of religious conservatism. 
                                                
20 See, for example, Bedross der Matossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to 
Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire (Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2014). 
21 See, for example, Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of 
Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876 – 1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).  
22 François Georgeon, Abdülhamid II: Sultan Calife (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 14. 
23 Berkes, Development of Secularism, 253. 





Hamidian historiography has only recently departed from deterministic narratives 
to undergo reparative theoretical and practical revision. Arguments like those of 
Bernard Lewis, that “the advance of Christendom and the decline of Islam created a 
new relationship, Islam was crystalized—not to say ossified—and had become 
impervious to external stimuli, especially from the millennial enemy in the West”25 
would, soon after, be the topic of acrimonious contestation by scholars like Edward 
Said. In short, it took the rejection of objective reality (e.g. Hobsbawm on tradition, 
Anderson on imagined communities) and the advent of post-colonial and cultural 
studies to push academics to self-criticize in the face of many publicized charges (e.g. 
Hodgson of Eurocentrism, Said of Orientalism). In reconsidering the Hamidian regime, 
this resulted in evaluations that have come to focus on the ability of non-insular Islamic 
states and societies to be agents of their own change.26 
Outgrowing the decline paradigm, Eurocentrism, and essentialism has necessitated 
a reevaluation of the nature of the late-Ottoman state. The result has often been an 
evaluation of “The Politicization of Islam,”27 to borrow the title of Kemal H. Karpat’s 
influential work. New approaches to Ottoman history designated Islam as compatible 
with modernity by proving the manner in which it accommodated and was even used as 
tool to shape the proto-/nation. Karpat, for example, has argued that the Hamidian 
regime’s ‘pan-Islamism’ instilled a sense of nationalism in his subjects.28 The political 
identity of this nation was thus intimately linked to Islam; i.e. “[a]lthough Sultan 
Abdulhamid opposed the idea of a nation defined by attachment to a territorial 
                                                
25 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1968), 41. 
26 For primary-source examples of late-Ottoman deliberations on Islam and the demands of 
modern civilization see, “The Young Ottoman: Namık Kemal’s ‘Progress,’” in Michael Amin, 
Benjamin C. Fortna, and Elizabeth B. Frierson eds., The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for 
History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007): 406—411, Fatma Aliye, İstila-yı İslam (Kostantiniye: 
Tahir Bey Matbaası 1318 [1900/01]), Halil Hamid, Müsavat-ı Tamme (Istanbul: Leon Lütfi, 
1328 [1912/13]), Prens Sabahaddin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir? (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 
1334 [1915/16]). For secondary sources, see, among others, Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young 
Ottoman Thought: a Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1962), Nazan Çiçek, The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the 
Late Nineteenth Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs eds., 
Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration: Studies in Honour of Butrus Abu-Manneh (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2005), Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford UP, 
1995), Stefano Taglia, Intellectuals and Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Young Turks on 
the Challenges of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2015), and Özdalga ed., Late Ottoman 
Society. 
27 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam.  
28 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908,” IJMES 3, no. 3 





fatherland and/or ethnicity or language, his Islamism, when grafted onto Ottomanism, 
yielded a sense of nationhood that was anchored both in Islam and in various historical, 
regional, and ethnic particularities.”29 The basis of Selim Deringil’s argument that the 
Hamidian state was exclusivist rests upon a similar foundation. He finds the era to be,  
... both formative and disruptive … disruptive of much of the traditional fabric of 
society, as the State now came to demand not passive obedience but conformity to 
a unilaterally proclaimed normative order. In fact the Ottoman Empire hedged 
towards a ‘nationally imagined community,’ as Ottoman identity assumed an 
increasingly Turkish character, even if its identity was packaged in universalist 
Islamic terms.30  
Deringil’s work argues for the pragmatic utility of Islam for the Hamidian state. He 
proceeds to demonstrate how the policy was geared to Ottomanize Hanefi Islam, and 
homogenize the Muslim constituency accordingly. In fact, the re-introduction of Islam 
into the discourse of progress has resulted in the faith being reshaped in a manner that 
has frequently stripped it of its religiosity in being granted political agency. They were 
not mutually exclusive, however. As Benjamin C. Fortna has argued, “Islam cannot be 
reduced to the role of merely playing a part in an inherently secular agenda.”31 This is 
inevitable, however, so long as the assumption that those who wielded authority were 
“willing to use the faith”32 to save the State persists. 
The revision of the Hamidian era has presented some theoretical challenges. It 
has, at times, substituted new concepts to take for granted (more aligned with 
contemporary intellectual currents) in the place of old ones (that suited now outdated 
nation-state constructions). Namely, more recent histories of the late-Ottoman state 
have attempted to evaluate the polity as yet ‘another’ rational and modernizing one that 
can be measured by the same units and treated with the same rhetoric, all the while 
continuing to approach it as a novelty. The point of departure is that the “Ottoman state, 
almost alone in the Muslim world, possessed sovereignty and an independent Muslim 
ruler, the sultan-caliph, who had a sophisticated political organization at his disposal 
and could claim legitimately to be the defender of Islam.”33 This is not disparate from 
other opening vignettes that consider the Ottoman state to be “unique in many ways. It 
was the only Muslim great power. It was the only European Muslim power. It had 
                                                
29 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, 323.  
30 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 11.  
31 Benjamin C. Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late ‘Secular’ Schools,” IJMES 32, no. 3 (August 
2000), 370. 






emerged as the single most serious threat to European Christendom during the period 
when Europe was expanding as a result of the voyages of discovery and colonization in 
the late fifteenth and sixteenth century.”34 Echoing more recent contemporary days, in 
the search for parity, difference is maintained against those among whom a place of 
belonging is attempted be achieved. For the Hamidian era, this rests upon the notion 
that the regime’s ‘politicization of Islam,’  
... paradoxically, brought to an end the de facto separation of faith and state that 
prevailed in the government practices of the classical Ottoman era—the supposed 
din-u-devlet (fusion of state and faith), notwithstanding. Instead, modernization 
eventually provided the State with a new argument for abolishing the faith’s 
relatively autonomous sphere and monopolizing all sectors of power, even, when 
necessary, using the faith for its own benefit in the name of “secularism.”35  
While the above assertion that the ‘politicization of Islam’ merged religion and state 
will be disputed in what follows, the forthcoming chapters nevertheless accept Islam as 
a crucial point of reference in late-Ottoman reform and modernization—not the least 
because, as it has been established in the historiography, it provided a source of 
legitimacy for the House of Osman. Neither is the validity of the internal conflicts that 
occurred in the self-referential field of Ottoman nation formation disputed. 
The consideration proposed in this thesis is how the Hamidian state constructed its 
identity in reference to external outsiders—i.e. those who were unambiguously foreign. 
It will be argued that the foreigner prism reveals equally important features of the 
Hamidian nation-under-construction as self-referential analyses. Most notably, what 
germinates from this inquiry is the possibility that the Hamidian regime did not, in fact, 
fuse faith with state. Instead, what emerges from the dynamics of its engagement with 
natural-born Ottomans and foreigners is that the Hamidian regime, in fact, formalized 
the division between faith and state and bifurcated official nationalism into two 
complementary, yet distinct, spheres: the secular-territorial and extraterritorial-divine. 
This division is unobservable in examinations of late-Ottoman national identity from a 
self-referential perspective. The two distinct discourses merged when they addressed the 
Muslim constituency, who was within the sultan’s jurisdiction in each realm, thus 
creating the impression of exclusivism. Before analyzing the Hamidian project of nation 
formation further, it is first necessary to establish the historiographical problems 
associated with the ‘foreigner’ in the late-Ottoman context. 
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The Ottoman ‘Violation of the Nationalist Principle’ 
Modernity placed a call for ‘imagined communities’ to recast old elements into new 
entities held up by a superficially disparate socio-political ideology. Numerous 
participants responded to the challenge. In the Ottoman dominions, natural-born agents 
and opponents of the State, comprehensive of intellectuals with a social function,36 
sought to actively mold the nascent community in their un-/official capacities according 
to their respective convictions of how the State could best be saved. While their efforts 
have been duly documented, the active and passive participation of the ‘foreigner’ as 
migrant and potential citizen has, for the most part,37 been left out of debates concerning 
the construction late-Ottoman identity and national image. This is notwithstanding the 
fact that the text and praxis governing migration into the ‘well-protected domains,’ 
especially over the duration of the Hamidian years, has the capacity reveal the State’s 
vision for its nation at a critical juncture and to simultaneously challenge some basic 
assumptions about the nature of the State. 
The place allotted to foreigners within nations-under-construction is critical 
because foreigners are the most obvious other. And regardless of how nation/-ality has 
been imagined, it has always been presented as the natural inclination to forge a union 
with (representational) selves over contrasted (and, often deliberately constructed) 
others. The rhetoric of philosophical reflections and ideological formulations of nations 
and nationalism have always been couched within the confines of this terminology. 
According to John Stuart Mill, for example, “[a] portion of mankind may be said to 
constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies 
which do not exist between them and any others.”38 The primary nexus is therefore a 
dialogical one between the familiar self and the unfamiliar other. Though many earlier 
intellectualizations of nation were ethno-religiously non-essentialist, thus in accordance 
with the sole suitable derivation of official nationalism for the Ottoman state, the 
Ottomans were nevertheless not widely accepted as constituting a nation—e.g. not by 
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contemporary Great Power outsiders and irredentist insiders, nor by retrospective 
nationalist narratives of post-Ottoman states. One of the primary reasons for this has 
been the multiple, and often contradictory, forms the foreigner—i.e. the ‘other’—has 
taken in the quest to determine who an Ottoman was.  
Foreigners have seldom been considered in relation the construction of the Ottoman 
national image, perhaps most importantly, because the Ottomans were the ones to often 
be ascribed that identity. As such, their state could not become the legitimate “political 
shell”39 of a nation in the modern era. If a state is classified as foreign in relation to 
those over whom it exercises hegemony, the equation results in a “violation of the 
nationalist principle.”40 Modernity yielded a slew of national states with internally and 
externally validated claims to their existence. Those among them who considered the 
Ottomans as being “radically alien to Western civilization” 41  denied Ottomans 
nationhood. In the final year of the Great War, a pamphlet describing the future of the 
polity definitively declared that, 
… [t]he Ottoman Empire is not a national State. It has not grown by willing 
cooperation between neighbours, but by the domination of a military power over 
what might have been nations, or parts of nations, if Ottoman militarism had not 
cut them short…The breaking up of Turkey is not the destruction of a living 
commonwealth, but the liberation of enslaved peoples from prison, a clearing of 
the ground for the commonwealths which these peoples are at last to build.42 
The above description could faithfully describe a number of polities within and beyond 
the mythological confines of ‘Western Civilization’—with a temporal range that 
transcends and is inclusive of both the establishments of Ancient Rome and the United 
States of America. Those among them who were claimed as contributors to the heritage 
of ‘Western civilization’ were exceptionalized, by their being redeemed by an idea.43 
The remainder were disadvantaged by the same civilizational discourse. The conviction 
that Ottomans were ‘radically alien’ was a necessary one. It provided the sustenance 
‘Western Civilization’ needed, to maintain its self-ascribed identity by proxy of the 
other that was its most familiar unfamiliar. The narrative had no room for an Ottoman 
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nation, not the least because an Ottoman nation would have entailed the political 
allegiance and natural national belonging of the heirs of Greco-Byzantine and Christian 
culture, which ‘Western Civilization’ had traced its own heritage to, to what was neatly 
ascribed the identity of foreign subjugator. 
The House of Osman was not the only designated-foreigner in historical 
deliberations about the nature of the Ottoman state. Since foreignness is relational, 
members of its constituency were, by extension and default, also foreignized due to 
their purported antipodality to the State that demanded their default allegiance. The 
foreignization of indigenous members of the Ottoman state in outsider (-insider) 
recollections have, until recently, produced interpretations that have equated the 
Ottoman historical existence with a yoke that suffocated the self-determination of 
various ‘national’ groups. One cannot dispute this notion purely on the grounds that 
nations are constructed. The present intellectual landscape concedes that Man can 
indeed exist without his Shadow44 and “nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a 
universal necessity.”45 Yet, neither now nor in the Ottoman age of nation formation 
could the intrinsic value, fundamental necessity, or subjective reality of one Man’s 
Shadow be disputed or objectively denied by another, especially by one that was 
considered an other. The latter could only resolve to persuade the Man that he had 
mistaken his Shadow. It follows, therefore, that the Ottoman state was obliged to 
negotiate the features of its identity in relation to domestic communities whose 
members were either suspected of being united by, or evaluated as being susceptible to, 
independent national aspirations. In other words, for the sake of self-preservation and 
protecting Ottoman territorial integrity, those who sought to uphold their hegemony had 
to reformulate the nature of the State from the perspective of those who it exercised 
power over but had begun to consider it a violation of the aforementioned national 
principle: rule by a foreigner. By rational and ideological means, the State tried to 
convince the constituency that they were the same and thus shared the same, Ottoman, 
Shadow. The Ottoman effort to convince its domestic constituency that it was not 
violating a fundamental nationalist principle necessitated that it gear its efforts to stave 
off indigenous foreignizations. 
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The Sense of Foreignness versus the Condition of Being a Foreigner  
The study of foreigners and migration in the modern framework of rational national 
identity formation, as agents and phenomenon that grant access to the complexity of 
governance and official ideology, cannot be expected to bear meaningful fruit if those 
who wield authority and yield the power to formalize the rules are viewed in reductive 
terms. To first and foremost identify the nature of Ottoman rule as nothing more than 
six hundred years of occupation—and the House of Osman and its state apparatus as the 
perpetual suppressor of various national awakenings—blurs domestic and foreign. 
According to this interpretation, and in view of an attributed or veritable discord 
between one’s political and sentimental belonging each set of actors, depending on 
perspective, can attest or be imposed an identity easily characterized as embodying 
foreignness, e.g. the Ottomans ruling class, the peoples bound to their political 
authority, and those beyond the jurisdiction of the Ottoman state’s laws.  
There is a profound distinction that needs to be addressed between the sentiment of 
feeling foreign to (or in) one’s own state, and the state of being a foreigner in the setting 
of an alien state. The difference in the modern era is encapsulated in a necessary act. To 
achieve harmony in legal and sentimental existence, one who feels foreign to the state 
that has de facto claimed his/her natural-born allegiance is obliged to “relinquish… [it] 
according to conditions that are determined by the law.”46 Much of the historiography in 
the field of proto-/national identity formation in the late-Ottoman context has focused 
on the practical outcomes of the former, sentimental, condition (e.g. best encapsulated 
by irredentism in the nineteenth century), which, at times, materialized in the attainment 
of the aforementioned harmony in the actualization of alternative states. By contrast, 
those whose natural-born status fell into the latter category of legal foreigners have been 
relatively overlooked.47 Historiographically visible (legal) foreigners within the late-
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Ottoman state are recalled to be, for the most part, Great Power nationals who 
reinforced the dilemma of the sentimental foreigners’ lack of belonging. What is foreign 
has therefore been limited to assumptions arising from self-referential assessments that 
presume the existence of clear binaries within Ottoman society, inadvertently feeding 
into discredited narratives that emphasize a select set of sentimental foreigners’ closer 
association with alternative externalities. An equally limited set of ‘foreigners’ allows 
for the mutual reinforcement of both identities, set in struggle with a condensed ‘other.’ 
The resultant dialectic, which resembles a cultural diaspora amongst the makers and 
inheritors Western civilization, echoes how post-colonial cultural identities have been 
formulated elsewhere. 48  In the imagination of both the engineers of Great Power 
metanarrative and particular sentimental foreigners, the latter were suspended between 
a single, joint, cultural heritage that was interrupted and awaiting release for, finally, 
‘becoming.’ 
The historiographical neglect of legal ‘foreigners’ as contributors to the formation 
of the Ottoman nation, as identities the State collided with and individuals it propagated 
belonging to, is partially due to the overwhelming focus dedicated to natural-born 
contenders for the same, ‘foreigner,’ title. Summarily, the ethno-religious nature of 
irredentist nationalisms that gained momentum in the nineteenth century rendered some 
indigenous communities as the most consequential foreigners in conversations to be had 
about Ottoman nationality. The frequency with which one encounters the compound 
descriptive ‘minorities and foreigners’ in discussions about late-Ottoman society aptly 
demonstrates that these two groups were attributed an identity (often by themselves as 
much as by outsiders) that had the power to convince and maintain the assumption that 
each were more similar to each other than either was to the Ottoman—neither really 
belonged where there were found. This assumed, perhaps counter-intuitively, a very 
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narrow identity for both ‘minority’ and ‘foreigner.’ The scholarship has come a long 
way since Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis jumpstarted a conversation in 1978 that 
materialized as the collection of essays in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: 
the Functioning of a Plural Society. More crassly, until Ottoman society was given the 
benefit of a more complex nature over the last few decades and until contemporary 
millennial scholarship considered the intentions and, more importantly, participation of 
diverse actors for/in a plural society as being genuine.49  
 The ‘minorities and foreigners’ designation has historically taken for granted the 
notion of a neatly compartmentalized society by overwhelmingly anticipating a 
Christian identity for ‘minorities’ and a Great Power one for ‘foreigners.’ One can see 
this blatantly articulated, without qualifications, even in the Great Power press. In 
covering the restoration of the constitution in 1908, for example, the London Daily 
News wrote a few words on Ottoman demography. It spoke of a “large Christian 
population whose pride it is to consider itself European”50—though not all Europeans 
considered the ‘Christian population’ their fully-fledged equals. There were exceptions 
to the trend of a predominantly Christian foreignization, to be sure. Muslim Ottoman 
Arabs, for example, gradually became self-/attested foreigners as well. If one were to 
observe historical productions of the era under study, the ideological vestiges of which 
are still at times discernible in contemporary historiography that nevertheless aims to 
transcend them, it becomes evident that from the nineteenth until late twentieth century, 
Jewish nationals and Russian Muslim immigrants,51 for instance, were somewhat less 
legitimate members of the ‘imagined community’ of ‘minorities and foreigners.’ 
Full access to membership in the imagined community of ‘minorities and 
foreigners’ entailed the invention of a link between the two constituent components. 
The link assumed the guise of a real and/or mythological shared civilizational heritage. 
From a more pragmatic angle, it additionally allowed for the exploitation of this Greco-
Roman civilizational trajectory (already created in the Enlightenment) for the benefit of 
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mutual interests. It was this link that created the circumstances in which Ottoman 
minorities could easily become artificial foreigners. If they thence remained in the 
Ottoman dominions, their newly acquired foreign status in their host-cum-home land 
allowed for them to benefit from extra-territorial privileges.  
The transition of an Ottoman ‘minority’ into an artificial ‘foreigner’ transpired as a 
form of ‘protection.’ Because of the dynamics of civilizational value and status, and the 
power relations that are inherent in this paradigm, the benefit of a fluid identity was not 
granted to all equally. Regarding those to whom it was granted, it was an open secret 
that the system was exploited. Favors begot favors. Great Power agents and 
representatives were not implicated en masse, however.  
Some of the diplomats found the capitulatory system frankly embarrassing. Arthur 
Hardinge once complained about its abuse, saying the spirit of the rules was being 
broken to support ‘Levantine adventurers’ who had little or no affiliation to 
Britain. He recalled dealing with one claim on behalf of a resident in Galata ‘who 
bore the scarcely Anglo-Saxon surname of Dimitrake.’52  
Protégé claimants of capitulatory privileges were also a source of agitation for some 
members of the natural-born foreign national community. As were legitimate claimants 
of capitulatory privileges within the Ottoman dominions, they often complained of the 
foreignization of the indigenous as well, as it could also be interpreted as a dilution of 
their status, and civilizational stock. Indigenous Ottomans transitioning into artificial 
foreigners meant that they acquired a status reserved for natural-born legal, ‘European,’ 
foreigners. Protégés thereby carried the potential to denigrate Great Power nationals by 
indexing them with ‘Oriental’ natives who were, according to some, less worthy 
relatives of Western Europeans with whom they shared a cultural heritage but 
nevertheless had evolved beyond.   
Natural-born Ottomans being considered artificial—sentimental—foreigners or 
becoming actual foreigners presented a roster of difficulties for the Ottoman state. First 
and foremost, it was a symptom of the severity of the State’s competition with the Great 
Powers over the loyalty of a natural-born constituency, whose sentiments of belonging 
the government was incessantly trying to attach to the Ottoman state. Internal social 
dynamics were shuffled when certain communities or causes were privileged over 
others, solely based on the impression of a shared civilizational trajectory. For instance, 
                                                
52 A. Hardinge, A Diplomat in the East (London: Cape, 1923), 13, in John Burman ed., Notes 
From Constantinople: The Political Diary of Sir Nicholas O’Conor Britain’s Ambassador to the 





some have attributed the Jewish ‘decline’ at the turn of the nineteenth century to 
“structural changes caused by increasing ties with Europe...Greeks and Armenians may 
have replaced prominent Jews in trade, fiscal and monetary matters during this century 
because Europe preferred to deal with Christians.”53  External meddling in internal 
affairs also exacerbated communal conflicts. In the Balkans and eastern Anatolia, for 
example, the impetus for implementing the 1878 Berlin Treaty’s provisions was timed 
according to “international pressure.”54 It followed that local communities responded to 
local events in eastern Anatolia based upon what they had interpreted to be analogous 
circumstances for what had transpired in the Balkans. In other words, the 1895 promise 
of reforms in the region the Great Powers lexicologically foreignized in its local context 
as “Turkish Armenia”55 was seen by Muslim members of the community as “a prelude 
to Armenian independence ... which would force the Muslim majority either to live 
under a Christian authority or to abandon their homes and villages to resettle in Muslim 
lands—as thousands of Muslims from Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Balkans had 
already been forced to do.” 56  Aside from shuffling social dynamics, Great Power 
intervention in the Ottoman domestic sphere was presented practical difficulties for the 
State.  
In an era in which the Ottoman state was attempting to register citizens, Great 
Power embassies were among the many forces that contributed to the infamous 
inaccuracies of the Ottoman censuses, as they denied their hosts the opportunity to 
conduct full count of those within the territories. The Ottoman state had reserved the 
right to ‘assume’ the Ottoman nationality of anyone resident within the dominions with 
the final article (Art.9) of the Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi of 1869 (Ottoman 
Nationality Law).57 The individual was designated the responsibility to prove his/her 
foreign nationality—via documentation—to be excused from taxation, military service, 
or evade the jurisdiction of Ottoman laws and tribunals, etc. While Great Power 
embassies tried their nationals and protégés in their own embassy courts, they 
additionally claimed that it would be too difficult to enforce the request of the Ottoman 
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government to have those who claimed to be foreigners (and thus above Ottoman law) 
to prove it through legalized residence permits before Ottoman public administration 
and tribunals in the capital and the provinces; the order was circulated to the embassies 
in May 1887 by the Grand Vizier, in conformity with the Nationality Bureau.58 The 
detriments of such resistance to the modernizing Ottoman government’s ability and 
distinguish its legal constituency from extra-legal ‘foreigners,’ to register and assert 
authority over its populace (a portion of whom chose to remain hidden from the State), 
was exacerbated when the Great Powers would not disclose how many of their nationals 
were in fact resident in the sultan’s dominions. When the Ottoman government 
conducted its first censuses, “foreigners were excluded owing to protests from foreign 
embassies at being counted.” 59  The inability of the Ottoman government to assert 
uncontested authority within its own dominions over the domestic constituency it was 
laboring to maintain hegemony was a continuous challenge that created loopholes for 
exploitation by various interested parties. 
Because of the privileges that accompanied protégé status, trends in swapping 
identities among conceptual ‘minorities and foreigners’ were observably unidirectional. 
‘Minorities’ more often became ‘foreigners’ than vice versa. This is not to say that the 
converse, i.e. the Ottomanization of the foreigner, did not occur. Rather, those who were 
(self-) categorized as members of the imagined ‘minorities and foreigners’ community 
sought to maintain their distinctions against the Ottoman state and constituency, which 
also served to reinforce the notion that there existed similarities (product of the 
aforementioned constructed civilizational link) between themselves and members of the 
‘minority’ community they protected. Great Power nationals explicitly maintaining their 
nations could elevate their social status and allow them to reap more practical benefits. 
It also simultaneously reiterated the unfeasibility and unnaturalness of the notion that 
those their home states ‘protected’ and the occupier of the protected could share the 
same (national) identity. But Great Power nationals were not the only foreigners—and 
neither did all Great Power nationals seek belonging in the ‘minorities and foreigners’ 
community. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, while those who could 
be considered minorities had access to becoming foreigners, in the expansionist context 
of the Hamidian regime, foreigners were not encouraged to seek membership in the 
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‘minority’ communities of Ottoman society. They were encouraged to become 
Ottomans, sans qualifiers.  
The identifiably reactive element in the State’s drive to forge a collective and 
popular Ottoman identity contributed to, and was contributed to by, the intensification 
of the pronouncement of indigenous foreignness. The ideological conceptualization and 
practical achievement of the Greek nation in 1821, for example, certainly predated and, 
even, in part, prompted the formulation of the Ottoman proto-nation. Like every other 
post-Ottoman collectivity, (modern-) Greek national identity was constructed in contrast 
to an Ottoman other. It hearkened back to the ancient glories of a pre-Ottoman past,60 
and the narrative emphasized that Ottoman occupation had arrested Greek civilization— 
almost unaltered in its construction, this charge was subsequently extended to the 
broader Balkans, 61  and, later, the Arab provinces, as well. 62  Because the Ottoman 
project was designed for the sake of domestic unity and preservation, it competed with 
and aimed to render obsolete alternative politico-national belongings. So the Ottoman 
state did construct its national identity, i.e. its Shadow, partially as a pre-emptive 
measure to counter further domestic foreignizations. This was ever-more urgent since 
these sentiments were both fostered and exploited by competing external Powers who 
imposed on the Ottoman state social, political, economic, legal, and moral conditions on 
the pretext of protecting ‘minorities.’ It was a self-legitimating cycle that necessitated 
the visibility of the latter group to justify its ‘protection’ by a Great Power government, 
colonial agent, or representative, which, in turn, spoke to the self-interest of each 
participant while simultaneously feeding the homeland metanarrative of the ‘Civilizing 
Mission.’ One manner in which the State could counter foreign intrusion, domestic 
foreignization, and nation formation, and simultaneously respond to the void that had 
emerged with the deterioration of the ‘old belief-system’ was to rationalize. 
The Ottoman resolution for the ‘void’ that had emerged with the apparent 
unsustainability of the legitimacy basis of traditional authority was the gradual 
rationalization of the State’s structure and legal framework. Most polities that tackled 
modernity textualized their respective states for internal and external consumption. That 
this was the standard nineteenth-century response is evidenced, among other means, by 
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the abundance of nationality laws produced in its latter half. Governments aspired for 
standardization and mechanization—this required the strict identification of distinct 
components and their functions within a would-be efficient machine. Thus, in a manner 
that applied the utilitarian achievements of the Industrial Revolution to statecraft, the 
State, its powers and their jurisdictions, its nationals, their rights and duties, and the 
State’s responsibilities to the aforementioned nationals, etc., were intricately defined. 
The nation was a deliberately manufactured product. It was necessary for distinction to 
be addressed—both from within and without. The former would have to be diluted 
while the latter could be exaggerated by contrast. The vividness of the ‘other’ validated 
and preserved the ‘self.’ The nation materialized as the difference of the two values. 
This task was especially daunting for the Ottoman state. The silhouette of its Shadow 
was meant to encapsulate, and thereby unify, multiple types of diversity. The Ottoman 
nation considered all present and owing allegiance at the time of its declared intent ‘to 
be’ a national entity as members, despite the fact that there were those within who 
claimed and/or were assigned the identity of an ‘other.’ It thus becomes necessary to 
consider precisely whom the Ottoman state defined as a member of its constituency—
and, by extension, their ‘others’—within its legal framework. 
The making of the Ottoman state and its nationalism has most often been studied 
from within; the Ottoman state has been evaluated in relation to its self. Ottoman 
nationalism was conjured in the second quarter of the nineteenth century to convince the 
(then-) subject population of unity within the framework of a modernizing Ottoman 
state that was learning to speak the language of ‘nation.’ Ottomanism, as a nascent 
ideology for a collective identity, was the official response to the State’s collision with 
the newly emergent ‘modular’ phenomenon of nationalism, which was “capable of 
being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of 
social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political 
and ideological constellations.” 63  Ottomanism was not solely a unifying doctrine, 
however—not over the course of the Hamidian years, or before. The overwhelming 
attention that has been focused on measuring the State’s ability to appeal to the 
foreignizing members of its indigenous constituency through an appeal to Ottomanism 
has neglected the manner in which the State conceptualized its nationals, contra actual 
foreigners. This has concealed features of the ideology that had could have been geared 
                                                





for offensive purposes. Sometimes, these active Hamidian enterprises have instead been 
evaluated as an alternate ideology altogether, e.g. pan-Islamism. 64 
Analyzing the Hamidian state’s accommodation of im-/migrants reveals that over 
the course of the reign of the last absolute Ottoman dynast, the State was expansionist. 
Its ideology was articulated through a malleable Ottomanism that had graduated from a 
proto-nationalism to a fully-fledged nationalism less than a decade prior to the 
accession of Abdülhamid II. By the commencement of his reign, individual members of 
the (superficially) interconnected collective had come to occupy a dominant—though, 
not uncontested—place in the Ottoman metanarrative and cultural intertext. The 
previously established Ottoman identity was also vague, however, for it needed to 
qualify a diverse populace. Because the legal definition of an Ottoman was created in 
contrast to legal (non-sentimental) foreigners and was simultaneously designed to avert 
indigenous foreignizations, an Ottoman was an ambiguous specimen. While Ottoman 
identity was neutral, however, its accompanying ideology of Ottomanism could be 
refined to suit the interests of the State according to domestic and international 
circumstances. It allowed, for example, the Hamidian regime to recruit ideological 
adherents on an extra-territorial platform—this was especially tactful when, the 
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platform was an urban metropolis of a Great Power state, as one of the forthcoming 
chapters will demonstrate. While the regime was constructing its image from a 
defensive position in the face of indigenous foreignizations (including its own) it was 
nevertheless able to improvise offensive international policy on the ideological level, all 
the while actively dictating the construction of a modern and fluid Ottoman national 
identity. Over the duration of the Hamidian years, the ambiguity of Ottoman-ness 
promoted expansionism more than exclusivism. 
The Ambiguity of Ottoman-ness  
States the modern era in resolved to maintain hegemony and bargain for political 
and ideological loyalty by weaving the interest of individuals into those of the State. 
The intellectual frame of reference that drove the Ottoman age of reform was one that 
acknowledged, a priori, the status the individual had attained. The State could not 
expect loyalty of the individual without addressing the latter’s expectations from the 
State. Promoting a sense of belonging therefore necessitated fostering the conviction 
within individuals that their Ottoman state, whose nationalism they would be 
subscribing to, would account for the rights of each member within the greater 
community. 65  The quintessence of the shift to a rational framework with the 
Revolutionary Age was precisely the need to respond to an awakening that had swept 
the sentiments of the subject masses: their loyalty could no longer be taken for 
granted—thenceforth, it would only be expected in exchange for secular, citizen, 
guarantees. 
The process of rationalization was one avenue that the “partnership”66 between the 
individual and the polity found expression in. Rationalization entailed the explicit 
articulation—in a mutually binding charter—of the reciprocal obligations and 
responsibilities of the two contracting parties. Accordingly, the Hatt-ı Şerif-i Gülhane 
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(Edict of the Rose Chamber) of 1839 inaugurated the ‘Tanzimat’ Era (literally, 
‘reorganization’) with the State’s declaration that individuals were entitled to certain 
guarantees: life, honor, property, and freedom from arbitrary rule. Its precepts were 
formalized with the 1856 Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict). Two decades later, the 
Constitution completed the process of weaving the interests of the entire constituency to 
the interest of the State. All Ottomans were declared members of a collective entity, to 
be stakeholders in the Ottoman state on an individual basis. The State had met the 
challenge of modernity, at least theoretically, with the declaration that all were entitled 
hürriyet-i şahsi (individual liberty) in the ninth article of the Kanun-i Esasi 
(‘Fundamental Law,’ i.e. the Ottoman Constitution).67 On this path and in synchronicity 
with its neighbors, the Ottoman state was decidedly invested in the project of nation 
formation, even if its product struggled to universally convince the constituency.  
The rationalization of the Ottoman state required each contracting party to be 
defined. The advent of the political individual necessitated the State to endeavor toward 
the erasure of communal identities. Due to the diverse nature of those the Ottoman state 
wanted to maintain hegemony over, members were defined in conveniently vague and 
static terms—summarily, they were ethno-religiously neutral. The 1869 Tabiiyet-i 
Osmaniye Kanunnamesi (Ottoman Nationality Law) had defined those who were, were 
not, could become, and could re-become Ottomans. It had done so solely in relation to 
what it was to be an Ottoman (and, by extension, a non-Ottoman). The law thus only 
specified two modes of being: Ottoman and foreign. In reformulating itself to address 
the individual in a manner that would be inclusive of each pre-existing subject member, 
the potency of the former basis of the Ottoman state’s legitimacy was diluted. Among 
these factors was its possession of the caliphate, the symbolic status of the House of 
Osman in the umma’s imagination, and its role as protector of the transnational faithful 
within its borders, and beyond. From the Islahat Fermanı onward, the role the State 
adopted vis-à-vis the populace over whom it yielded authority “differed from the 
Islamic legal and political theory according to which the ethos of the State is justice not 
equality of all subjects.”68 The equalization of the constituency thus threatened the 
authority and prestige of the House of Osman in the eyes of some of the members of the 
very same communal entities that had legitimated its historic rule. The Constitution that 
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was drafted by the Tanzimat bureaucrats and declared by Abdülhamid II sought to solve 
this conflict by reintegrating the Ottoman dynasty’s legitimate authority vis-à-vis the 
umma into the rational framework of the State. 
The Constitution reiterated the individual belonging of each ethno-religiously 
neutral member to the Ottoman state on an equal basis. Since the implications will be 
further emphasized in following chapters (e.g. “Chapter I: Migration in a Rational 
Framework”), it suffices here to state that the Constitution reasserted the House of 
Osman’s caliphal claims (Art. 3 and 4),69 and declared Islam to be the religion of the 
Ottoman state, all the while maintaining the freedom of religion for its constituency 
(Art. 11).70 While reclaiming his spiritual authority on a transnational platform, the 
Constitution allowed the sultan to speak to his constituency of ambiguous and neutral 
individuals as their temporal authority. In the domestic realm, the two discourses 
merged when they found a single expression in being addressed to the Muslim 
constituency—the sultan was their temporal and spiritual authority. They were the 
recipients of two symbiotic, but distinct discourses. It is precisely because the 
formulation of Ottoman national identity over the course of the Hamidian regime (and 
beyond) has been observed from the perspective of domestic legitimation policies, that 
the bifurcation of sultanic authority has been overlooked. From this domestic 
perspective, not only have the foreignized non-Muslim constituents been viewed as the 
most consequential ‘others’ of the generic Ottoman, but, also, the Muslim core-
constituent has been regarded as the model Ottoman. This perspective has put forth the 
argument that the Hamidian vision of the nation was exclusivist in privileging (Hanefi-) 
Sunni-Ottomans. This was not a “fusion of state and faith,” 71  however. That the 
Constitution officially formalized the two’s division, for good, is observable in the 
State’s engagement with legal foreigners.  
The exception to the historiographical neglect of migration in the formulation 
Ottoman proto-/national identity has been refugee migration from the lost territories of 
the dominions. It is not surprising that the inclusion and resettlement of Muslims into 
the shrinking territories has buttressed the thesis of the (Hanefi-) Sunni Ottoman being 
the model Ottoman, according to the late-Ottoman state. The phenomenological 
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consequence of the Crimean War (1853-56), Russo-Ottoman War (1877-78), and the 
Berlin Treaty (1878) for the Ottoman state was an influx of millions of (mostly Hanefi-
Sunni) Muslim refugees into the shrinking borders, which significantly increased the 
demographic impact of this group. While the newly independent provinces retained the 
previously Ottoman Christian population, a substantial proportion of Muslims were 
driven into dominions. The aftermath of these events meant that the composition of the 
remainders of the Ottoman state became, demographically, more Muslim. Because the 
new demographic realities were not the consequence of an active policy that was the 
expression of the State’s will to have a more Muslim state, however, to overemphasize 
refugee migration in national identity formation risks false considerations. The State 
became more Muslim because it was unable to retain its pre-dominantly Christian 
provinces, despite its will to do so. It is only the State’s response to the phenomenon 
that can be evaluated for this purpose. Its settlement of refugees in non-Muslim regions 
can and has been read as an expression of the desire to thin the concentration of non-
Muslims in certain regions, for example, when “the State sought to normalize the status 
of tens of thousands of Muslim refugees from the Caucasus and southeastern Europe 
[who were] ... settled in sensitive (mixed) areas to help bolster the Muslim balance of 
power...”72 While this kind of demographic engineering was certainly contrary to the 
‘ethos’ the State propagated itself to espouse, the increased proportion of Muslims 
originating from the former territories within the geographically shrinking state cannot 
factor into how the State formulated the identity of its constituency or its nation. 
Refugees were already Ottomans—they had already factored into the Ottoman 
formulation before resettlement. Ottoman refugees were therefore not the others of 
indistinct Ottomans. 
The foreigners pressured by the Hamidian regime to naturalize reveal more about 
the features of the regime’s vision for its nation. As it will be argued in the following 
chapters, in this realm, the Hamidian state operated on the principles inherent in the 
Nationality Law and the Constitution. The former defined the identity of the Ottoman 
‘self’ and its ‘other.’ It dictated the status of resident foreigners and articulated 
                                                





conditions for naturalization.73 The presence of an unidentifiable number of foreigners 
within the domains presented an obstacle for the State—it could not exercise absolute 
authority over the population within its territories, because its laws did not pertain to 
those who were claimed extraterritorial status. It is counterintuitive for modern states 
undergoing centralization, nationalization, and homogenization efforts to promote a 
high volume of foreigner presence. The State has little to no authority over these 
individuals, who, nevertheless, make a profound social-economic and politico-economic 
impact, all the while benefiting from citizen benefits without making citizen 
contributions to the general welfare of the State, e.g. through either military service or 
tax obligations. It was the ambition of the Hamidian regime “to prevent the proliferation 
of foreigners.”74 It could be interpreted to be especially damaging for the interest of the 
State if these foreigners enjoyed capitulatory privileges that elevated them above 
Ottoman law and provided them with better economic incentives than their indigenous, 
national, counterparts. It was in the State’s interest to have citizens rather than 
foreigners; its ultimate aim was the latter’s naturalization, however, not expulsion. 
Regarding the application of the precepts of the Nationality Law, this research has 
not found evidence that Hamidian state denied naturalization to any individuals based 
on a discernible Sunni-Ottoman ‘exclusivist’ agenda. Aside from the cases that are 
referenced here, Malte Fuhrmann’s studies on the underworld of Ottoman port cities has 
demonstrated that the State had room Great Power prostitutes and pimps, who “took on 
Ottoman passports”75 to avoid their home states’ harassment and extradition orders. 
They were not Sunni. They were used as pawns do demonstrate to the Ottoman public 
Western degeneracy and immorality. They were part of the contest to reclaim 
“territorial sovereignty”76 in the face of the Ottoman state being denigrated to the semi-
colonial status of losing supremacy (e.g. economic) within its own domains. Whatever 
the reason, these Great Power outcasts could nevertheless become Ottomans. Non-
Muslims did not need to be excluded from potential membership for the State to 
maintain a predominantly Muslim constituency. If there existed a ‘bias’ to naturalize 
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more Muslims as Ottomans, this would have occurred through the application of Article 
4, through which the State reserved the right to give Ottoman citizenship to those who 
had not met other articulated conditions. 77  Article 4 would have only expedited 
becoming an Ottoman, however, as membership was accessible to anyone after five 
years of residence. The argument that the Hamidian regime was not pan-Islamist, and 
was—to some extent—exclusivist is accepted; the debate here is whether these features 
can be traced to the Nationality Law.  
The Nationality Law did not dictate migration in the Hamidian Era; it dictated 
status. Operating in a quasi-secular realm, citizenship status located the de facto 
belonging (and, thus, allegiance) of neutral citizens and foreigners, in relation to the 
Ottoman state. The Nationality Law laid out the conditions for how to become an 
Ottoman. So long as applicants met the criteria, the Hamidian regime did not deny their 
ambition for belonging—in fact, it promoted it. The Nationality Law operated with the 
intent of serving the interest of the State in a secular framework (and was couched in the 
same rhetoric). Additional bilateral agreements (e.g. capitulatory agreements and the 
certain prohibitions according to origin state) particularized the treatment a foreigner 
could expect while within the Ottoman territories, so long as s/he was not seeking 
citizenship. With regard to foreigners who had crossed Ottoman borders and were 
within the dominions, the Hamidian regime’s response could only be reactive. Its 
reaction was confined to operate within the precepts of the laws that had rationalized the 
State before the accession of Abdülhamid—he was bound to them, even as “the ruler 
who represents the last example of personal rule in the empire.” 78  Hamidian 
Ottomanism, so far at it was operating within the territories and according to the legal 
framework, was a secular and egalitarian nationalism that conceived of an Ottoman in 
ethno-religiously neutral terms. Needless to say, these were not its only confines.  
Hamidian nation formation and its accompanying Ottomanist nationalism were 
guided by the principles inherent in the Constitution as much as the Nationality Law. 
The former dictated the ideology of the Hamidian regime, and the latter outlined its 
secular identity (of the individuals and the collective they composed). Together, they 
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allowed the Hamidian regime to operate in two realms, the practical implications of 
their to representative discourses only merged in the natural-born Muslim constituency. 
Regarding foreigners as potential-Ottomans, members could be recruited to the nation-
under-formation on a transnational platform by channeling the established and 
legitimated ‘Fundamental Law’ of the land. The Nationality Law, on the other hand, 
dictated the terms and procedures of their naturalization.  
That the Hamidian regime took heed of what was articulated in the Constitution has 
been generally disregarded. Abdülhamid’s declaration of it and the convening of the 
Ottoman Parliament were quickly followed by one being suspended and the other being 
prorogued. Despite this, the argument that the Hamidian regime had no interest in the 
Constitution has to be approached skeptically. Many of the principles enshrined in it 
were still adhered to over the course of Abdülhamid’s autocratic rule—not the least 
because they were not original to the Constitution but were a part of the inheritance of 
the Hamidian State. Aside from those articles of the Constitution that repeated 
constituency rights that had already been legitimated by the Rose Chamber and Reform 
Edicts, the charter had textualized the Sultan’s symbolic roles for global consumption. 
Most principally, the Constitution re-integrated the role of the Ottoman sultan as the 
caliph of all Muslims in the rational framework, this time in a contract whose adherence 
and integrity was to be defended on a universal scale (e.g. by the Great Powers). It had 
been accepted and hailed by the national and international community, and its principles 
had thereby been textualized and legitimated. The Hamidian regime needed to convey 
some semblance of loyalty to the Constitution’s essence; “[t]he sultan knew the contents 
of the constitution better than his opponents.”79 It had value for the Hamidian state, 
which is why it was annually printed in the Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye (the 
Yearbook of the Sublime Ottoman State). It is in light of this that it becomes significant 
to note that “in the crisis of 1876 to 1878 Abdülhamid felt his way gradually—first 
weakening the constitutional draft, then getting rid of the chief supporters of the 
constitution, then proroguing the chamber sine die, but never abolishing the constitution 
[emphasis added].” 80  Thenceforth, Abdülhamid tailored himself as a benevolent 
sovereign and labored to render sections of the constitution (e.g. representative 
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government) obsolete by seemingly-providing his constituency with the secular 
guarantees it promised, personally. 81 He took a similar approach to the caliphate. 
The Hamidian regime engineered the bifurcation of official Ottomanism and 
thereby advocated belonging in two spheres. 82  The Nationality Law governed the 
condition of being an Ottoman in temporal terms—the Hamidian state did not contest 
the static and ethno-religiously neutral identity that was rationalized for active 
nationalization in the decade that preceded its ascent. The Ottoman Constitution that 
was declared upon the commencement of Abdülhamid’s reign, however, did allow the 
State to develop official Ottomanism with expansionist ambitions. As a malleable 
ideology, Ottomanism could be fine-tuned to promote a certain type of neo-/citizen over 
another, depending on the platform upon which it was employed. In short, following the 
formalization of the separation of faith and state ensured by the Constitution, the 
Hamidian regime solicited extraterritorial adherents (inclusive of those who were 
territorial) for Ottomanism on divine authority.  
Abdülhamid II was able to propagate belonging for extraterritorial adherents based 
on divine appeal, and utilize the same discourse for his domestic Muslim constituency, 
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without contradicting the State’s modernizing identity. The Constitution had rationally 
reaffırmed his distinct, protective, role regarding the umma; ideological recruitment 
methods relied upon the sanctified status of Abdülhamid as caliph of the faithful. While 
the Hamidian state was bound to the faithful application of rational law in naturalizing 
all foreigners, irrespective of race or creed, it also assumed the role of custodian and 
promoted a sense of belonging for the transnational umma, without necessarily 
promoting its members’ migration to the Ottoman domains. Rearing Ottoman loyalists 
out of hostile state nationals allowed the State to retaliate in the game of cultural 
imperialism. In the event that seeking harmony between sentimental and national 
belonging prompted an individual’s relocation into the sultan-caliph’s dominions, the 
State switched to the rational framework and requested national loyalty in addition to 
ideological adherence (which was assumed as already secured, a notion the State could 
not take for granted regarding its domestic constituency). Upon relocation, those who 
were recruited as extraterritorial Ottomanists were treated on equalized terms with 
Ottomans and would-be Ottomans already within the dominions, where national interest 
overrode all other factors. 
The Hamidian regime ensured that a Muslim populace remained the dominant 
identity of the Ottoman state—within a sea of ethno-religiously neutral Ottomans. It 
achieved this through formulating an expansionist trans-/national official Ottomanism 
while remaining within the confines of rational laws that preceded and dated to the 
commencement of the era. The Hamidian state solicited extraterritorial adherents based 
on caliphal appeal that was legitimated by the Constitution. While it could promote a 
certain type of immigrant through tailored ideological recruitment methods, it could not 
manipulate demographics by denying belonging to those who had met the conditions 
articulated by the Nationality Law. Neither could the State explicitly privilege Muslims 
over non-Muslims in the law’s implementation. The Nationality Law was severe in its 
treatment of those who rejected their natural-born Ottoman status, who, over the course 
of the Hamidian years, were more often non-Muslims than Muslims. It still was not 
exclusivist, however, since unlike other nationality laws that will be evaluated in a 





of those who rejected Ottoman nationality, neither did it impose ‘dependent citizenship’ 
on Ottoman women.83 
This study of the phenomenon of migration into the ‘well-protected domains’ in the 
last Ottoman century concedes continuities between the Tanzimat, Hamidian, and 
Young Turk eras. If there were shifts in the ideological trajectory to maintain hegemony 
by consent,84 they, too, were confined to maneuver within the confines of a new rational 
framework that the State was obliged to acknowledge and give semblance of loyalty to. 
The Ottoman state benefited from the evolution of the legal system because it made the 
process of centralization and nationalization more efficient; the system was its tool. The 
State had the potential to serve and be served by a textualized, organic, legal system,  
If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilisation and of 
citizen (and hence of collective life and of individual relations), and to eliminate 
certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its 
instrument for this purpose.85  
In other words, the law is able to normalize a new status quo for the civil society that 
reinforces the State’s position of dominance over it. Law also accumulates and is 
inherited, however. The government that is in a position to dictate new legal realities to 
serve its own benefit for the totality of the temporal continuum that begins with its 
accumulation of power and reaches forward into the future, for which it wants to 
guarantee its position, cannot achieve consent without upholding its legal inheritance. 
The Hamidian regime, therefore, could not expect voluntary legal obedience if it was, 
itself, arbitrarily—unjustifiably and unpunctually—86negligent. 
                                                
83  The Ottoman Nationality Law did, however, acknowledge the validity of ‘dependent 
citizenship’ by allowing recourse to natural-born Ottoman status for women whose marriages to 
a foreigner were dissolved, in the event that she had been imposed the nationality of her 
husband by the other state’s law. For an evaluation of dependent citizenship in the Ottoman 
frontier-zone context, see Kern’s Imperial Citizen and “Rethinking Ottoman Frontier Policies.” 
84 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 12.  
85 Ibid., 246.  
86 Whether the act was premeditated or not, Abdülhamid II suspended the constitution and 
dissolved parliament at a moment that would have made it plausible to assume that, for him, 
“the parliament was more of a hindrance than a help to the national cause.” See Rogan, The Fall 
of the Ottomans, 3. In the context of the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman, for which he had already 
successfully galvanized the core-constituency through his singular, caliphal, call for jihad, 
popular opposition to absolutism would have been unlikely—especially given the fact that the 
still-novel constitution’s declaration was, itself, not considered to be the will of the people. It 
was the will of the interested-bourgeois intellectual elite, who had been educated at Tanzimat 
schools to become members of the governing bureaucracy but were denied a say in any of its 
affairs, and was expressed at a moment that betrayed submission to direct and indirect Great 
Power pressure. The unfeasibility of gathering public or international support for the opposition 





The migrant prism elaborates on an essential feature of the Hamidian regime. It 
adds nuance to the State’s temporal, practical, and ideological investment in the 
construction of an Ottoman citizenry and official nationalist ideology. Both operated 
within the confines of an inherited rational framework and legal principles, prior to the 
collapse of sultanic authority. Expressly, the Hamidian regime formulated an Ottoman 
nation that it could neither seal nor declare. The explicit declaration of the nation would 
have undermined the regime, since the act necessitated a cathartic moment in which 
sovereignty would be transferred from the sultan to the nation (in the form of 
representative government—or at least a semblance of it). As long as the Hamidian 
regime formulated a malleable nationalism, constructed the nation, but did not seal the 
nation through its declaration, the Ottoman state remained open to outsiders. It was 
expansionist. 
The Sealing of the Nation 
Nations are sealed through cathartic moments that are later (re-) fashioned as the 
(symbolic) triumph over the oppressive force that had inhibited self-actualization at an 
earlier juncture, i.e. the moments that mark a mythic rupture and are conjured for 
ceremonies and invented traditions that retrospectively legitimate and affirm the 
naturalness and inevitability of imagined communities. As it has been argued, while the 
Hamidian regime formed the nation, it could not seal it. The catharsis would have 
undermined Abdülhamid’s absolutist rule; it necessitated a victory for sovereignty of 
the nation. The official Ottomanism of the Hamidian regime was instead tied to the 
sovereign, himself. The anniversary of Gazi Sultan Abdülhamid Han II’s accession was 
announced in the native press as an event to be rejoiced and treated as a “holiday [by] ... 
citizens, young, old, man and woman... each individual honored to rise to 
Ottomanism.”87 The sultan was the proclaimed monarch of every Ottoman national and 
extraterritorial adherent. The Ottomanists’ chant was formulated with a possessive; it 
emphasized their personal relationship with the dynast: “padişahım çok yaşa” (“long 
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live my sultan”). 88  Thus, while the Hamidian state built a relationship with single 
individual Ottomans, the Young Turk Regime attempted to create a single, coherent, 
national entity out of them. While the Hamidian regime fashioned a ceremony (e.g. 
holiday) for the nation out of the sultan’s accession, the Young Turk regime created a 
national holiday for the Ottoman nation.  
On 23 July 1908, a rebellion that began in Macedonia three weeks prior had 
snowballed its way to the Ottoman capital in the form of a revolution. The sultan 
resolved to “follow the current;” 89  he restored the Constitution and reconvened 
parliament. While it may have been “a reflection of how few people bothered to read 
the heavily censored Ottoman press that it took a full twenty-four hours before the 
public reacted to the news,”90 on the twenty-fifth hour, the preceding day’s events were 
interpreted as a triumph for Ottoman liberalism. The Constitution was celebrated by the 
Ottoman constituency—domestic, exilic and diasporic, from Istanbul to the Americas—
91 along with members of the international community. It is argued herewith, that the 
constituency who was once asked to ‘rise’ for Ottomanism could not have ‘risen’ to the 
Ottoman ‘nation’ on 24 July so enthusiastically if the decades of Abdülhamid’s rule had 
not managed to foster and formulate a viable collectivity of individuals, inclusive of 
naturalized foreigners, unified in their sentimental belonging to the Ottoman state; it 
was they who responded with ‘euphoria’92 to the cause and prospect of the transfer of 
sovereignty from absolutist dynast to the body they composed. 
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The (semblance of the) transference of power to the collectivity of individuals (i.e. 
the nation) that had been negotiated and formed over the course of the Hamidian 
years—also by contrast to external others (e.g. foreigners)—materialized in the moment 
of the retrospectively ceremony-able ‘catharsis’ of 1908. It was subsequently 
memorialized, in 1909. The triumph and the sealing of the nation is observable in an 
addition made to the Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye between the 1326 (1908/09) 
and 1327 (1909/10) volumes. The Ottoman constitution 
was the State’s modern “expression of political 
independence.”93 It had additionally declared the rational 
existence of state and citizen. While it duly made its 
appearance in each and every volume of the Salname 
printed over the course of the Hamidian years, the Salname 
of 1327 (1909/10) referred, for the first time, to an 
Ottoman nation (Image 1). The memorialization of its 
sovereignty was devoted an entire page—the volume’s 
only page in color (red). 94  Beneath a single star and 
crescent, it read: “İyd-i Milli Osmani Temmuz 10” (Ottoman Nation/-al Holiday 10 
July).95 It celebrated the declaration of the Ottoman Constitution, but, significantly, it 
also preceded the Constitution in the actual volume. The individual citizens that had 
been defined to be in the process of forming an Ottoman nation over the course of the 
preceding decades finally constituted an acknowledged—representable—member of a 
defined unified collective. They were denominated the ‘Ottoman nation,’ and were to 
take precedence. The nationalism that had been forged throughout the Hamidian years 
had formally ‘engendered’ its nation. The sealing the Ottoman nation subsequently led 
to a transformation of its identity; it was no longer ‘suspended.’ Like all nationalisms 
that meet their nations, it became inward looking and sought to protect and reinforce a 
declared identity that became more narrow, and, hence, ‘exclusivist.’ 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis argues that the national identity synthesis achieved by the Hamidian 
regime revealed itself in the dialogical zone of the liminal stage of the ‘foreigner’—
existing between migration and naturalization. The central argument is that the regime 
was fully invested in forming a nation, though, adamant about not sealing it. 
Furthermore, the Hamidian state’s propaganda apparatus simultaneously propagated 
Ottomanism in two realms: territorial and extraterritorial. The argument commences 
with a discussion of the rational framework inherited by the State.  
“Migration in a Rational Framework” traces the revision of the State’s relationship 
with subject-cum-citizens at the juncture of modernity. This juncture is defined as the 
historical moment when the State had to reckon with the ‘individual’s’ acquisition of 
the power of political consequentiality. This chapter thus traces the development of 
Ottoman national identity formation through the proliferation of those whose interests 
were woven into the interest of the State from the 1808 Sened-i İttifak (Deed of 
Agreement) until the 1876 Constitution. The latter declared all Ottomans to be 
stakeholders in the welfare of the State. It is accepted here that “national identity is an 
abstract concept that sums up the collective expression of a subjective individual sense 
of belonging to a socio-political unit: the nation state.”96 Following this assumption, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion on Ottoman nationalism.  
Ottomanism, as the State’s official nationalism, was the ‘bias’ the State had to 
‘mobilize’ in the hearts and minds of its constituency. Its function was to naturalize the 
populace’s (primary) sense of belonging to a very particular collective consciousness: 
the one engineered by the State to reinforce its hegemony over the seemingly new 
collective (i.e. the refashioned old collective). In other words, for the State to maintain 
its capacity to exercise ‘radical power’ over a ‘conflict’ and ‘non-conflict’ temporal 
continuum, masses had to feel what the decision-makers (i.e. the State) “want[ed] them 
to feel:”97 What the what the Hamidian regime ‘wanted’ them to feel was a sentimental 
attachment to the Ottoman state. The fostering of this sentiment was channeled through 
legal, literary, social, political, and media appendages that were entrusted with the task 
of ‘securing’ the people’s “compliance by controlling their thoughts and 
desires…thought control takes many less total and mundane forms [than ‘Brave New 
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World and the world of B.F. Skinner’], through the control of information, through 
mass media and through the process of socialisation.”98 It is granted that one of the 
ambitions of Ottomanism was to halt domestic foreignization. 
“The City, Incomplete” focuses on Istanbul as the chosen site from which to 
observe the impact of the collision of the State’s apparatus, the domestic constituency, 
and elements that are pronounced as ‘foreign/er.’ The dynamics of the city echoed, 
though in concentrated and exaggerated form, the crescendos and diminuendos of inter-
/national affairs. To a certain extent, the flexibility of the State in its own capital 
measured the power it wielded over its own affairs. Great Power influence and 
competition were so ubiquitous in Istanbul, that some perceived that “foreign intrigue 
was [even] evident in the palace.”99 Contestation with Great Powers over the Ottoman 
constituency’s loyalty was pronounced to an extent that allowed Tahsin Paşa, an aide 
and presumed confidante of the Sultan, to defame an adversary on precisely this basis. 
In his post-Hamidian memoirs, Tahsin Paşa questions the loyalty of Hacı Ali Paşa, a 
palace-insider and supports his allegation with the statement that Adam Block, a British 
Embassy representative, had on one occasion told him that Hacı Ali Paşa was “one of 
ours...[they] claimed ownership.” 100  Significantly, Ottomans observed and were 
observed in Istanbul—the State was very much aware. The State’s functioning in the 
city can therefore provide a lens through which one can observe how it wanted this will 
to be perceived. This chapter introduces the will of the State and its vision for a nation 
by analogy: of the State’s engagement with the city’s many names.  
The Hamidian regime asserted ownership over of all manifestations of identity. 
That it sought to ultimate authority over both material and symbolic identities is evident 
in its responses to the existence of multiple signifiers for the seat of its authority. Like 
all words, each lacked innocence. 101  Nevertheless, the State did not force into 
circulation a single name for the city. Instead, it usurped the social existence of each 
appellation as an expression of its own multiple identities. Rather than challenging 
those among them imbued with an inherent capacity to express a position contrary to its 
own interest, the Hamidian regime upheld and perpetuated the Ottoman tradition of 
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taking active—and ultimate—ownership of all the city’s names. It was the will of the 
Hamidian state to circulate both the signifier Ko(n)stantiniyye (City of Constantine) and 
its potential challenger, Dar ul-Hilafet-i Aliyye (Gate of the Sublime Caliphate), among 
others. Each was utilized according to how the State wanted to position itself in relation 
to the intended audience. Abdülhamid thus upheld the House of Osman’s tradition of 
propagating itself as both the conqueror and the inheritor of Byzantium. 102  The 
connotation of the conflicting meanings conveyed in the multiplicity of the city’s 
appellations was less significant than the final surrender of each, to the Ottoman state. 
The chapter continues with an elaboration on the features of the most visible and 
discussed foreigners within the Ottoman dominions: Great Power nationals. 
“Transcending Borders, Negotiating Identities” challenges images conjured by the 
word ‘foreigner’ in the Ottoman historical context. While the preceding chapter’s focus 
was on Great Power nationals who conform to the image of ‘the foreigner’ in the late-
Ottoman capital, this chapter introduces a Great Power national who was not an 
ideological agent of her home state, Britain. On the contrary, she expressed her active 
opposition to the State that had claimed her natural-born allegiance by seeking 
belonging in the sultan’s dominions. The chapter evaluates the successes of extra-
territorial Ottomanism by demonstrating how the tangibility of the sultan-caliph was 
promoted in the late-nineteenth century Anglo-Muslim (convert) community of 
Liverpool, England. An analysis of the rhetoric employed in the community’s press 
reveals a significant attachment to the Ottoman nation-under-formation. The tightening 
of the bonds between the Ottoman state and its extra-territorial, non-national, 
ideological adherents in Liverpool intensified in the 1890s and culminated at the turn of 
the twentieth-century—the timing makes it plausible that the Hamidian state was 
retaliating to the pressures placed on the Ottoman state by British politicians, 
missionaries, and public opinion. Anti-Hamidianism fuelled by “humanitarianism”103 
was eventually coupled with an increase in the severity of anti-Islamic sentiment in the 
British home state. The metanarrative gradually materialized into the social exclusion 
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and marginalization of the convert community, i.e. “the infidel within.” 104  Some 
members of the Anglo-Muslim community refused the terms imposed by their home 
state societies and pursued harmony in the ever-widening gap between their sentimental 
and national belongings, elsewhere. While the home state was rejecting them, the 
Hamidian state was prepared to offer benefits for religious and ideological allegiance.  
The Hamidian regime did not promote the migration of extraterritorial Ottomanists 
as a policy. It did nevertheless promote the idea of an open border and was prepared for 
their potential settlement in the Ottoman territories. A feature of the dynamics of 
nineteenth century Great Power modernity, civilization, and progress was that for 
women, ‘Western’ promises were often deferred in their homelands. Convert women 
were defeated twice: once on account of their gender and once on account of their 
chosen religion, the latter was interpreted by compatriots as a betrayal. With increased 
mobility in the nineteenth century, single lower-to-middle class women who were 
disenfranchised in their home state societies sometimes sought change and opportunity 
in the sultan’s dominions, irrespective of their religion. The arguable difference between 
how the State responded to female Great Power outcasts and those among them who 
were converts to Islam was the resources the State was prepared to expend to ease the 
latter’s integration into the Ottoman society. Convert women felt entitled to ask for the 
State’s help solely on account of their conversion. Anticipating them eventually 
becoming citizens, the State provided them with services that were ordinarily 
considered citizen-benefits (e.g. shelter, allowance, free education for their children in 
public schools). According to the stipulations of the nationality laws of their natural-
born states, Great Power women who married men of other nations were rejected from 
their nations. Those among them who married Ottoman men joined the Ottoman nation. 
Thus with the addition of those unconvinced by competitors’ nationalist and 
civilizational rhetoric, the Hamidian state grew.  
“Multiple-belongings, Long-Distance Nationalism” takes Iranians living within the 
Ottoman dominions as its focus. Through this lens, it engages with historiography that 
has argued for the exclusivist nature of the Hamidian state and its legitimation policies. 
It concedes that the Ottomanization of Islam under the reign of Abdülhamid II was, as 
has been argued elsewhere, not a pan-Islamist venture. The chapter challenges, 
however, the assertion that the policies directed at Iranians is demonstrative of this. 
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Despite the fact that measures such as the 1874 prohibition of marriages between 
Ottoman women and Iranian men were couched in a language that stresses preventing 
the spread of Shi‘i Islam, it is argued that the Hamidian state’s ultimate aim was to 
secure national interest. The achievement of this aim outweighed other considerations, 
e.g. including alterations in religious demographics.105 This is demonstrated through the 
debate that the punishment for the ‘crime’ of Ottoman women marrying Iranian men 
(with appears to have garnered greater energy than prevention) actually only ensured an 
increase in the number of Shi‘i Ottomans. The penalty was the maintenance of the 
Ottoman nationality of the woman in question and the extension of her nationality to her 
offspring. It is further argued that this imposed retention of natural-born status for 
Ottoman women and its inheritance by her illegal offspring was instead motivated by 
the opportunity afforded by the timing of the Ottoman Nationality Law with respect to 
the rationalization of Qajar identity. As stated in the first chapter, most states adopted 
nationality laws in their processes of legal rationalization in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, most Great Power states included a dependent 
citizenship clause, which ejected women and their offspring from the nation upon 
marriage to a foreigner, stating that the woman becomes a national of her husband’s 
state.  
The Ottoman Nationality Law did not discuss the nationality of Ottoman women 
who married foreign men. The Nationality Law only gave Ottoman women recourse to 
re-claiming natural-born status it in the event of having lost it upon marriage to a 
foreigner, which would have been imposed by the husband’s state rather than the 
Ottoman. The law could therefore not fight for Ottoman women who married Great 
Power nationals, for example. The law on the status of Qajar nationals, on the other 
hand, was passed after the one dictating the status of Ottoman, on 7 August 1894.106 
Because both the Ottoman Nationality Law and the marriage prohibition (that upheld 
the natural-born status of Ottoman women who married Iranian men) pre-empted the 
dependent citizenship clause later imposed by the Qajar state, the Ottoman state was 
able to fight for Ottoman women who married Qajar nationals, adopt the illegal 
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offspring of the unions, and make the adoption of Ottoman nationality of the husbands 
an imposed and necessary condition for the preservation of the family unit. Summarily, 
confronted with the choice of Shi‘i Ottomans and Shi‘i Qajars, the Hamidian regime 
preferred the former. The State could (try to) register them, and subsequently validate 
its authority to exercise power over them. Qajar nationals within the dominions lived 
beyond Ottoman jurisdiction. Thus with the addition of those whose religious adherence 
challenged the Hanefization-Ottomanization efforts of the regime, the Hamidian state 
grew.   
“The Hamidian Vision of the Nation” is the concluding chapter of this thesis and 
puts forth the simple argument that the last Ottoman dynast to be able to exercise 
absolute power before the collapse of sultanic authority put national interest above other 
factors. Upholding national interest was perceived to entail the continuation of the 
centralization efforts that had commenced at the turn of the nineteenth century. The 
urgent task was the Ottomanization of the domestic constituency—the achievement of 
all within the dominions being accountable to the State in a social, legal, military, 
economic, and political capacity. Due to external and internal dynamics, some members 
of the constituency became sentimental foreigners and sought alternate belongings. 
While negotiating the impact of multiple foreignizations (including its own) within the 
dominions and failing to persuade “crucial local factors”107 (for reasons that include the 
reintegration of the State’s religious identity into the rational framework), the Hamidian 
regime nevertheless constructed its formal identity solely by contradistinction to legal 
foreigners. It is argued in this chapter that ‘faith and state’ were not ‘fused’ over the 
course of the Hamidian years. Instead, the separation of the two was formalized. 
Thenceforth, they operated in distinct—yet, complimentary—spheres. That ‘faith and 
state’ only merged in being directed at the Sunni-Ottoman component of the 
constituency is revealed in the State’s accommodation of foreigners. In this domain, the 
State did not exhibit exclusivist tendencies. Instead, because the Hamidian regime was 
not sealed and had room to grow, it grew, all the while coming to terms with loss. 
Though its territorial integrity was challenged, the State expanded demographically and 
ideologically by recruiting foreigners—both as extraterritorial Ottomanist allies, and as 
new members of the Ottoman nation-under-construction. 
                                                





Nationality is the relationship each individual has to 
a state...108 
Migration in a Rational Framework  
The question of how foreigners were considered in the processes of Ottoman identity 
formation over the course of the Hamidian years first needs to address how the State 
defined a foreigner. And answering this question necessarily begins with how the State 
defined an Ottoman. While Sultan Abdülhamid has been granted significant agency and 
credit in personally shaping the collective identity of state and nation over the course of 
his three decades in power, it is often taken for granted that the non-constitutionalist 
sultan had to nevertheless navigate within the confines of legal precedence that had 
been established prior to his accession. Abdülhamid may have been the “last Ottoman 
sultan who had ruled with absolute power”109 prior to the collapse of sultanic authority, 
but he was still accountable and could not rule completely arbitrarily. In other words, 
regarding citizenship, Abdülhamid II did not have the power to define who was 
Ottoman and who was foreign. This chapter evaluates the Hamidian regime’s rational 
inheritance insofar as it concerns national identity formation. It also considers the room 
the formulation leaves for the interpretation that Ottoman nationality was exclusivist, 
especially in comparison to other late-nineteenth century nationality laws.   
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state became actively 
involved in the construction of an official identity for the Ottoman citizenry. From the 
inauguration of the Tanzimat (1839) onwards, Abdülhamid became the sole sultan able 
to consolidate absolute authority in the person of the dynastic sovereign. Whatever his 
fundamental vision for the Ottoman nation was, he could not disregard the fact that it 
had already germinated. The man “who was in effect the last real sultan of the 
empire”110 nonetheless inherited a rationalizing state. He therefore had to negotiate his 
own vision with the substantial headway his predecessors had already achieved in the 
forming of the modernizing Ottoman state and nation. Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the relationship between subject and sovereign had gradually transformed into 
a contractual one that was characterized by mutual rights and obligations. The process 
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had begun with the Sened-i İttifak (Deed of Agreement) of 1808111 and was ensured 
popularization with the promulgation of the 1839 Hatt-i Şerif-i Gülhane (Rose Chamber 
Edict) that marked the symbolic commencement of the Tanzimat era. The Kanun-i 
Esasi (‘Fundamental Law,’ i.e. Ottoman Constitution) was a culmination.  
Sultan Abdülhamid declared the Ottoman state’s embrace of a constitutional system 
almost as soon as he ascended to the throne. A Reuter’s Telegram reported on 1 
September 1876 that the “announcement of the deposition of Murad and the 
proclamation of Prince Abdul Hamid as his successor has been received with perfect 
tranquility on the part of the population;”112 The Constitution was declared by the end 
of the year.  In fact, Tanzimat bureaucrats had made Abdülhamid’s accession contingent 
upon his declaration of the charter and the date had been “fixed for the first plenary 
meeting of the Conference of Constantinople.”113 The role played by the bureaucrats in 
the ‘shuffling’ of sovereigns was no secret. The Edinburgh Evening News blatantly 
opined on the State of the Porte’s political affairs, which had rendered the Ottoman 
sovereign a “fictitious monarch”114 on the day of Abdülhamid’s accession ceremonies:  
...Murad was known to have a weakness for absinthe, but his madness did not 
appear till after his accession. Abdul Hamid is said to entertain a fondness for 
domestic pets, and for holding out a heavy chair with one arm; but it is also hinted 
that he detests the New Turkish Party, and is a devoted upholder of the old 
régime. Should Abdul Hamid desert his former innocent diversions, and proceed 
to amuse himself with the policy of obstruction, Midhat Pasha will no doubt find 
that he has shuffled the cards against himself, and made a bad change from idiot 
to fanatic. The task of king-making has always been dangerous; and the latest 
instance of the manufacture will not improbably fall within the rule.115  
It did not appear in the first few months of Abdülhamid’s rule that Midhat Paşa had 
“shuffled the cards against himself.”116 As 1876 was coming to a close Abdülhamid 
seemed to only affirm the impression he had given to Midhat Paşa on his private 
“interview”117 with him at his Musluoğlu residence. Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, who was 
Midhat Paşa’s son and, unsurprisingly, an opponent of the sultan, published an account 
of the meeting. He claimed that the heir presumptive had “promised [Midhat Paşa] all 
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and more than all that was asked of him. He pretended to opinions more advanced than 
the most advanced of his Ministers, and in favour of a more democratic Constitution 
than the one elaborated.”118 The Constitution was duly proclaimed in December 1876 
and the Russo-Ottoman War that commenced the following year became the context of 
its “strangulation,”119 in February 1878.  
Abdülhamid ruled with the Constitution in a state of suspension for thirty years. It 
will be argued throughout, however, that the principles of the charter had already been 
legitimated by the mere act of declaration and the Hamidian regime utilized those 
among them that most suited its own interests. The charter was not abolished, outright, 
because its utility for the regime could have only been exploited through a skillful 
manipulation of emphasizing the Constitution’s suspended status. The State therefore 
perpetuated the collective notion of its possibility of reinstitution, upon the emergence 
of suitable conditions. Despite the Constitution’s suspension, however, Abdülhamid 
could not disregard its citizen guarantees, wholesale and without justification. On one 
hand, formal constitutionalism and a parliamentary government were novel features for 
the Ottoman state, in 1876—both being instituted by the absolute sovereign upon 
accession. Given that they were perceived as the products of his personal beneficence, 
Abdülhamid could claim assert greater authority in determining their fate, and was 
afforded the opportunity of exceptional circumstances in suspending the former and 
proroguing the latter. Much of the structural centralization and socio-legal liberalization 
initiatives of the Tanzimat, on the other hand, had already been normalized by 1876 and 
“the sultan did not wish to be the uppermost patron in a patrimonial chain, but rather a 
unique patrimonial figure, ruling with the help of a rational bureaucracy constrained by 
laws.”120 In other words, Abdülhamid II inherited most of the reform-era obligations the 
State owed its new citizenry, and was bound to uphold them. 
Whether Abdülhamid II was ‘enthusiastic’121 about constitutional government, per 
se, many of the Constitution’s articles that addressed the citizens’ fundamental and 
universal rights (Art. 1 – 26) did not originate with the Constitution. Regarding the 
universal rights of citizens, the Constitution a re-iterated, collected, and formalized in a 
single charter many of the guarantees already promised to ‘Ottomans’ with royal edicts 
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on previous occasions. The same held true for the definition of an Ottoman; Article 8 
articulated that,  
 ... [A]ll individuals who are under the allegiance of the Ottoman state are 
designated as Ottomans, without exception, irrespective of whichever religion or 
denomination to which they belong—and the quality of being an Ottoman is 
acquired and relinquished according to conditions that are determined by law.122 
With respect to who was an Ottoman, and how this legal identity could be “acquired 
and relinquished,”123 the Constitution referred to a law that was external to it. The 
Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi (Ottoman Nationality Law) of 1869 had defined who 
an Ottoman was and stipulated the conditions for naturalization and ejection from the 
nation in the decade preceding the declaration of the Constitution. Throughout the reign 
of Abdülhamid II, citizens were made and unmade by adhering to the regulations of the 
Nationality Law and with the inherent acceptance of the validity of each component of 
the abovementioned Article 8 in the suspended Constitution.  
The Hamidian regime could not rewrite the definition of an Ottoman. The signifier 
and its signified had already been defined in every rescript addressing the nature of the 
constituency from the Rose Chamber Edict to the Constitution. The identity of the 
nation could still be shaped through demographics, however. In the zone of migration 
and naturalization, the State could not be ‘exclusivist;’ the law did not allow for that. It 
could instead influence the demographic composition of the constituency into congruity 
with its vision and achieve results superficially similar to those of exclusivist policies, 
through methods of positive discrimination. For this, the Hamidian regime diverted its 
resources to the official version of the ideology of Ottomanism, through which 
belonging could be promoted on an extraterritorial platform according to attributes that 
were propagated as shared between the State and its desired potential members. For 
better or worse, the timing, duration, circumstances, and nature of Abdülhamid’s reign 
afforded him the opportunity to be the sultan most heavily invested in the construction 
of an official nationalism and the formation of an Ottoman collectivity of individuals 
(i.e. a nation) at state level.  
Migration, the status of nationals versus foreigners, and the legal particularities of 
how they could swap identities through naturalization provides an additional lens from 
which to view the nature of the Hamidian vision for the nation. Of the many factors that 
set the parameters for national identity formation, that ‘an Ottoman’ was a neutral 
                                                






identity was of primary importance—citizenship could thus show no bias for potential-
/members. Secondly, waves of inward, outward, individual, and mass migration, 
compounded with borders and populations that shifted in the process of irredentism 
begetting nations, altered the demographic features of the Ottoman state. Finally, the 
State had to negotiate its interests in the face of the unrelenting challenge of not having 
jurisdiction over a significant minority of foreign/-ized residents within its borders, e.g. 
Great Power nationals and protégés. This meant that policy was shaped by the will to 
reduce the number of foreigners living within its domains. This was not, however, 
synonymous with the State’s desire for foreign individuals to vacate the dominions. 
Rather than pursuing their expulsion, the Hamidian regime’s preference seems to have 
been a reduction in the number of resident foreigners through naturalization. To 
accommodate all of these concerns, the Hamidian version of nation, national identity, 
and official state nationalism, as entities and ideologies under-construction, were 
necessarily dynamic, malleable, and continuously cross-referenced with the legal 
framework. In the meantime, the definition of a citizen remained conveniently vague 
and static. What emerges in the liminal stage of the ‘foreigner,’ specifically in the zone 
existing between migration and naturalization, is insight into a version of Hamidian 
Ottomanism as an expansionist nationalism operating in two realms. 
In order to evaluate how migration, national ideologies, and institutional 
rationalization interacted with one another over the course of the Hamidian regime, it is 
essential to look at the particularities of the Ottoman state’s legal framework itself, so 
far as they pertained to these three factors that affected identity formation in response to 
migration phenomena. There exists a plethora of persuasive Ottoman modernization 
theories, and a variety of dates to which the emergence of modernity has been traced. 
Among them, the one that dates the modernization process to 1808 will be chosen for 
the evaluation of nation building in relation to migration. Thus this chapter will 
highlight the concept of nation within the context of a rationalizing Ottoman legal 
system, and will trace its evolution from the Deed of Agreement through the 
Constitution. The Deed of Agreement was the first instance in which the Ottoman 
sultan’s power was restricted—his authority was no longer defined primarily by the 
Islamic precept of being a just, Muslim, ruler. The contract signed between Mahmud II 
(r. 1808 – 1839) and a fraction of the ruled formed a ‘partnership,’ thereby elevating the 
protection of the welfare of the State above other interests. With the theoretical 





expanded from being applicable to elite regional power-holders to all subjects. These 
principles were reiterated in the Hatt-ı Hümayun/Islahat Fermanı (Royal Reform Edict) 
of 1856. 
The knitting of the mutual responsibilities of sovereign and subject into the same 
fabric of the forming nation gradually included the stitches of all who were declared and 
defined as Ottoman citizens by the Nationality Law. Popularization, later reaffirmed in 
the Constitution, yet not forestalled by its suspension, was emblematic of the State’s 
intention of becoming a nation. Thus, over the course of six decades in the nineteenth 
century, the drive to transform the system of rule and the nature and definition of 
authority from a premodern to a rationalizing one had materialized for the Ottoman state 
some vital organs and the partial skeleton of modernity. Official Ottoman nationalism, 
“combin[ed] naturalization with retention of dynastic power, in particular over the huge 
polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages…stretching the short, tight, skin 
of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.” 124  In short, the State’s 
preoccupation with building an Ottoman nation made itself evident with the debut of the 
Nationality Law. The rationalization of the State would continue with future measures, 
in a state of co-dependency with maintaining the appeal of official nationalism. The 
most consequential among them was the 1876 Constitution.  
Contractual Relationships: the Transformation of ‘Subjects into Citizens’ 
Similar to many other states, the ‘long nineteenth century’ began for the Ottomans 
with more turbulence and uncertainty than it ended. In the aftermath of existential 
challenges that had severely threatened the State’s territorial integrity from within and 
without, the House of Osman, too, had to quickly come to terms with a “legitimacy 
crisis,” 125  that rippled through states and societies on a global level. The French 
Revolution of 1789 may have become symbol of this change, but it was not unique, as 
...[p]rotests of a similar nature featured in other European countries governed in 
absolutist style. The parallels between the preconditions, the foci of protest, and 
the effects of unrest thus support the validity of depictions of the 1789 – 1848 
period as a continental, rather than essentially “French,” Age of Revolution.126  
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While ‘the Age of Revolution’ swept the ‘continent,’ both its un-bordered impetuses 
and manifestations reached still beyond it. Other successful revolutions that attest to a 
radical universal shift in the dynamics of authority and power by the advent of the 
nineteenth century—that further de-exceptionalize Marianne—were the American 
(1775–1783), Haitian (1791–1804), and Liège (1789–1791); among the unsuccessful 
were the Peruvian (1780–1782) and Irish (1798). In addition to organized civil 
rebellions and armed uprisings that sought independence from existing authority, the 
turn of the century was characterized by the demands of ‘the masses’ for a change in 
their collective circumstances and accountability (e.g. peasant revolts under the Chinese 
Qing and Romanov dynasties). In this global climate, the House of Osman—a house 
divided by with internal feuds—entered this precarious ‘Age’ with stark new realities.  
As the eighteenth century was coming to a close and the nineteenth beginning, the 
Ottoman state had to reckon with internal challenges and external competition, both of 
which undermined the State’s right to rule over its territorial domains and its subject 
population. The stock examples for the external threats that challenged the state are 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and Syria (1798—1801) and the two Russo-Turkish Wars 
(1768–1774 and 1787–1792), which “ending in defeat for the Ottomans, undermined 
considerably the authority of the central government.” 127  The consequences were 
material and immaterial, e.g. aside from dealing the Ottomans major territorial and 
economic setbacks, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) allowed the Tsar to emerge as 
the protector of the sultan’s Orthodox Christian subjects. Mehmed Ali Paşa, the vali 
(governor) of Egypt, came to symbolize the greatest concession of Ottoman authority in 
the domestic sphere—a pragmatic one, since he was soon after used by the State to 
(momentarily) defeat another internal threat: the first Saud-Wahhab campaign to 
capture the Holy cities of the Arabian Peninsula (1802—1818). Other frequently 
referenced challenges arose in regions where groups such as local notables (ayans and 
derebeys) or janissaries had been able to foster legitimacy on their own accord over a 
century of decentralized administration, or where discontent with the corruption and 
injustice of the government or its representatives found expression in unrest, 
demonstration, and dissent (e.g. local militia uprisings against the janissaries of 
Belgrade, in 1804).128  
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The nineteenth-century challenges to the Ottoman state and its authority were not 
novel,129 neither was their simultaneity. Instead, novelty laid in the manner in which the 
State responded to them. The State’s engagement in a field of contest against its own 
provincial representatives who had accrued power over the course of decentralized 
decades obviated a bitter revelation. Not for the first time, it demonstrated that the 
State’s agents had been able to develop an independent power base by sustaining the 
legitimacy of their own local authority. Their interests were not by default aligned with 
those of the State; in fact, more often than not, they benefited from the decentralized 
status quo, at the expense of the State. Thus when the State took initiatives to adapt and 
change to protect its welfare, it found itself challenged by a number of formidable 
opponents acting out of self-interest. The methods of suppression or bribery that had 
been resorted to in previous centuries (e.g. the Celali Revolts of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries) were neither sufficient nor reliable any longer. Following the 
deposition of yet another sultan, i.e. “[t]he janissary-ulema revolt which ended Selim 
III’s rule in 1807,”130 which demonstrated the apparent incompatibility between the 
interest of the State and the authority of local power-holders, the early nineteenth 
century witnessed the introduction of a new solution to an old Ottoman problem: it 
sought to forge a ‘partnership’ to protect the State’s welfare, and thus shared power.  
The Deed of Agreement was the document that inaugurated the process of the 
Ottoman state’s institutional rationalization and centralization. The treaty “marked a 
turning-point in Ottoman history.” 131  Specifically, in the aftermath of Selim III’s 
deposition—itself a consequence of conflicting interests between the State’s reformist 
drive and the resistance of those threatened by its fulfillment—his successor, Sultan 
Mahmud II, resolved to issue an accord that ultimately tied to the State the interests of 
those with whom he competed for power. The coalition between the center and 
provincial leaders was part of a “partnership”132 initiative to “convert disunity into 
unity.”133  Thenceforth, with each social contract that followed, the numbers of the 
                                                
129  With the exception of the nature of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign, which has been 
described by Edward Said to be the instigator of modern imperialism, see Edward Said, 
Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979). 
130 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Social and Economic Transformation of Istanbul in the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History, 253. 
131 Ali Akyıldız and Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Negotiating the power of the sultan: the Ottoman Sened-i 
İttifak (Deed of Agreement), 1808,” in Amin, Fortna, and Frierson eds., The Modern Middle 
East, 23. 
132 Yaycıoğlu, “Sened-i İttifak.” 





sultan’s subjects shrank in proportion to the growth of his ‘partners’—at least in the 
texts he claimed to be accountable to.  
Contractually folding the Ottoman dynasty’s competitor’s interests into the interest 
of the State continued to grow with the Rose Chamber and Reform Edicts. The former 
symbolically germinated Ottomanism as a proto-nationalist discourse with the 
proliferation of those who became invested ‘Ottomans.’ The three subsequent decades 
witnessed the evolution of the proto-nationalism into a legitimate, expansionist, and 
official nationalism. The signifier had taken a departure from designating an individual 
who, as it was understood in the eighteenth century, “served the Ottoman state as a 
member of the ruling elite or askeri class, in return for which he received an income 
from the Sultan and was granted certain tax privileges.”134 With the Rose Chamber 
Edict, the essential nature of the ‘Ottoman’ identification had been remolded from being 
a designation for the elite to one that was granted—in theory—to all who owed 
allegiance to the sultan. As a proto-nationalist vision that emerged in response to both 
internal and external pressures,135  it promised equal protection and guaranteed life, 
property, and honor to the theretofore-unequal proto-citizenry it swiftly and sweepingly 
adopted. The subsequent landmark on the trail of Ottomanism’s evolution as an official 
doctrine, the 1856 Reform, patented the rationalization of Ottoman legal discourse and 
thereby directly challenged what the State had previously built its legitimacy on. It also 
“marked a new era: that of the secularization of law.”136 Expressly, while the Rose 
Chamber Edict “did not alter the Islamic basis of the State, as the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 
1856 and certain ensuing measures, did.”137 The maintenance of the territorial integrity 
of the State necessitated the legal assimilation and uniformity of the populace.  
The House of Osman’s nineteenth century initiative to form partners out of subjects 
confronted externally sourced obstacles. The protection offered by Great Powers to 
those born under the allegiance of the sultan and irredentist nationalisms, for example, 
were among the greatest challenges to the territorial integrity and domestic cohesion of 
the Ottoman state. The overcome such barriers to the maintenance of its hegemony, the 
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State had to conceptualize the nation-under-formation in a manner that would counter 
domestic foreignization by legally equalizing and making uniform the constituency, 
which made methods of inclusion the necessary course of action. The transformation of 
the ‘Islamic basis of the State’ therefore persisted when the Ottoman Nationality Law 
branded neo-citizens as ‘Ottomans’ on an individual basis—neutral in race and creed—
thus giving them an equal stake in the welfare of the new nation through personal 
affiliation in a collective popular and political identity. The State admitted duties to 
them in exchange. The Constitution both reiterated and thus further solidified the state’s 
existing guarantees to citizens and made new promises (e.g. representative government).  
The 1869 Ottoman Nationality Law in a Comparative Perspective  
It is necessary to briefly discuss how Ottomans are conceptualized for the era that 
preceded the establishment of the State’s formal definition of the identity in the 
nineteenth century, in order to see the level of congruency between our understandings 
of who an Ottoman was in relation to who the State’s. This is significant in light of 
migration, as preconceived notions of who constituted a natural member of the Ottoman 
constituency can influence interpretations of exclusivism versus inclusivism when 
considering migrants, as it can gear inquiry to evaluate the State’s relations with those 
migrants according to particularized attributions. In Hamidian-era policies, this has 
revealed itself in the placement of overwhelming focus on religious affiliation. As will 
be made evident, who the State allowed to adopt or repudiate its national identity had 
little to do with such attributes on the legal-institutional (versus ideological) level.  
Maurits H. van den Boogert has aptly referred to what can be considered the pre-
rational sentiment of an Ottoman collectivity as “Ottomanism avant la lettre.”138 In 
defining “homo ottomanicus,”139 Van den Boogert evaluates the features of Ottoman 
identity in terms of ‘constants’ and ‘variables.’ The most significant of the former are 
birthplace; language, affiliation, and taxation. 140  Rejecting the notion that ‘homo 
ottomanicus’ emerged simultaneously with ‘the Ottoman citizen,’141 Van den Boogert 
insists that the “archetypal Ottoman” did not “live in any particular period.”142 He 
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therefore establishes era as a variable, along with race, “profession, habitat, even 
gender.”143 These features of an Ottoman align with retrospective conceptualizations of 
who has come to be considered an Ottoman, in a post-citizen world, despite their 
transplant to a time when the state did not in fact consider its subjects as ‘Ottomans.’ 
Nevertheless, individuals exhibiting Van den Boogert’s constants were adopted by the 
state in the nineteenth century. Thus, whether they were considered as such prior to the 
advent of an ‘Ottoman citizen’ or not, there is coherence with his “Ottomanism avant la 
lettre’ and official Ottomanism, which made its debut with the Rose Chamber Edict and 
spanned through the ‘end of empire.’ What Van den Boogert describes, however, is, 
precisely, who was conjured by (inclusive) variations of Ottomanism—as an ideology. 
In other words, while a conceptual Ottoman may have exhibited the aforementioned 
constants, it was only one among them that had the potential (rather than guarantee) of 
making a legal Ottoman: place of birth. In the age of citizenship descent (from an 
Ottoman) was the only ‘constant’ that made an individual a natural-born Ottoman. 
The Ottoman Nationality Law articulated the official and universally accessible 
requisites of being and becoming an Ottoman in nine articles, from five perspectives. 
The Law based natural-born citizenship on the principle of jus sanguinis (hereditary, 
right of blood) and also gave access to membership based on jus soli (right of the 
soil).144 The incorporation of both principles reduced the odds of conflicting nationality 
laws producing stateless Ottomans. 145  The first article of the Nationality Law 
considered those who were born to Ottoman parents (or, an Ottoman father) to be a 
citizen of the “Exalted State,”146 the second gave access to membership within three 
years of reaching majority if born in the territories, and the ninth reserved for the 
government the right to assume, by default, the Ottoman nationality of those whose 
residence was within the sultan’s protected dominions (memalik-i mahruse-yi Padişah); 
                                                
143 van den Boogert, “Resurrecting Homo Ottomanicus, 11-13.  
144 For a discussion of the incorporation of these two principles in the Ottoman Nationality Law, 
see, among others, Campos, Ottoman Brothers, 61, Kern, Imperial Citizen, 16, Nazan 
Maksudyan, Orphans and Destitute Children in the Late Ottoman Empire (New York: Syracuse 
UP, 2014), 44, and Mutaz M. Qafisheh, The International Law Foundations of Palestinian 
Nationality: A Legal Examination of Nationality in Palestine under Britain’s Rule (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 29. 
145 For examples of statelessness due to the non-mutual-exclusivity of jus soil and jus sanguinis, 
see William Samore, “Statelessness as a Consequence of Conflict of Nationality Laws,” The 
American Journal of International Law 45, no: 3 (July 1951): 476 – 494. 
146 Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesidir, Atatürk Kitaplığı Belediye Osmanlı Kitaplığı: 0.3261.  





it was the responsibility of the individual to prove their non-Ottoman nationality.147 The 
third and fourth articles articulated how to acquire Ottoman nationality for those who 
were not born in the dominions, while the fifth and sixth concerned how to un-become 
an Ottoman.148 The seventh article stipulated how women who had lost their nationality 
due to the dependent citizenship clauses of the nationality laws of their husbands’ states 
could re-become Ottomans upon the dissolution of the marriage, and the eighth article 
specified the cases in which hereditary nationality did not apply.149  The House of 
Osman’s claim to generic citizens was based upon the notion that the individual and the 
State descended from the same territorial root. Accordingly, an Ottoman national was 
static and loaded with ambiguities when it came to the ‘constants’ of the individual. In 
fact, the only constant was that s/he was an Ottoman. The ambiguity of Ottomanness 
allowed for the state to pursue expansionist policies and to seek new members for its 
constituency.  
The process of foreigners becoming Ottomans was straightforward. If one was born 
within the Ottoman territories, one could to petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to become an Ottoman within three years of reaching majority (Art. 2); if born 
elsewhere, one had to meet a five year residency requirement (Art.3).150 The State could 
additionally confer Ottoman nationality to exceptional individuals, for whom the 
aforementioned requirements did not apply (Art. 4).151 If one applied without meeting 
the minimum residency conditions, their appeal would be rejected on that basis.152 The 
State does not seem to have expelled those whose application was rejected because they 
had not met the number of requisite years within the dominions. Neither does 
immigration seem to have been strictly regulated, since there were those who were 
resident for thirty years before applying for citizenship.153 Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests that those who met the conditions and applied for naturalization on the basis of 
the third article of the Nationality Law were granted citizenship, regardless of any 
ethno-religious or home state considerations over the course of the Hamidian years. 
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The Ottoman Nationality Law and official state nationalism under the reign of 
Abdülhamid II have been evaluated as ‘exclusivist.’154 Exclusivism has not only been 
assigned to the regime’s discourse and policies, but also the actual articles of the 
nationality law (that pre-dated the accession of Abdülhamid). ‘Exclusivist’ nationalism 
is often discussed in the context of states that are characterized in ethno-religiously 
hegemonic terms. 155  Understanding the nature of the State, i.e. whether it is an 
‘ethnohegemony’ or ‘accommodationist,’ is crucial, since  
...[o]ne of the most important aspects to examine in any political system, a sort of 
litmus test for the classification of a polity, is whether it allows members of a 
minority within it dual identity amounting to full acceptance by the larger political 
community as well as within their own particular ethnic community.156  
Accordingly, the presence of exclusivism in the State’s policies over the course of the 
Hamidian regime is interrelated to whether or not the Ottoman state permitted 
“members of a minority within it dual identity.” The Hamidian system’s ‘classification’ 
thus becomes even more significant in light of the fact that ‘dual identities’ in the 
Ottoman constituency, also during the Hamidian era, are almost a given. While the 
‘exclusivist’ premise about the nature of the Ottoman state gears complimentary 
interpretations for its actions, e.g. attempting to shed light on some violent ones 
undertaken by the State at given junctures, it can also be taken for granted.  
It is reasonable to assume that an ‘exclusivist’ state is more likely to promote 
‘exclusionary’ policies, which, compared to ‘assimilationist’ and ‘accommodationist’ 
nationalisms,157 “are the most violent.”158 In the analysis of a given state’s level of 
exclusivism, the definition of nation-/al are often conflated with official state 
nationalism (which is harder to define). The danger in this union is to miss the nuances 
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of their operations, on different realms with differing degrees of malleability and 
independent capacities. While the two can reinforce each other, they can as easily 
contradict one another. Though the domestic and international politics of an era can 
only be understood if approached holistically, it is useful to sometimes take things apart 
and study various components in their own right—from a comparative perspective—
before putting them back together and in their original context, again. The legal 
definition of nation-/al needs to be analyzed independently in order to determine the 
parameters in which the Hamidian regime was operating as it constructed its official 
nationalism. In other words, a state can pursue assimilationist, accommodationist, 
exclusivist, or exclusionary policies despite operating within the rational framework of 
an egalitarian civic nation. In his astute scholarship on the legitimation of power over 
the course of the Hamidian years, Selim Deringil has stated that an 
... ‘exclusivist’ tone is apparent in the very ‘Law on Ottoman Nationality’ (19 
January 1869), which states in Article 8: The children of one who has died or has 
abandoned Ottoman nationality, even if they are minors, are not considered to be 
the same nationality as their father and continue to be Ottoman subjects. 
(However) the children of a foreigner who has taken Ottoman nationality, even if 
they are minors, will not be considered the same nationality as their fathers and 
will be considered as foreigners.’159 
Michelle Campos has built upon Deringil’s argument of exclusivism by asserting that 
“several contradictory factors seem to have driven the Ottoman citizenship law.”160 She 
argues that,  
 ... the Ottoman citizenship law was not broadly pan-Islamic, for at the same time 
citizenship also aimed to further mark the border between Ottoman and non-
Ottoman Muslims, playing a particularly important role in the eastern frontier of 
the empire with Qajar Iran.161  
In other words, the Nationality Law needed to emphasize the distinctness of those living 
on each side of the Ottoman-Qajar border and bordered the umma along national lines. 
In the vein of Campos’ argument, it can be assumed that “the Ottoman state did not 
simply want to expand its Muslim population at any cost, and treated some groups of 
foreign Muslims with suspicion and distance.” 162  While this is certainly true, the 
lingering question is to what extent Islam was the determining factor in the treatment of 
these groups. Whether the State sought their assimilation, accommodation, or exclusion 
could help answer this question.  
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The Ottoman state was not pan-Islamist. Campos and Deringil are among those 
whose works have helped establish two important features of the late-Ottoman state. It 
sought the political assimilation of indigenous non-Muslims through their inclusion into 
the citizenry; and it constructed a dominant quasi-national Islam through the imposition 
of Hanefization and Ottomanization—processes that were certainly not concealed over 
the course of the Hamidian period. While the non-Pan-Islamist arguments are accepted, 
what struggles in the face of scrutiny is the role allotted to the actual Nationality Law 
within these policies and formulations. The nationality law was “not broadly pan-
Islamist.” 163  Neither was it exclusivist in any capacity beyond privileging generic 
Ottomans. Its mode of defining citizens was even contrary to former understandings of 
jurisprudence and their interpretation by generations of Ottoman ‘men of the pen.’ 
Throughout the history of the Ottoman state, legal theory and practice consisted of 
“systems and interpretations of Islamic law...they were all—usually and explicitly—
situated within the realm of fikh (Islamic jurisprudence), and believed to be in 
conformity with the şeriat (religious law/Sharia).”164 The Nationality Law, on the other 
hand, made absolutely no reference to Islam, its remits, or its umma. Thus Ottoman 
nationality, and the law that defined it, was not even particularly Islamic. A legal 
‘Ottoman’ was by necessity an otherwise ethno-religiously neutral political individual.   
The organic nationality laws of the nineteenth century legitimized the means by 
which common/customary law had previously claimed allegiance: jus solis and jus 
sanguinis. Sometimes they included a combination of both.165 As previously mentioned, 
the Ottoman Nationality Law employed both by claiming individuals born to Ottoman 
parents as Ottomans (Art. 1)166 and entitling those who were born within the dominions 
a right to membership (Art. 3).167 To recapitulate, the law stipulated that the State 
considered all within its political borders to be Ottomans, until proven otherwise (Art. 
9).168 Exceptions to hereditary nationality that have been used to support the assertion 
that the law was exclusivist concerned the offspring of those who had taken up another 
state’s nationality and had thereby lost their Ottoman one—in this case the children 
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remained Ottomans—the offspring of naturalized Ottomans would, in turn, have 
remained foreign (Art. 8).169 Article 8 is, indeed, a relative anomaly in that it presents a 
variance from the norms of Great Power nationality laws that extended the altered 
national status of a man to his wife and children, i.e. ‘dependent citizenship.’  
The implementation of the eighth article of the Nationality Law did not curtail the 
demographic growth of non-natural-born Ottomans, especially with respect to those 
who would have seemed to challenge the Hamidian regime’s presumed preference for 
Hanefi-Sunni-Ottoman exclusivism. If, for example, a married man who had one child 
was a national of state x and adopted the allegiance of state GP, and state GP’s 
nationality law enforced dependent citizenship, then state GP would automatically 
assume the nationality of all three individuals. The Ottoman Law did not comply with 
this. If the same individual became an Ottoman citizen, his child would remain a GP 
national. The status of his wife was not mentioned in the Ottoman Nationality Law. If 
the individual who had adopted GP nationality was, instead, a natural-born Ottoman, 
then, according to the Ottoman Law, his child was still considered an Ottoman, despite 
the fact that GP had adopted him/her. While the Ottoman law still did not stipulate the 
status of his wife, she would, again, be considered a GP national according to the 
dependent citizenship clause of GP law. On the face of it, the Ottoman set of regulations 
appears as though the Ottoman state resisted adopting the children of naturalized 
Ottomans. By the same token however, it refused to eject from its nation the children of 
natural-born Ottomans who are naturalized by other states. The Ottoman Nationality 
Law therefore gave priority to natural-born Ottomans. The religion or race of these 
Ottomans, however, has little to do with this preferential treatment, particularly since 
those who would have adopted foreign nationality in this period—along with their 
children—were more likely to be non-Hanefi-Sunni Muslims. And while the same law 
did not adopt the children of naturalized Ottomans, they would still be allowed to claim 
nationality on their own accord after five years of residence. Natural-born status was 
hereditary, but joining and leaving the Ottoman nation was more the prerogative of the 
individual rather than a family affair. The State did not reject the membership claims of 
those who had not expatriated themselves out of their own will. By this means, the 
number of Ottomans and their potential descendants was maximized. Given that being 
an Ottoman had no defined features other than being a member of the Ottoman state, 
                                                





whether the promotion of the hereditary aspect of nationality was a symptom of 
exclusivism will be debated in subsequent chapters.  
The Ottoman Nationality Law defined natural-born citizens in a manner similar to 
the Great Powers (aside from some hereditary aspects). The legal articulation of the 
quality of being a natural-born British subject began in 1350, with “[a] Statute for those 
who are born in Parts beyond Sea.”170 By the advent of the Hamidian era, those born 
within the dominions or beyond them to natural-born fathers were considered natural-
born Britons, along with those born on British ships (4 & 5 Geo. V, Ch. 17, Art. 1—a, 
b, and c).171 Naturalization by certificate became possible with the Aliens Act of 1844—
“prior to this act, nationality could be obtained only by special acts of Parliament or by 
letters of denization.”172 The 1870 Naturalization Act further specified regulations for 
naturalization and was later supplemented by the Aliens Act of 1905. The former (Arts. 
4 and 6) also allowed subjects to become expatriates through “a declaration of 
alienage.” 173  The Austrian Code of 1811—which defined nationals as the political 
possession of the political Austrian state, who were subject to its law—declared that 
nationality “belongs by birth to the children of all Austrian citizens ... place of birth had 
no effect on nationality” (Art. 28).174 In conjunction with the “principle of reciprocity” 
with Austria, 175 Hungary enacted its own legislation in 1879. It claimed the legitimate 
children of Hungarian men, the illegitimate children of Hungarian women (Art. 2), and 
the legitimated-illegitimate children of Hungarian men with foreign women (Art. 3).176 
Dependent citizenship translated into Hungarian nationality being extended to foreign 
wives (and offspring) of natural-born and naturalized Hungarians (Arts. 5 and 7).177 
Similar to the Ottoman Law, Article 19 entitled the State to assume the nationality of 
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those either born or “foundlings found in Hungarian territory and educated there”178—
until proven otherwise.  
Foreigners had to meet various conditions in order to become Great Power 
nationals. The most basic of the requisites was a minimum residency for a number of 
years. The Ottoman Nationality Law required five years of residency, and did not 
articulate additional conditions. According to the 1853 and 1896 Austrian legislation, 
individuals had to meet ten years of continuous, voluntary, retrospective residence (with 
exceptions, e.g. military service);179 over the course of this time, the applicant could not 
have “become a public charge.”180  Acquiring Hungarian nationality was not solely 
dependent on duration of residence either. 181  After five years of residence, 
“naturalization papers ...[were]...given only to persons”182 who were legally competent 
or had a representative (Art. 8.1), were (or were expected to be) registered as residents 
of a municipality (Art. 8.2), were financially self-sufficient and could meet “the 
standards of living in their place of residence” (Art. 8.5),183 and, with exceptions, had 
“been listed as a taxpayer for five years” (Art. 8.6).184 It required the individual in 
question to be “of good character” (Art. 8.4), to which no exceptions were articulated.185 
Similar to the Ottoman Law, the Hungarian Crown reserved the right to recommend 
individuals who did not meet the articulated conditions.186 If approved, the applicant 
was required to take an oath of allegiance within a year.187  
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century supplements to the nationality laws of 
some Great Power increased requirements for applicants, making the path to citizenship 
narrower. The British Aliens Act of 1905 that supplemented the 1870 Naturalization 
Act is a good example. The requisite time of residence for applicants desiring to become 
naturalized Britons was the same five years as the Ottoman and Hungarian—the latter 
required additional evidence of intention to either live in the dominions or, if abroad, to 
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serve the Crown (Art. 7).188 In the British case, if an applicant met the requirements, 
admission to membership became depended on the Secretary of State, who was entitled 
to deem whether the applicant’s legal assimilation was “conducive to the public good” 
(Art. 7).189 The Aliens Act of 1905 limited the ability of some individuals to achieve the 
requisite five-year residence, however, since it granted government agents “the power to 
prevent the landing of undesirable immigrants.”190 Article 1 defined undesirables: 
a. if he cannot show that he has in his possession or is in a position to obtain a 
means of decently supporting himself and his dependents (if any); or  
b. if he is a lunatic or idiot, or owing to any disease or infirmity appears likely to 
become a charge upon the rates or otherwise a detriment to the public; or  
c. if he has been sentenced in a foreign country with which there is an extradition 
treaty for a crime, not being an offence of a political character ... ; or 
d. if an expulsion order under this Act has been made in his case ...191 
The abovementioned grounds for being considered ‘undesirable’ were in overlooked in 
specific cases. An individuals could not be denied landing on account of not being 
financially self-sufficient or potentially incurring the State a cost, provided, for 
example, that arrival was motivated by the will to  
... avoid prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds or for an 
offense of a political character, or persecution, involving danger of imprisonment 
or danger to life or limb, on account of religious belief,192  
While the British government could champion itself as the protector of the freedom of 
conscience, the Aliens Act did condone expelling resident undesirables.193 Article 4 
declared that in the event of the expulsion of such undesirables,  
...the Secretary of State may, if he thinks fit, pay the whole or any part of the 
expenses of or incidental to the departure from the United Kingdom and 
maintenance until departure of the alien and his dependents (if any).194  
As of 1905, the British Crown was willing to bear the financial burden to protect its 
population from the potential legal assimilation of immigrants it deemed undesirable. 
Additionally, it specified conditions for the expatriation of natural-born citizens.  
States maintain(ed) the power to impose involuntary expatriation. Aside from being 
naturalized by or taking up arms for another state, however, few nationality laws 
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articulated specifically any other means by which such a circumstance could transpire. 
These were the exact means by which the Ottoman nation imposed involuntary 
expatriation. In the event that an individual was involuntarily expatriated, they were 
forbidden from returning to the sultan’s dominions (Art. 6).195 According to Hungarian 
Law, one could also lose their citizenship if they were “absent uninterruptedly from the 
territory of Hungary for more than ten years without the authorization of a Hungarian 
Cabinet Minister or of an Austro-Hungarian Minister.”196 Involuntary expatriation also 
occurred in less direct ways, however. Dependent citizenship allowed states to eject 
natural-born women who married foreigners from the nation by imposing on them 
alternate allegiances. 
Women who married foreign nationals in the nineteenth century were 
simultaneously faced with ensuring the likelihood of losing their natural-born 
citizenship. In the case that the state of their natural-born allegiance enforced dependent 
citizenship, the woman in question was more than likely to be ejected from her state 
and, in many cases (though not exclusively), adopted by her husband’s. This practice 
had no precedence in the European legal framework prior to the nineteenth century. 
Among the Great Powers, the French Civil Code of 1804 was the first to institute the 
annulment of citizenship for women (Arts. 12 and 19).197 Despite the fact that allegiance 
to the British Crown had been determined a hereditary duty/right since the 1350—52 
Act of Edw. III (St. 2)—a woman’s status had never been legally articulated to be 
dispensable until the 1844.198 The British law was still not quite as severe as the French, 
however; even in 1844 British law only referred to the nationality of a woman who had 
married a natural-born Briton. According to its conditions, the union entailed her being 
a naturalized Briton.199  
The British Nationalization Act of 1870 discarded, for the first time, the natural-
born rights of a woman who married a foreigner. She was thence “the subject of the 
State of which her husband is” (Art. 10.1).200 Subsequently, for the duration of her 
matrimony, she did not exist for the State; “married women were included in the list of 
persons under a disability who could not exercise the right to naturalization, being equal 
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in status to infants, lunatics, and idiots.”201 In short, she became an undesirable. If her 
husband should die, a formerly (natural-born) British woman had recourse to Article 
10.2, which “deemed [her] to be a statutory alien.”202 Article 8 permitted statutory 
aliens to apply for re-admission “on performing the same conditions and adducing the 
same evidence as is required in the case of an alien applying for a certificate of 
nationality.”203 Other Great Power states had similar conditions, some predating the 
British. Austria’s Imperial Patent of 24 March 1832 ensured that women marrying 
foreigners lost their nationality—“there was no other way of expatriation except with 
government authorization.”204  Austria’s dependent citizenship remained in force for 
women well into the twentieth century but was slightly altered by Paragraph 8 of the 
1925 Law to minimize the possibility of her being stateless. Therefore the supplement 
stipulated the woman’s nationality was with her marriage to a foreign national, “so long 
it is proved that she acquires by this marriage the citizenship of her husband’s state.”205 
The 1925 law further stated a woman would automatically lose her nationality if her 
husband lost his (Par. 9.2)206—this did have precedence in the legal framework of the 
nineteenth century. In addition to losing their nationality upon marriage, natural-born 
women were also often affected by changes in their husbands’ status. 
The nationality laws of most states dictated the status of a married woman 
according to her husband’s. Essentially, he had been granted the formal and explicit 
agency to impact the nationality of the whole family unit. Whether a married man’s 
change of nationality was voluntary or involuntary, his new status also generally 
affected his wife and children, “in accepting that women would lose their citizenship 
upon marriage, nations determined women’s citizenship rights in the service of the 
requirements of geopolitical concerns.”207 According to Hungarian law, if a man was 
‘released’ from citizenship upon request, his status was extended to his wife and 
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children (Art. 26 and 32), 208  and all ‘released’ individuals were required to leave 
Hungarian territory within a year of the certificate being issued.209 If a woman had 
attained citizenship because of her marriage to a Hungarian national, she could keep her 
naturalized status in the case divorce or his death (Art. 35),210 and a Hungarian woman 
whose nationality had been annulled could resume “Hungarian citizenship ... if the 
marriage has been annulled by the proper authorities.” 211  A woman who lost her 
citizenship by marrying a foreigner or by extension of her husband’s status, could “on 
her petition be reinstated into Hungarian citizenship, if judicially separated, legally 
divorced from her husband or upon the death of her husband, or if she has obtained city 
rights”212 (Art. 41). If her husband has been released due to in-/voluntary expatriation 
(e.g. ‘absence’ or ‘release’), the woman was protected only if the marriage was 
dissolved.  
The Ottoman Nationality Law did not impose dependent citizenship on women. It 
did, however, offer post-marriage women who had been affected by other states’ 
nationality laws recourse to their natural-born, Ottoman, status. They could reclaim 
their citizenship by petition within three years of the death of their husbands (Art. 7). 
The mere existence of Article 7 indicates that the Ottoman law “accepted the standard 
of dependent citizenship.”213 But it did not enforce this standard. Unlike the European 
standard, Ottoman Law did not actually specifically articulate that a woman would lose 
her nationality if she married a foreigner or that the naturalization of a husband would 
automatically be extended to the wife and children. In fact, the Ottoman state only 
addressed, in detail, the national status of a very particular set of Ottomans. And this 
was not through the Nationality Law, but a supplemental measure; “the only exception 
to the standard of ‘dependent’ citizenship was enacted on 7 October 1874 as the ‘Law 
Protecting the Prohibition of Marriages between Iranians and Ottoman Citizens’.”214 
The women who violated the prohibition and married Iranian men remained Ottomans, 
and their national status was extended to their illegal offspring.215  
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Regarding the status of women who married foreigners, the Ottoman Nationality 
Law less in common with the Great Powers with whom it competed and more in 
common with more distant counterparts. Latin American Nationality Laws were, by and 
large, far more liberal when it came to women. A woman losing her nationality as a 
consequence of marrying a non-national was not mentioned in Panama’s Constitution of 
1904, which also stipulated that a Panamanian father or mother (rather than father and 
mother, or just the father) made the offspring eligible for citizenship, thus giving 
women a legitimate role in constructing the constituency.216 The 1870 Constitution of 
Paraguay stipulated the same conditions. Furthermore, it rewarded immigrants who had 
married Paraguayan women, by reducing the duration of their requisite residency from 
two years to one (Art. 36).217 Women were not deprived of their natural-born nations 
according to the El Salvadoran Constitutions of 1872 and 1886, either. 218  Despite 
including some very strict regulations pertaining to foreigners, the State considered the 
legitimate offspring of foreign men and Salvadoran women as its nationals (as well as 
the woman’s descendants), along with illegitimate children of Salvadoran women (and 
the legitimate children of Salvadoran men) who were born abroad but not naturalized in 
their country of birth (Art. 42.2, 42.3, and 42.4). The Venezuelan Civil Code of 1904 
specified that women who married foreigners did not lose their citizenship, though 
foreign women who married Venezuelan men became Venezuelan (Arts. 18 and 19).219  
Not articulating on the status of women who married foreigners witnessed revision 
as the twentieth century progressed. “Difficulties”220 arose when non-mutual exclusivity 
of nationality laws engendered stateless women. Argentina, for example, eventually 
decreed that although its laws did not “include marriage among the ways of acquisition 
and loss of citizenship ... the foreign woman married to an Argentine follows the 
condition and status of her husband in her exercise of civil rights [emphasis added].”221 
Though the women could not be considered ‘Argentines,’ the State nevertheless saw no 
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cause for “objection to delivering them passports or other documents in place 
thereof.”222 The most nuanced treatment of women can be found in Japanese legislation: 
Law No. 21 of 1898 and Law No. 66 of 1899 made an exception for the status of 
women who were the “head of the house.”223 In most cases the Japanese law was 
consistent with Great Power nationality laws in that the status of women (and their 
children) were contingent upon and followed the status of the husband—whether 
becoming Japanese or adopting another nation (Arts. 8, 13, 15, and 18).224 The anomaly 
was a woman who was ‘head of the house’ did not lose her nationality upon marriage to 
a foreigner; her Japanese nationality was extended to her husband (nyufu) (Art. 5.2).225  
An evaluation of nationality laws contemporaneous with the Ottoman Law of 1869 
sheds light on relative degrees of inclusivity and exclusivity. Rationalization and the 
defining of the individual, because the individual became a political force the State had 
to reckon with, transcended oceans. It is also significant in light of migration to and 
from the Ottoman dominions. There was a significant Ottoman community in the 
America’s over the course of the Hamidian regime,226 for example, as well as Japanese 
residents of Istanbul.227 Nationality Laws factored into places that were considered for 
relocation. The Ottoman law falls on different points of the spectrum depending on its 
stance on who was considered a natural-born Ottoman, a potential Ottoman, and could 
be ejected from the Ottoman nation. The definition of who a natural-born Ottoman was 
remained hereditary. 
Much like the laws of other states the a priori determination of who could pass 
his/her Ottoman status hereditarily rested upon an antecedent declaration by the political 
state that all within the territorial dominions were bound to its authority and were also 
entitled to certain claims. In the Ottoman case, this formal declaration of who was under 
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the sultan’s jurisdiction on an equal basis, as an Ottoman, and could legitimately claim 
the State’s protection occurred with the Rose Chamber and Reform Edicts. The House 
of Osman was the inspiration of the demonym of the citizenry. ‘Ottoman’ does not 
describe anything more than a political allegiance/stance: linguistically, Osman-lı 
literally means ‘with Osman.’ The law being ‘exclusivist’ in favor of Ottomans in the 
Ottoman state establishes very little, even if it articulates a preference for hereditary 
nationality, as articulated by Article 8. Furthermore, those who adopted a foreign 
nationality abroad—whose children the State considered Ottoman—were less likely to 
be members of the core constituency.  
Nineteenth-century nationalisms often exhibited exclusivist tendencies. The era’s 
nationality laws—by and large—did not. Liberia was perhaps one of the few exceptions 
of states that had an explicitly exclusivist nationality law that excluded potential 
membership based on race. Its raison d’être being “to provide a home for the dispersed 
and oppressed children of Africa,” 228  the possibility of membership and property 
ownership was, exclusively, reserved for individuals of black African heritage, with few 
exceptions (1907 Constitution, Art. 5.12 and 5.13; 1908 Nationality Law, Sec. 1.1).229 
Liberia was a new state, however, and could afford to engineer its vision of a 
homogenous populace without resorting to policies of domestic exclusion to achieve it. 
The German Nationality Law of 1913 is beyond the temporal scope of the Hamidian 
regime and will thus not be discussed in detail. It is useful to briefly examine it along 
with its French conceptual other, semantically and theoretically, especially since, 
... for two centuries, locked together in a fateful position at the center of state- and 
nation-building in Europe, France and Germany have been constructing, 
elaborating, furnishing to other states distinctive, even antagonistic models of 
nationhood and national self-understanding.230  
The French and German models are informative in that they have thus shaped the 
contemporary frame of reference, as well as the vocabulary of nation.  
The conception and formulation of Ottoman nationality resembled the French 
model more than the German. The former was “political and ideological,” the latter 
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“ethnocultural.”231 The ethnocultural nature of the German nation has been considered 
to be a product of its time and circumstances;  
Romantics and reformers understood the relation between nation and state in 
completely different terms: the former in quasi-aesthetic terms, with the State as 
the expression of the nation and of its constitute Volksgeist; the latter in strictly 
political terms, with the nation—the mobilized and united Staatsvold—as the 
deliberate and artificial creation of the State.232  
Aside from its broader conceptualization, the periodization of the Ottoman state’s 
nation-building process also followed the French model. In both cases, the emerging 
nation was grafted onto a pre-existing state. Conversely, the concept of a German nation 
had been fomenting prior to the creation of its state, materialized only with unification, 
in 1871. Despite these features, however, the German nation has still been described in 
overinclusivist and underinclusivist terms (rather than exclusivist), “it was 
underinclusive, excluding above all millions of Austrian Germans...overinclusive, 
including French in Alsace-Lorraine, Danes in North Schleswig, and Poles in eastern 
Prussia.” 233  Similar to some non-core-constituency Ottomans, the groups were a 
testament to Germany’s overinclusivist nature “were not simply linguistic but rather, 
especially in the last case, self-conscious minorities.”234 Thus, by the same token, even 
if the Ottoman state had resembled the German example in its ethnocultural 
conceptualization of its national identity, along with exclusivism, the argument that it 
was also simultaneously ‘under-‘ and ‘over-inclusive’ would have to be addressed.  
It is evident that the core constituency of the late-Ottoman state reflected the Turco-
Sunni identity that was retrospectively designated to it when it became evident that 
Ottoman pluralism would ultimately fail to survive the nation into the twentieth century, 
intact. Though the salience of these core constituency features varied in their degrees of 
potency and refinement over the course of the State’s existence—e.g. it has been argued 
that the Turkic component was less a factor over the course of the Hamidian years than 
the Sunni Muslim, which was refined through Ottomanization-Hanefization efforts.235 
If, indeed, either element of this ethno-religious compound was promoted over others as 
a factor in the formulation of the nationality law, the rational laws that were instituted 
over the course of the nineteenth century certainly did not provide any evidence for it. If 
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national identity was conceived as being ethno-religiously specific and representative of 
only a segment of the constituency, then the term ‘Ottoman’, as defined in the Ottoman 
Nationality Law was ‘overinclusive.’ This core term was an undefined one among many 
other determinants. And, unlike the designation ‘German,’ it was also racially 
ambiguous. By the same token, however, Ottoman nationality would additionally have 
been ‘underinclusive,’ by not including, nor privileging with a claim to natural-born 
membership within the polity, any of the groups that shared these core ethno-religious 
constants (e.g. Turco-Muslims under Russian or Iranian sovereignty or Hanefi Muslims 
living beyond Ottoman dominions). The national identity that was formulated by the 
Ottoman state neither stressed nor addressed the inherent belonging of these identities to 
its nation. Nonetheless, the State hosted them, bargained for their loyalty, or competed 
for their citizenship, especially against the Russian state.236   
By the advent of the Hamidian regime, and certainly onwards, the Ottoman state 
appears to have actively solicited membership and potential belonging to Muslim 
foreigners more than non-Muslims. It did not, however, consider them as a part of the 
nation until they naturalized as Ottomans. Neither did it refuse membership to non-
Muslims. Like the nationality laws of other nineteenth-century ‘multi-national’ states 
confronted with the urgency to define and adopt individuals in a manner most 
conducive to preserving their borders, the Ottoman law was by necessity ethno-
religiously neutral in its definition of citizen. Though it could encourage the 
naturalization of core constituency co-religionists, and did not reject or disenfranchise 
those who did not share the same ‘constants.’ 
The Ottoman Nationality Law cemented a new reality for the Islamicate world. It 
rationalized the subordination of membership in the religious community to 
membership in a modern political nation. In contradiction to the concept of the unity of 
the community of believers, the Ottoman government drew borders with the intention of 
forming a nation and did not give Muslims an exclusive mode of access to the State’s 
political body of membership. Before, “a foreigner could not acquire Turkish nationality 
unless he had embraced the Mohammedan religion.”237 Access to Ottoman subjecthood 
through conversion had been established by the capitulations of 1675, 1740, 1718, and 
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1746, 238  (for English, French, Austrian, and Danish renegades, respectively), was 
formally discarded (or, concealed) in the rational framework, in 1869. Thenceforth, 
national identity was carried “by blood, sanguinis jure: this was the distinction clearly 
established between religious nationalism and civil nationalism.”239 The Ottoman state 
did not venture to stretch the tight skin of its forming nation to include the umma. The 
State had never claimed the allegiance of Muslims that were beyond its territorial 
jurisdiction based on its political authority, to begin with. 
Foreigners who wished to become neutral Ottomans needed to reside within the 
dominions for five years, irrespective of race, creed, or home state. This was the only 
condition for naturalization articulated by the Ottoman Nationality Law. In terms of the 
number of years, five was the standard requisite time for many (e.g. Great Britain and 
Austria), less than some (e.g. Hungary), and more than others (e.g. Brazil and 
Paraguay). The Ottoman law, similar to non-Great Power states, did not have additional 
requirements (e.g. financial independence, ‘good character,’ freedom from disability, 
etc.).  In instances of involuntary expatriation, the Ottoman law was consistent with 
many others in that the adoption of a foreign nationality or the taking up arms for 
another state entailed involuntary expatriation, i.e. exclusion, from the State. Some 
states had more detailed grounds for ejecting individuals from its nation, e.g. 
Panamanians who had not supported the national cause for independence had their 
citizenship revoked.240 Neither did the Ottoman law have a clause that legitimated the 
expulsion of resident foreigners, like the British had decreed the 1905 Aliens Act. 
Despite the fact that the Ottoman Nationality Law was less severe than others in terms 
of the provisions for imposed expatriation—especially for women, whom it did not by 
default eject from the nation upon marriage with a foreigner—it was certainly 
unsympathetic to those who took up allegiance to other states. 
The Ottoman Nationality Law was relatively harsh on former citizens. It forbade 
individuals who had expatriated themselves and had taken up another nationality 
without the permission of the State from re-entry into its dominions (Art. 6). In fact, the 
trend in taking up foreign nationality while abroad exhibits a pattern of adopting foreign 
nationality, not only without the permission of the State, but also without notifying the 
State. Choosing to be discreet over one’s new nationality and to simultaneously try and 
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maintain Ottoman nationality was influenced by the fact that expatriation entailed 
relinquishing one’s property. With the Tanzimat reforms, Ottoman law came to allow 
foreigners to own property; “[t]he third of the land laws of 1867 ... announced on June 
18, granted permission to foreigners to own real estate in the Ottoman Empire.”241 But 
the law did not grant property to those who had voluntarily abandoned their Ottoman 
nationality. While punishing those natural-born citizens who rejected their nations, over 
the course of the Hamidian years, the State simultaneously pressured foreign residents 
who had achieved the requisite term of residence to adopt Ottoman nationality, and 
solicited membership beyond its borders through its official nationalist ideology.   
The Bifurcation of Official Ottomanism, 1876—1909242  
The process of the Ottoman state’s rationalization and nation-building project, 
encompassing the construction of its official nationalism, occurred at a critical juncture 
in the State’s history. This period was, until recently, considered to be the Ottomans’ 
insurmountable ‘decline’—a moment at which it needed to change, or perish. The 
essentialist notion that, at this moment, the State was in a mode of passive acquiescence 
and the recipient of the ‘Western’ imposition of ‘Western’ reform has now been put to 
rest. The House of Osman and its governing apparatus have been granted agency in 
shaping the particularly Ottoman version of modernity. The extent to which the State 
was in a defensive or offensive position while undergoing its modernization efforts is 
still up for debate. It is argued here that the Ottoman state was neither in a defensive nor 
an offensive phase under the reign of Abdülhamid II, but that it negotiated both. 
There are undeniably defensive elements to official Ottomanism and the subsequent 
constructions of the Ottoman nation-/al identity. If one measures a State’s power among 
nations by the ‘proximity’ of its fields of engagement, as Noam Chomsky has done to 
measure the contemporary global power of the United States, for example, then some 
Great Powers had a wider reach than the Ottoman state. More precisely, in the post-
Napoleonic age of modern imperialism, this was a field in which Great Powers 
competed, whereas the British Empire, ultimately, and by far, excelled. Putting aside the 
prospect of measuring the competitive power of a state by the proximity of its fields of 
engagement, such fields of engagements are also indicative of where states face their 
greatest challenges. In this sense, the Great Powers—as a conglomerate—may have 
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been overestimated in being assumed the most direct formidable adversaries of the 
Ottomans by mere suggestion of them having been, again, assumed, to be the catalyst 
for Ottoman progress, rationalization, and project of modernity, i.e. ‘the impact of the 
West,’ which was, until recently synonymous with “delivery—read modernity—[...] 
injecting and inspiring reform and paving the way for modern nationalisms.” 243 
‘Proximity of engagement’ is also useful in evaluating the Ottoman project of nation 
formation, from the defensive angle. In this sense, whatever the role or ‘impact of the 
West’ was in the creation of post-Ottoman nation-states (whether fiscal, political, 
inspirational, ideological, etc.), the drive to form an Ottoman nation was not fueled to 
counter the penultimate source of irredentist nationalisms, but the form of its final 
manifestation would take.  
The project of Ottoman nation formation commenced abruptly. And not 
insignificantly, it followed the successful creation of the first post-Ottoman nation-state. 
The emergence of an independent Greece demonstrated that self-determination was 
accelerated by defining the ‘self’—by spelling out of the name and features of the 
collectivity that was meant to form the cohesive nation that legitimated the political 
shell of its state. While asserting autonomy, the Greek constitution also indirectly 
defined the ‘other’ from whom the new state had declared emancipation. As such,  
... [t]he first article of the first Constitutional text of modern Greece, the 
“Epidauros Constitution” of 1822, classified as Greeks “natives [autochthonous] 
who believe in Christ.” In this and in the other two revolutionary constitutions 
(1822-1827), there is no clear distinction between notions of “Greek citizen” and 
notions of “Greek Christian Orthodox.”244 
Because the Greek nation was created for the liberation of a specific ethno-religious 
community within the Ottoman state, an ethnic component that was nevertheless 
flexible and could include regional Christians depending on their status,245 the Ottoman 
nation would have to be a designator for all of the ethno-religious communities resident 
within the domains the State wanted to retain. In this sense, Ottomanism was defensive. 
Alas, dissuading alternate communal identifications that may prompt inspiration for 
self-determination was not the State’s only intention in undertaking nation-formation. 
Ottomanism and its ensuing nation were indications of the State simultaneously 
straddling offensive and defensive policies. They were, for example, also byproducts of 
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the State’s need to register and homogenize a diverse subject population in order to 
extract (e.g. taxes and military service) more efficiently at a time there was great 
material investment being made to remain competitive; “this Ottomanism” was 
therefore also a form of “identity politics [that]…emerged as a tool of state expansion 
rather than a result of Westernization.”246 This was both defensive and offensive.  
Official Ottomanism, as it was practiced by the Hamidian regime differed from 
other varieties of the nationalist ideology. It developed on a shared temporal continuum 
with some, but occupied different spaces; exilic Young Turks in Geneva and Paris who 
synthesized their visions collective national harmony over the course of the “intellectual 
phase” 247  of the movement would certainly not be suggested that their version of 
Ottomanism was similar to the sultan who they wanted to overthrow, and whose mode 
of government they despised. With other varieties, Hamidian Ottomanism shared a 
space but not time. Domestic varieties of Ottomanism that followed the Young Turk 
Revolution also differed from Hamidian Ottomanism, not the least because they 
followed the collapse of sultanic authority and the formal debut of the nation and were 
thus necessarily dictated by those who claimed to be the representatives rather than the 
authority of the latter. All versions, however, deliberated—with different conclusions—
how to best persuade those groups that they believed to be indigenous and inherent 
component of the Ottoman nation that they belonged to this constructed ideal. By the 
same token, each also deliberated who was foreign—an Ottoman’s ‘other.’ Combined 
with these definitions, determining who was foreign and could become an Ottoman 
lends a lens onto the self-attested identity of the State, along with how it saw its future. 
This analysis rests in migration and naturalization. Trends of migration and 
naturalization reveal that the Hamidian regime was more expansionist than exclusivist.  
The Hamidian regime propagated belonging on two levels, one was secular-
territorial and the other extraterritorial-ideological. As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, in advocating legal assimilation to foreigners who were already resident 
within the territories, the State operated within a secular, rational, and legal framework. 
In this sphere, the State adhered to the conditions articulated in the Nationality Law 
(e.g. it may have shown discreet privilege to Muslims—it was entitled to do so, through 
Article 4—but it did not discriminate in the naturalization of those who had met the 
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requirements of nationalization, which meant that the discreet privilege only entitled 
Muslims seeking membership to the Ottoman nation-under-constructions to an 
expedited naturalization). On the other hand, the manner in which the Hamidian state 
recruited for members in the extraterritorial realm was through capitalizing on the 
sovereign’s sacrosanctity, as the spiritual leader of the umma, which was legitimated 
through the Constitution (despite Great Power attempts to undermine Abdülhamid’s 
position as such, especially in the second half of his reign). An evaluation of the 
Hamidian regime’s extraterritorial and territorial recruitment methods therefore reveals 
a method of shaping the constituency through employing positive discrimination. 
Externally, the State propagated membership to those who would reinforce the authority 
and power of Abdülhamid rather than internally practicing exclusivist policies that 
would have achieved a similar outcome, i.e. through emphasizing the fundamental un-
belonging of ‘non-conformists’ who resisted Ottomanization. If individuals who were 
recruited externally did become internal residents, however, the State treated them as 
foreigners. The Hamidian regime expected the foreigner’s adherence to the State’s 
secular and rational principles to be expressed through naturalization. The studies that 
make up this thesis address the soft and hard policies in both the territorial and 
extraterritorial realms, and collectively establish that the Hamidian vision for a nation 
was, indeed, exclusivist. The nuance rests with the fact that Hamidian exclusivism was 
not based on excluding members of the natural-born constituency that challenged the 
regime’s claims to ‘hegemony by consent,’ but rather upon the expectation that the 
national affiliation of those within the territorial shell of the political Ottoman state to 
be consistent with the national interest—exclusively Ottoman.248 
                                                





“...even though the Osmanli may sink again some day into 
the Asiatic darkness from which he came, Constantinople, 
under a new name, perhaps, will still and ever be the capital 
of the East, the golden key to Asia, the jewel coveted for 
many crowns, in strife for which the greedy nations will 
contend to the very end of time.”249 
The City, Incomplete 
The significance of Istanbul in considering the Ottoman national image over the course 
of the Hamidian years rests upon two assumptions. First, as the seat of the sovereign 
and the governing apparatus, the city was where the State was able to most directly 
exercise power. In this capacity, the city also provides testimony to the discrepancy that 
existed between how the State’s authority manifested itself where it had the greatest 
jurisdiction, and where it willed to have greater jurisdiction. Of second importance is 
the quasi-symbolic nature of the State’s ability to exercise power, as Istanbul was also 
where the foreign and domestic forces aimed to limit the State’s hegemony. Thus the 
malleable Hamidian vision for the nation was being constructed within the confines of 
an inherited rational framework in the capital city that the Hamidian regime surveilled, 
while under the surveillance of political and ideological opponents. The study of 
Hamidian Istanbul and the place and perception of the foreigner within it, first needs to 
overcome a great obstacle, however. Namely, that Istanbul was a legend: “romance [...] 
clings to Constantinople.”250 The city’s ‘actuality’ was shaped by a point of reference, 
e.g. the subjective and uncompromising vividness of this ‘romance,’ thus the city’s 
names became indexicals251—much in the same way ‘actuality’ is.252 
Istanbul, or Constantinople: What’s in a Name? 
The reference points of Hamidian era observers of the capital are an obstacle in the 
quest for verisimilitude of the foreigner’s place in the city. The perceptions of those 
whose glances sought the verification of (what had vanished of) their version of an 
idealized ‘Constantinople,’ the ‘Istanbuls’ of others were lost. Since many of the city’s 
names were in simultaneous circulation, how the city was indexed according to the 
perpetuators of the various appellations is a worthwhile consideration. 
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Among other designators, the Ottoman capital was conjured by Constantinople, 
Ko(n)stantiniye, Istanbul, Stamboul, Islambol, and Dersaadet. Whether the signified 
was ‘the city of Constantine’ or ‘in/to the city,’253 whether it embodied a perversion, 
signaled ‘where Islam abounds,’ or, instead, located the material countenance of ‘the 
gate of felicity,’ all were used. A multitude of meanings were thus conveyed—the 
choice of the former was intimately tied to the intent of the latter. There were others as 
well; notable among them were Byzantium, Nova Roma (Νέα Rώµη), Asitane-i Saadet, 
Tsarigrad, et cetera. The name of a city reveals its history, true. Istanbul’s designators, 
for example, divulge Byzantine, Greek, Latin and Roman heritage. An Arabic 
association can be traced to Dersaadet; in Tsarigrad, there is ambition and mythology. 
Of the names, Islambol is the one to assume the greatest religious signification. It has 
been argued that  
[f]rom the very beginning of the Ottoman administration, one of the most 
significant policies was the creation and retention of Istanbul’s Islamic character. 
A vivid illustration of this policy was the occasional use of the name ‘İslambol’ 
(where Islam abounds) in the official records during the reign of Mehmed II.254  
Mehmed II circulating ‘Islambol’ was not solely a demonstration of “one of the most 
significant policies” of the State—“from the very beginning”—i.e. “the creation and 
retention of Istanbul’s Islamic character.”255 With ‘Islambol,’ Mehmed II also indexed a 
very specific moment of transition: of legitimacy, power, and ownership over the city 
and its residents. Circulating ‘Islambol’ additionally imposed the external recognition of 
the transition, while at the same time expressing the Ottoman ambition of becoming a 
center in the Islamicate world (well before the conquest of the Arab world and the Holy 
cities of Islam). This name that was chosen to represent all of this, however, was also 
one that undeniably claimed continuity with Second Rome. The House of Osman did 
not fashion itself as just the conqueror of Constantinople, but also as its inheritor. The 
implied continuity was what ultimately made ‘Islambol’ lose circulatory value (and 
become a resort in defensive moments)—receivers of the message denied the link. 
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The effect and utility of Islambol to express a transition of power that nevertheless 
claimed continuity was additionally damaged by the word lacking original belonging to 
the Ottoman context. Its source was not within the linguistic culture of the Ottomans, 
whose claims of legitimacy as the rulers of the city it was presumably created to serve. 
The morphology of ‘Islambol’ was as Greek as the morphology of ‘Istanbul;’ i.e. “[t]he 
old problem of Turkish name Stambúl (Stambol in 1426, Istanbol by Turkish scholars, 
Islambol in the seventeenth century) may now be considered as explained: the name 
was transformed from the older form Stimbóli.”256 In the nationalizing and national eras, 
Islambol has been brushed with the stroke of illegitimacy and thereby discredited as an 
adoption of the indigenous—and idealized—(linguistic) culture that was copied and 
modified by the Ottomans. Islambol was written off as a derivation of a “corruption”257 
(a thrice removed imitation of an imitation of an ideal, in Platonic terms). There are 
variations of the argument on derivation, as well. The attempt to imbue with meaning a 
word that was an incorrect appellation of the original Greek and had no origin in the 
‘Turkish’ context also lent itself to the interpretation that the Ottomans customization of 
an already bastardized Istanbul to suit their own propagated identity and ambitions 
came at the expense of others who could be expressed as the legitimate possessors of 
the city, based merely on the heritage of its name.  
Istanbul is not a Turkish corruption of Stimbóli, though it maybe that both are 
closely linked to Stamboul, and thus the inspiration of Islambol. As the Ottomans were 
closing their final century as the rulers of the polynymous city, Edward Bourne 
challenged the assumption that Istanbul was a Turkish corruption. Among other 
“indisputable proofs,”258 he referenced a French translation of Ibn Battuta’s travelogue 
and quoted Battuta by proxy. The fourteenth-century traveller mentioned the Byzantine 
city being divided in two sections, the residents called one called “Esthamboûl…[and 
the other] Galata.”259  The Voyages revealed that the use (and, division!) of Istanbul 
preceded the Turks. The doubts arising from Bourne’s readiness to trust a French 
translation (and transliteration) are alleviated when one compares how Istanbul appears 
in an Arabic version of Battuta’s travels with the how it appeared in Ottoman. It suffices 
                                                
256 Georgacas, “The Names of Constantinople,” 366. 
257 Bourne, “The Derivation of Stamboul,” 78. 
258 Ibid., 80. 
259 Ibn Batoutah, Voyages d’Ibn Batoutah, Defrémery and Sanguinetti trans., Vol. II, pp.431-2. 





that say that “260”اصطنبول and “261”استنبول are close enough to make the Bourne’s point, 
since the opening vowel (and the ‘nun,’ i.e. ن) is most critical. Though it does leave as 
many questions as it answers, because Bourne’s proxy French translation substitutes an 
‘m’ where there ought to be an ‘n,’ which makes it closer to the word that it is argued to 
be the source of the corruption (Stimbóli), rather than the corruption itself (Istanbul)—
whereas Battuta’s rendering makes a case for the reverse.  
Determining who was the original corruptor of Istanbul, or, if the word is, indeed, a 
corruption is less significant here. What is more relevant is the availability and 
simultaneous circulation of a multitude of names and the fact that each had a value, and, 
when used, could be a tool for individuals to orient themselves in an intellectual rather 
than physical space. Istanbul’s names could not have served the sole function of 
designating a geographical place, especially if there was not a single name that the State 
had designated for that function. Each and every designation was loaded with value:  
[t]he all-purpose word in the dictionary, a product of the neutralization of the 
practical relations within which it functions, has no social existence: in practice it 
is always immersed with situations, to such an extent that core meaning which 
remains relatively invariant through the diversity of markets may pass 
unnoticed.262  
These values associated with the contexts words are ‘immersed with’ are not designated 
by a single source, but are additionally acquired and accumulated upon words gaining 
their ‘social existence.’ Considering the civilizational discourses of the era in question, 
the fact that there exists an essentialist argument and an accompanying lexicological 
deconstruction for every word that described the Ottoman capital can be considered in 
conjunction with the fact that ‘forms of semiosis’ are 
subject to rules of access and regulations as to circulation. That means that that 
such systemic patterns of indexicality are also systemic patterns of authority, of 
control and evaluation, and hence of inclusion and exclusion by real or perceived 
others...263 
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In light of the acceptance that a word (as indexical) has the power to convey a position 
(also of authority), what becomes more important than seeking a most legitimate name 
for the city is to consider the values, connotations, associations, and the (conflicting) 
messages produced by the plethora of the city’s designators that were circulated at the 
same time—especially since ‘legitimacy’ is also an indexical. The legitimacy of 
legitimacy is contextual and dependent upon a point of reference; it is therefore 
abstract.Regarding the State’s engagement with a medley of diverse words that lacked 
innocence, it is worth contemplating the implication of the potential non-existence of a 
single official name. The converse scenario is perhaps even more remarkable, i.e. the 
potential existence of an official name, that the House of Osman did not choose to force 
into circulation as the preferred, dominant, appellation. These deliberations end up 
yielding an analogy for the way in the State interacted with its constituency.  
All of the aforementioned names signified the capital over the course of the 
Ottoman centuries. They could have been expressed and interpreted as neutral 
identifiers in some fields. In many others, however, they carried the capacity to be 
delivered and/or received as loaded, sometimes even paradoxically. To regard, for 
example, ‘I/Sta(m/n)bul’ as a ‘Turkish’ corruption of something pure-ly Greek is 
analogous to how the city was viewed by many. On the other hand, to deny the ‘Turks’ 
the corruption of the word, as well, could have suggested that they were even less 
entitled to the city than would have been if they had actually corrupted it. Each exposes 
a bias. Given the suggestion that both have the same non-Turkish origin, the debate 
between these two (and their designated values) renders the indexical utility of one over 
the other slightly comical, if the intention is to stress Greek belonging (since both are 
discovered as being Greek). Nevertheless, given the plethora of options that existed by 
the nineteenth century, an analysis of the choice of which is utilized, and by whom, is as 
worthy a consideration as determining the level of authentic belonging of the word to 
whichever culture was first to witness—or bring about—the manifestation of its final 
corruption. One concedes that the words for the Ottoman capital distinct values in the 
cultural intertext, even if the substance of their respective values may have since been 
proven as hollow (i.e. if they did, indeed, have the same pre-Ottoman cultural origin). 
When Istanbul’s residents, foreigners, or the State chose one name over another, 
they indexed: their position, their identity, and their relationship to the city were all 





Constantinople,”264 for example, takes a position if historically contextualized in a pre- 
and post-Byzantine temporal framework that extends to the early-(Turkish) Republican 
Era, i.e. after Istanbul had become the official name of the city in 1930.265 A text about 
the names of ‘Constantinople’ that includes the officialized ‘Istanbul’ but refers to the 
city’s ancient designator as the dominant signifier in a framework where the latter no 
longer exists as a geo-political entity, indexes an historical entity (with identified 
contemporary ethno-cultural descendants) as the most legitimate possessor of the city. 
This choice can express and/or be received as a rejection of the city’s current mode of 
existence—e.g. suggesting that the city belongs the polity most closely associated with 
the signifier, without ever needing to precisely articulate this position. The indexical 
effect is further multiplied when this orientation is expressed in the above medium of a 
scholarly article, because it is a platform in which “one can speak as an expert using a 
particular register indexing membership of expert groups,”266  i.e. the legitimator is 
legitimate. The impact of the inherent values of the appellation are unaltered by whether 
or not it was pure, corrupted by, or authentic to the Ottoman polity—the search for a 
‘legitimate name’ though locating its origin in the past, is superfluous in relation to 
what the word evolves to express, with the values it has acquired in the meantime vis-à-
vis its legitimacy.  
Hamidian Istanbul was “polycentric.”267 The State, press, various indigenous and 
foreign communities, classes, nations, competing Great Powers and their appendages, 
churches, mosques, synagogues, and masonic centers are among the obvious centers 
(themselves, also polycentric) whose representatives and affiliates indexed the city in 
ways that were sometimes conflicting. The names of the city that were in circulation for 
daily use were tied to socio-cultural and historical associations, and were not dictated by 
philology. But philology and semiotics were nevertheless registers of legitimacy that 
were sometimes utilized for their potential to reinforce narratives. In other words, the 
underlying social and cultural stress that was derived from lexicological associations of 
‘Constantinople’ could become a tool to emphasize a pre-Ottoman past in some fields. 
In others fields, utilizing ‘Istanbul’ could suggest traversing beyond the juncture of 
1453, i.e. beyond “the psychological impact of the conquest in the West, and the horror 
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over the fall of the Byzantine Empire.”268 The word had acquired through its ‘social 
existence’ the capability—independently, so long as its connotations were maintained in 
the culture and discourse of the society/-ies participating in the exchange—to 
historically trace the city to the point in which it belonged to its presumably legitimate 
owner. The articulation of the word carried the potentiality to promote resistance to 
accepting change beyond the point from which it refused to advance.  
Nineteenth-century impressions of the city, recorded by those whose feet were 
firmly planted in the ground of Istanbul, were often processed through expectations that 
were formed according to their relations to the ‘centers’ that best promoted their 
interests. Thus many eastbound visitors journeyed to ‘Constantinople.’ Whilst in ‘the 
City of Constantine,’ they took customary glimpses at ‘Stamboul,’ the quarter that 
conceptually conflated Turkish and Muslim,269 but they seldom mentioned Istanbul or 
any other designations for the city. Their recollections confirmed, conformed to, or were 
disappointed by the legend of the city and its inhabitants that was perpetuated by the 
center with which they were most closely associated, i.e. this was especially true for 
observers who were representatives of the Great Powers and perpetuators of the 
corresponding metanarrative. The legacy of Byzantium occupied a prominent place in 
the European imagination. What emerges in many versions of late Ottoman Istanbul is 
lament for the loss of its Constantinople past. An attachment to bygone times was 
reflected in the writings of those who were nostalgic for an era in which the Hagia 
Sophia was a Church—they longed for this history to reclaim possession of the city.  
Western European visitors to Hamidian Istanbul could express remorse for the 
change subjected to one of the centers of the Greco-Roman heritage they had come to 
believe they inherited. Upon arrival, those whose sentiments reverberated with this 
notion indexed their position. They were in ‘Constantinople’ and “would rather stand 
there in the dim aisle of the great mosque and believe for a moment that the savage 
warrior marked it for his own with Christian blood.”270 The Hagia Sophia, the greatest 
symbol of the unfortunate Ottoman interruption in the city’s European destiny, was 
... a pleasure, from the artistic point of view at all events, to think that, in all 
probability, at some not very distant date, when the Ottoman Empire shall have 
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passed to its doom, these exquisite decorations will reappear in all their fadeless 
splendor, as fresh and beautiful as when they were first executed.271   
The future of the Byzantine city and Constantine’s church was in fact imagined from 
the perspective of the past; Constantinople could be a hope for the city to return to the 
unchanged—imagined—moment from which it had deviated. Furthermore, it was a 
future that did not include its current residents. As part and parcel of Greco-Roman 
‘Western Civilization’ that had been in the process of a re-making since the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment, many expressed anguish over the Turkish possession of the eastern 
capital of Christendom. Constantinople was the past, and the future when the Turks 
would return to wherever it was they came from, after their unentitled occupation of the 
city, that was an extension of their civilizational opposite, had expired—it was more for 
some, and less for others.  
Alongside those who regretted the Ottoman possession of their Byzantine heritage, 
there were others who were more consumed with its Orientalist-tinged present. In other 
words, some expressed concern for the eventual loss of an exoticized and romanticized 
Ottoman Constantinople. Edmondo de Amicis imagined the fate and legacy of the pages 
he had composed about Istanbul. In a tone of humility, he imagined that his “old torn 
book of the nineteenth century,” might in the distant future be found in the “bottom of” 
some Italian bride’s “grandmother’s clothes-press.”272 In experiencing the city on what 
De Amicis imagined to be the bride’s “wedding journey,” he predicted she would 
“exclaim, ‘what a pity! what a dreadful pity it is that Constantinople has changed 
so.’”273 It was not only foreigners who lamented change, and loss, however. Members 
of the Ottoman community also criticized material and immaterial change; their lament 
was for another kind of change. In short, an idealized image of the city and a sorrow for 
the inflictions of time (actual, imagined, and potential) permeated the writings of those 
who tried to preserve its memory. Both those who froze the city in the (pre-Ottoman) 
distant past, the nearer (Ottoman) past, and those who wanted it frozen in its 
(Orientalist) present were invested in what the city symbolized for their personal 
realities—the articulation of one name for the city over another could be an expression 
of an association for a particular version of the city, and a longing to participate in its 
reclaiming. Observers of Constantinople were dependent on their version of the city for 
their own identities, for it located them in the world and in the civilizations within it. 
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They feared the dissolution of the city they believed existed, that they saw to exist, only 
incompletely. 
The Polycentric State’s Hegemony over Polycentricism 
 
Istanbul was a city of many centers that directed conflicting discourses and visions 
for the city’s present, past, and future. As mentioned in the previous section, those who 
articulated the city’s name were able to express their orientations through active or 
passive acceptance of these positions through valued semiotic indexicals. In light of 
this, it is significant that the Ottoman state did not choose to force into circulation a 
particular signifier for the city that became its capital. The administrative name of the 
region was Dersaadet,274 which was the most commonly employed designator for the 
city in the State’s official internal correspondences. Istanbul was more widely circulated 
in the social sphere, however. While maintaining Dersaadet as the most consistently 
utilized form of the city’s name in an official capacity, the State allowed Constantinople 
and other designations to roam free along with all of their connotations. With the advent 
and subsequent burgeoning of the press in the nineteenth century, the cacophony of 
names for the city had become evident on a quotidian basis by the Hamidian regime. 
Over the course of those years, Istanbul was a newspaper hub that published a plethora 
of dailies and weeklies. Native, foreign, and state owned papers (though frequently 
censured or shut down) were circulated near and far—the city they were printed out of, 
however, was a deliberate choice, based on their audience and respective centers.  
The front pages of the many newspapers betrayed any semblance of a unified vision 
for the Ottoman capital city, so far as its name was concerned. In 1893, for example, the 
Persian exilic press was distributing its Akhtar [Star] to ‘Dersaadet’, among other 
places, but referred to the city within its pages as ‘Islambol.’275 The Ottoman Maarif 
[Education] was also circulated within ‘Dersaadet,’ but had a column titled “Istanbul 
Post.”276  The Oriental Advertiser was printed from Constantinople’s “Buyuk Millet 
Han, Troisième Etage, Galata.”277 One presumes that since the administrative name of 
the city was ‘Dersaadet,’ this is what was printed on the top left-hand corner of many 
(though not all) newspapers among the list of places that it was delivered to. This was 
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an expression of compliance to what would have been the preferred name for the postal 
service, however, and was inconsistent with the preference of journalists working for 
various press organs. The preference of the paper was reflected in the choice of words 
employed in the actual articles. Neither was compliance to postal preferences universal. 
English and French-language newspapers did not pay much heed to the administrative 
name of the city and instead designated Constantinople in both instances (for circulation 
and nominal references). This was not strictly a foreign-press phenomenon, however, 
since not all Ottoman-language newspapers used Dersaadet as one of the regions for 
circulation. İkdam [Perseverance], for example, was printing the details of publication, 
editor, and subscription details in Ottoman and French by 1909. There was no 
membership for ‘Istanbul,’ which is where its administrative headquarters were, under 
the proprietorship of Ahmet Cevdet; it was, however, “10 paras” per issue “à Co/spleI” 
(in Constantinople).278 İkdam made a point to designate itself as a “Turkish” (“Türk 
gazetesidir...  journal Turc”) newspaper rather than an “Ottoman” one,279 thus it may 
have found Istanbul more consistent with this asserted identity than Dersaadet. Even 
though the term has since been proven as a pre-Turkish designation for the city, it was 
nevertheless accepted as a Turkish designation in the nineteenth century. 
The lack of a uniform name for the city and even inconsistencies in the signifiers 
(and, thus, what was signified and indexed) within a single source was not limited to the 
press. Rather, it is an observable phenomenon for nearly everything printed in Hamidian 
Istanbul, inclusive of signs and plaques; the Dersaadet Elektrik Şirketi (‘Dersaadet 
Electricity Firm’) translated its function on 
company plaques as “Electricite—
Constantinople.” Neither was it unusual for 
books that came out of Istanbul’s Ottoman 
printing houses to have been published in 
Dersaadet, Constantinople, Ko(n)stantiniye, 
Istanbul, et cetera. Often, there was even a 
bizarre discord between the name utilized by a given publisher and the author whose 
work it printed. The ‘Ottoman Press’ had published Tarih-i Cevdet [History of Cevdet] 
in ‘Dersaadet,’ but Cevdet often referred to the city as ‘Istanbul’.280 In the eleventh 
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volume (of twelve) of his history of the Ottomans, Cevdet mentioned the city as part of 
various headings within his ‘Table of Contents’ eight times. The city was designated as 
‘Dersaadet’ once, but as ‘Istanbul’281 seven times. Furthermore, within the book itself, 
Cevdet refers to “Istanbul ve Bilad-ı Selase” (“Istanbul and the three adjoining 
[districts]”).282 Whereas the State may have been inconsistent with which name of the 
city it chose to utilize in an un-/official capacity, the compound in this specific 
formulation was very specific, and it was not ‘Istanbul’, but ‘Dersaadet ve Bilad-ı 
Selase.’283 This can be observed not only in literary tradition, but also in the official 
censuses of the capital, which were, if ironically, printed in ‘Istanbul.’  
The Hamidian regime did not push a preferred name for the city into circulation in 
the linguistic market. The Constitution had articulated the capital of the Ottoman state 
to be city of ‘Istanbul’ [“Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin pay-ı tahtı İstanbul şehiridir”]284 when 
Abdülhamid came to the throne. Even so, the regime’s semiotic stance was non-
committal and changed according to the facet of its identity it sought to assert at given 
historical moments, throughout the Hamidian years. There is even a lack of consistency 
amongst the various books of the Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-yi Osmaniye—arguably the 
most official annual volume to be published within the dominions. It was printed in 
‘Istanbul’ in 1880/81,285 but in ‘Dersaadet’ in 1895/96.286 Even if the Salname was 
published in Dersaadet, the official name of the vilayet (province) could be listed as 
‘İstanbul’ within the same volume.287 However many varieties of the name were used in 
the thirty three volumes that were published for the years that Abdülhamid was in 
power, the Constitution that was printed in each of them repeated the capital of the 
Ottoman state to be ‘Istanbul’—even if that particular volume that had this information 
embedded in it was published in ‘Dersaadet.’288  Over the course of last decade of 
Abdülhamid II’s rule, when the sultan was intensifying his efforts to legitimate his 
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religious authority as caliph in the eyes of the transnational umma and their colonial 
subjugators, certain volumes were published in the theretofore unfamiliar ‘Dar ul-
Hilafet-i Aliyye’ (‘the gate of the Sublime Caliphate’), e.g. 1898/99289 and 1901/02.290 
This is notwithstanding the fact that the versions of the city’s name utilized within the 
Salname itself were, again, Dersaadet and Istanbul (e.g the office of Istanbul’s religious 
judiciary, Istanbul’s high schools, and the bookstores and publishers of Dersaadet).291 
The Hamidian regime’s engagement with the city’s names allowed the State to 
become the authority of the city’s polycentricism rather than its suppressor. The State 
benefited from the nonconstrictive leniencies granted by indexical ‘codeswitching.’292 
The State’s ability to maintain hegemony in a polycentric city entailed that it engage 
with the fluidity of the city, its indexical values, and its residents. It was especially 
pertinent since codeswitching was so common among the constituency. A funny 
example that demonstrates its extent reveals itself in the “Articles of Peace Between 
[the brothers] Silvio and Pierre Biscuchia Terminating the War of 1867 & 1868” that 
was contracted by the founder of Istanbul’s American Robert College, Cyrus Hamlin, in 
order to get the pupils to bring about an end to the physical and verbal abuse they were 
inflicting on one another. With the treaty, Silvio and Pierre expressed their agreement 
That in order to preserve peace, amity and good will and to confirm a strict 
brotherhood to all future generations one shall not call the other an ass or a dog or 
a pig or a thief, robber, rowdy, pezevenk [pimp] or other opprobrious epithet in 
Italian, French, Turkish, Greek, English, Bulgarian, Armenian or any other 
language spoken at the tower of Babel since that day.293  
The House of Osman needed to codeswitch to assert its dominance in ‘the tower of 
Babel.’ Thus the State employed many variations of the city’s name over the course of 
it history, and especially in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries—indeed, 
until the more strict linguistic and cultural homogenization of the constituency in the 
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(thus it is fitting that Istanbul was forced into circulation as the official, preferred, and 
enforced name for the city in 1930, with the shift from state-nation to nation-state).  
Hamidian semiotics was customized and the choice of how to index the city was 
considered according to audience. The State was thereby able to contest over the 
ownership of each variation, along with its history. That the receiver was a key factor in 
the State’s determining its choice of appellation can be observed in schoolbooks. The 
Ottoman version of the curriculum book for the bilingual state high school, the Mekteb-i 
Sultani, was published in ‘Istanbul,’294  as was a general grammar book for public 
secondary and teachers’ training schools.295 The ‘Matbaa-ı Amire,’ which had published 
the Ottoman curriculum in Istanbul, also published the French-language counterpart of 
Mekteb-i Sultani’s curriculum; the same press printed the latter in “Constantinople.”296 
The Hamidian regime seems to have understood that there were no “innocent 
words...[that e]ach word, each expression, threatens to take on two antagonistic senses, 
reflecting the way in which it is understood by the sender and the receiver.”297 The 
name of the city was chosen by the ‘sender’ echoed the one utilized by the respective 
‘receiver,’ thereby minimizing the possibility of alienating and/challenging diverse 
orientations. Whether it was referring to the capital city in the press, diplomatic 
correspondences, or school curricula, it chose to demonstrate its fluidity for external and 
internal consumption. This also allowed it to index itself as the ultimate owner of each 
semiotic manifestation of Istanbul, and, therefore, of Istanbul itself. 
At first glance, Hamidian Era policies seem to exhibit a lag between the paces at 
which the Ottoman state’s linguistic and rational frameworks evolved. This lag can be 
observed in the comparative trajectories of both realms’ transitions from 
accommodationist to legal assimilationist models. Summarily, while the State could 
construct a neutral Ottoman national citizenry, there were no correspondingly neutral 
alternatives in the semiotic field. In the political official-nationalist realm, “recourse to a 
neutralized language is obligatory whenever it is a matter of establishing a practical 
consensus between agents or groups of agents having partially or totally different 
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interests.”298 Neutrality and consensus rested on accepting the indexical values of the 
circulated names of the polycentric city, and for the State to index itself as a legitimate 
articulator of each. The polyglot state could not have imposed strict linguistic 
assimilation or ask its ‘Ottoman’ citizens to discard their linguistic attachments without 
alienating non-core constituency members whose loyalty it sought. Such alienation 
materialized under the Young Turk regime in the Arab provinces in a post-Hamidian era 
that does attempt to impose linguistic assimilation, for example. Thus it appears that the 
Hamidian regime’s active codeswitching was a strategic political choice. It was not in 
conflict with the state’s rational development, Ottomans—along with being ethno-
religiously neutral—did were not linguistically defined, either.299 
The Hamidian state approached the indexical values of the capital city in the same 
manner that it engaged with its citizens. While actively engaging in nation formation 
within a rationalizing framework, it simultaneously remained cautious and steered clear 
of offending sensitivities with non-neutral identifiers for state and citizen. Furthermore, 
in a blatantly polycentric city and state, by not officiating or enforcing a single semiotic 
manifestation for the capital city, it was able to portray itself as the primary authority 
over all centers, identities, and associations. The State minting coins in ‘Konstantiniye’ 
forced the recognition that it also claimed ownership of the word that could be used to 
symbolically challenge Ottoman presence and authority in Istanbul—the State claimed 
all versions of the city, and contributed to the diversification of interpretations, thereby 
asserting itself as a polycentric state, with a hegemonic claim over its polycentricism 
(i.e. it fashioned itself as a center among and above multiple centers). While asserting 
that it had inherited the Rome through the articulation of Constantinople, it also diluted 
the severity of any, single, indexical value being associated with the word that could 
have been abrasive to its interest. Despite appearances, the linguistic and rational 
assimilations were congruent, and served to reinforce (and demonstrate) the Hamidian 
state’s authoritarian use of each to govern a diverse constituency. Diversity was not an 
obstacle to becoming an Ottoman, so long as the Ottoman state was the entity to which 
one owed exclusive political loyalty. It mattered less how the polycentric city was 
indexed, so long as it was recognized and acknowledged that the State could index its 
own orientation as he final authority of each of the various manifestations. 
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Premodernity: Morphological and Demographical Features 
The Ottomans state inherited Istanbul’s pre-modern urban infrastructure as much as 
its signifiers. It added new ones to each, with the ambition of legitimating the state’s 
claimed authority over the city and its residents. Morphological and demographical 
Ottomanization of Istanbul’s Byzantine base was achieved through accommodating re-
new-ed growth—both organically and by dictate. Thus, a fish market in operation since 
the time of Andronicus II Paleologus (r. 1282-1328), would, by the last Ottoman 
century, be observed in the vicinity of the Valide Sultan Mosque and with a path that 
reached the Grand Bazaar.300 By then, in the eyes of an observer who only saw the 
urban population divided amongst Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, the “venders 
[were], almost without exception Turks.”301 The city’s features were manipulated in a 
manner that not only absorbed the pre-existing population, but also bided for their 
political allegiance. While the State encouraged the city’s repopulation after conquest 
with an appeal to multi-religious migrants, it simultaneously ensured that preexisting 
elements would be overwhelmed by an influx of a new populace dominated by those 
whose loyalty was tied to the Ottoman state, and who professed a competing faith. 
The Ottoman conquest of Istanbul entailed the entry of Islam into the gates of 
Eastern Christiandom. While conquest did not entail de-Christianization of Istanbul, it 
did require Muslim dominance in the city—not just demographically, but symbolically. 
Muslim dominance was promoted by the Ottoman contribution of mosques, which 
became the seeds of Islamic complexes, neighborhoods, and districts. To ensure the 
assertive capacity of Islam further, new-old legends materialized with emblematic 
manifestations and associations in the city’s landscape. For example, the anecdote goes 
that according to the umma, “it was a conviction, from the time of the Prophet onward, 
that the conquest of Constantinople was predestined for them by God.”302 When the city 
fell to Mehmet II’s forces in 1453, the Ottoman achievement was tied to the umma’s 
prophecy. Mehmet II circulating ‘Islambol’ expressed his will to transform the city into 
one of the centers of the Dar-ul-Islam. This intention was further stressed with the 
‘invented tradition’ of girdling at the (presumed) burial site of the prophet’s companion 
Abu Ayyub (Eyüp) al-Ansari,  
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outside the city walls at the northern end of the Golden Horn ... who is believed to 
have died there during the siege of the city in 672. A mosque and tomb built in 
this district by Mehmed II the Conqueror became an important ceremonial 
centre.303 
Mehmed was grooming the House of Osman for the custodianship of Islam, which 
transpired when Selim I conquered the Islamic Holy Lands of Mecca and Medina, along 
with the caliphate, in 1517. Such achievements were among the contributions to 
successive Ottoman sultans’ abilities to be able to promote themselves as those “who 
waged war against infidelity and heresy, and without whose aid the faith and the holy 
law could not survive. In this formulation, the defence and implementation of the 
shari‘a was dependent on the rule of the Ottoman sultan.”304 Istanbul thence became the 
seat of the two highest (Sunni) Islamic figures: the Sultan-Caliph and the Şeyhülislam. 
Neither resided in the outskirts, but in the center they had claimed.  
The ‘Islamization’ of Istanbul occurred in conjunction with the actuality that the 
city remained the capital of Eastern Orthodoxy, as it had been since the fourth century. 
The Patriarch of Constantinople was in Fener, where, according to some perceptions, 
“ancient Byzantium has taken refuge.”305 The Armenian patriarch and the Hahambaşı, 
the Chief Rabbi (an office also allegedly instituted by Mehmet II), addressed their 
respective faithful from Istanbul. Despite the House of Osman claiming the caliphate, 
ruling within an Islamic framework (customized with kanun), and proclaiming the 
capital as a center of the Muslim world, the city nevertheless was the capital of three 
faiths—all of which had a prominent and active constituency within the walls of the 
city. Neither was Istanbul’s Islamization consistently Islamic. It was within the confines 
of established Islamic jurisprudence for Beyazıt II (r. 1447-1512) to open the gates of 
the city to an influx of Spanish Jews escaping the Reconquista. It was, however, 
contrary to these principles that the city acquired churches and synagogues from which 
previously non-existent non-Muslim districts grew. While the dhimmi (‘people of the 
book’) were to be protected and granted the liberty to worship according to their own 
customs in their own houses of God, they were not traditionally allowed to construct 
new places of worship after being integrated into Dar-ul-Islam. Notwithstanding, every 
church and synagogue in Ottoman Istanbul after the city’s ‘Islamization’ functioned 
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through the permission and protection of Ottoman volition.306 They were seeds of new 
non-Muslim neighborhoods. Thus the practical implications of the theory that at the 
juncture of incorporation, “while an area of a city of non-Muslims who had submitted to 
a Muslim state was accepted as, administratively, a part of Islamic territory, its ultimate 
Islamization remained a constant hope,”307 remain unclear in the Ottoman case. Neither 
is it obvious whose hope this was, as there is little evidence to suggest that this ‘ultimate 
Islamization’ was the State’s ambition. The Ottomans did not pursue ‘Islamization,’ 
beyond governing in a framework of institutionalized inequality between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, until the nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms. 
The nineteenth-century pursuit of ‘Ottomanism’ drastically altered the identity of 
individuals, their relationship to the State, and the urban landscape and fabric of the 
capital city. Prior to this juncture, Ottoman legal categorization of subjects was carried 
out according to religion. Subjects were Muslims, dhimmi, or non-Muslim foreigners.308 
A similar method of categorization articulated the particulars of land ownership. 
Registered as öşrî, haracî, or mirî, land either belonged to Muslims, non-Muslims, or 
the State, respectively.309 Such differentiation had crucial implications for the State in 
terms of revenue—non-Muslims paid cizya (a head-tax), in conformity with the 
Shari‘a.310 Visible othering, which, “for instance, determined the color codes for non-
Muslims, stipulating which color of robe or shoe a scriptuary was forbidden to wear, 
such as bright green robes or yellow shoes,”311 was also codified by the State (again, 
until the nineteenth century). Aside from these, an overarching rational and universal 
legal framework for everyday affairs applicable to all subjects was absent from the 
Ottoman mode of administration. This is reflective of the Ottoman mode of government 
until the era of centralization, in the era that commenced with the reign of Mahmud II 
(1808-1839). Prior to this, the government provided basic necessities (e.g. protection) 
and allowed communal disputes to be resolved locally internally, through religious 
authorities. The interests of none had yet been tied to the interest of the State.  
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Residence patterns of premodern Istanbul reflected collectivities based on religious 
persuasion. The extent to which communities were isolated from one another remains 
arguable. Neither does compartmentalization of the city and its residents necessitate that 
the State’s identity and rhythm was solely and forcefully driven by Islamic doctrine. It 
remains difficult to ascertain to which extent religious residential communalism was 
state-sponsored. While the State seems to have encouraged basic visual markers for the 
religious adherence of its subjects (e.g. sartorial regulations, animals that were allowed 
to be owned, etc.), it is difficult to gauge to which degree it enforced the hypothetically 
insurmountable walls that sectionalized the city, closing off one religious community 
from another, and creating the memory of Istanbul as a segregated society. Aside from 
this being strictly the result of the will and imposition of the State, the Ottoman city 
could have also urbanized in this manner, because, as in all preindustrial societies, the 
primary marker of identity and authority within a given community was religious rather 
than civic. Determining the State as the absolute arbiter of residence pattern denies the 
city’s residents agency to have chosen to live in the proximity of those with whom they 
shared common affiliation with, in the context of a decentralized framework where the 
government was often absent. The argument that the religious laissez-faire-ism pursued 
by the State may have resulted in the instinctive development of settlement patterns that 
kept individuals with a shared religious identity in the same community is not a quixotic 
one. Residing in close proximity to secular representatives of the sacred, who were also 
dispute moderators, was also practical. State regulation can coexist with personal 
agency; the two can impact one another without defining one another.  
Residence patterns being reflective of religious collectivities created a premodern 
urban landscape consisting of a patchwork of neighborhoods and districts that branched 
out of churches, mosques, and synagogues. Not without exceptions, these communities 
were intrinsically defined by faith. By their very nature, they developed out of 
monumental cores that were not only based on the most common and imperative feature 
of the community, but also granted access to those who would implement (divine) 
justice: the mosque, synagogue, or church. The religious and legal authorities operated 
within an organizational hierarchy. Depending on their position within the structure, 
they were granted the power to resolve minor disputes locally in their capacity as 
representatives their faith’s institution within the Ottoman dominions. These were 
dynamics that did not change in the era of reform. Late-nineteenth century foreign 





office, was the civil chief of his community…a recognized officer of the civil 
government.” 312  Until the Tanzimat reforms introduced mixed courts, except for 
moments of intercommunal tension, the dhimmi self-governed on a micro and macro 
level—nevertheless, final submission was to the State. Local religious authorities 
throughout the dominions were responsible to their respective leaders in Istanbul. The 
ultimate arbiters of justice for each religious community were each protected by the 
Ottoman sultan, and, by the very nature of the description of roles in this relationship, 
were his innate subordinates.  
Residential groupings according to religion did not render Istanbul cleanly divided. 
It is in this regard that the argument for the State-imposed religio-hierarchical urban 
stratification of Istanbul must be approached skeptically. Pre-nineteenth century 
residence patterns in Istanbul reveals a city whose overall composition consisted of 
mostly-homogenous religious enclaves that did not necessarily border others of their 
kind. In fact there are some quite paradoxical and counterintuitive settlement patterns 
around some urban monuments and landmarks. For the sake of example, one can 
consider the practical aspects of the fact that one of “the largest Jewish cemeteries in 
Constantinople”313 was in a ‘Christian’ neighborhood. Accordingly, Istanbulite Jews 
from diverse origins within the capital would have had to traverse to and across one of 
the city’s Christian neighborhoods in order to perform the rituals of their faith. This 
would have necessitated borders that could have been transcended by ‘outsiders.’ 
Perhaps more importantly, it would have presented a contact-zone between those who 
were stationary residents in the Christian neighborhood (along with its non-resident ir-
/regulars), the mobile Jewish community, the latter’s stationary landmark, and 
everywhere in between the various origins of the Jewish community, the Christian 
neighborhood, and the ritual point.  
Residence patterns are not dictated by religion, alone. Among others, class and non-
religious cultural affinities factor into neighborhood profiles. Furthermore, Istanbul was 
not made up of three or four or five strictly and religiously compartmentalized (and 
insulated) neighborhoods. The city was a complex patchwork of micro-settlements 
inhabited by groups exhibiting shared cultural variables and constants, which included 
religious persuasion. If one is looking at pre-Tanzimat Istanbul with an eye for religious 
segregation, s/he is bound to find it. What is often missed in the process, however, is the 
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contact zone. Whether or not, or to which extent, this urban layout was the intention of 
the State, what emerges by the middle of the nineteenth century is that segregation and 
observable distinction based on religious persuasion was no longer the State’s 
priority—most evident from the fact that the state apparatus had, itself, relocated to the 
‘infidel’ zone, across the . Despite this shift and its visible manifestations symptomatic 
of Ottoman modernization, outsider observers resisted de-segregation and persisted in 
recording their version of the city in neatly-ethno-religiously-compartmentalized, 
premodern, terms. This version of the city endured as a staple of the metanarrative even 
beyond the Hamidian regime, through the ‘end of empire.’  
The City, Through Foreign Eyes  
Due to the Orientalist’s taste for travelogues, Great Power nationals were the ones 
who penned most surviving foreign accounts of late-nineteenth-century Ottoman 
Istanbul. For them, the city was almost invariably Constantinople. Whether an 
ephemeral visitor or indefinite settler, and despite their insistence on the strictly 
compartmentalized nature of the city, they had access to Istanbul’s neighborhoods—
they recorded their museum inspired impressions of all of them. In this manner, their 
own texts challenged their assertions about the nature of the city. Rather than being a 
textual representation of neat and distinct groupings of identities (and their material 
extensions), more often than not the scene they described was mesmerizing confusion. 
De Amicis saw an urban silhouette in which he observed  
…among the Turkish dwelling-houses European palaces rise suddenly up, spires 
overtop the minarets…roofs of Chinese kiosks appear above the façade of a 
theatre…side by side with open balconies and terraces are found Moorish 
buildings with recessed windows and small forbidding doorways.  Shrines to the 
Madonna are set up beneath Arabian archways; tombs stand in the 
courtyards…mosques, synagogues, Greek, Catholic, Armenian churches, crowd 
one upon the other, as though each were striving for the mastery…314  
Contemporary vestiges of Ottoman monuments attest that the above description of De 
Amici’s was more representative of Istanbul than the accounts that insisted on the 
division of Istanbul and the assertion that Stamboul was Muslim, and, across the Golden 
Horn was where the Christians resided, which is, incidentally, also how De Amici 
sometimes described the city.315 Thus, narrators were prone to self-contradictions.  
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In reading Hamidian Istanbul through foreigners’ accounts, one encounters the 
previously detailed segregated city and the physical clustering of ‘minority’ populations 
into certain districts according to religion. The same observers’ accounts of the social 
interactions and the urban, material, makeup of the city are often also the testimonies to 
their counterargument, however. There existed in Istanbul districts whose residents 
were overwhelmingly Muslim, Jewish, Armenian, Greek, or Frankish to the degree that 
Fener was described as the Greek quarter, Balat, the Jewish “Ghetto,”316 Kasımpaşa the 
Muslim district, and Kumkapı the Armenian. Such labels were subject to (sometimes 
extremely lenient) exceptions that they were consistently denied. In Istanbul it was 
possible to,  
... at every street-corner, ... come upon a new race or religion…pass among tombs 
and mosques, churches and synagogues…encounter handsome Armenian women 
with fine matronly figures, slender Turkish ones who steal a look at you through 
their veils; all around you hear Greek, Armenian, Spanish—the Spanish of the 
Jews.317  
Multi-denominational sharing of space amongst Istanbul’s population was accelerated 
with the Tanzimat and intensified with the legal reforms that the Hamidian state 
inherited, which had eliminated visual distinction among Ottomans and had declared 
them equal before the law—at least, nominally—regardless of race or creed. Rose 
Chamber and Reform Edicts, the Nationality Law and the Constitution reinforced the 
State’s attempts to legally assimilate all constituents of the nation-under-formation. The 
Hamidian regime continued along this path with education.  
To whatever degree segregated residence patterns were an accurate reflection of 
social realities prior to the Hamidian era, they could no longer be claimed as official 
state-impositions in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Furthermore, 
community patterns had already begun to markedly alter in the preceding century. The 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mixed the Ottoman population—minority, majority, 
local, and foreign—to a greater degree than theretofore observed (or acknowledged). 
Edhem Eldem, notes that in the eighteenth century, residence patterns had 
“peripheralized”318 the traditional center of Istanbul (into what he terms the “no man’s 
land”) 319  and created communities that were more diverse than ever before.320  Neither 
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were such trends limited to the plebeian. In a move that has been interpreted as “not 
innocent… [since it] reflected the symbolism embodied in the western style of these 
new imperial buildings as well as in their location in the quarter most identified with a 
western presence and influence”321—the literal ‘house(s) of Osman,’ too, were relocated 
from Stamboul and across the Golden Horn.  
The Golden Horn, a Demarcation between the Faithful and Infidel  
Of the aforementioned appellations that designated Istanbul and its various parts, 
there was a distinction made by nineteenth-century Europeans between Stamboul and 
Constantinople. Galata and Pera were a part of Constantinople, and were presumed to 
be the European quarters. Though a short walk away from each other on the wooden 
Galata Bridge, “how far away they seem[ed]! [... from] Stamboul.”322 Stamboul was 
associated with “wood, poverty, and decay, filled with dirt, wretchedness and 
misery.” 323  It belonged to ‘Turks,’ who were patronizingly described to be pure, 
sorrowful, and more Oriental. Edmondo de Amicis, for example, found Stamboul to be 
somber and silent. It was a place that was “Eastern in its strictest sense.”324 There,  
everything breathes of jealousy and suspicion…[it is where] laughter and people 
appear and disappear, windows and doors open and shut, all motion is a 
hallucinated glimmer in a sea of stillness and melancholy that is assumed to 
characterize the Turkish way of life.325  
Alas, it was, again, these neighborhoods, hoping to encounter “a favorite beauty of 
some harem… [that he, instead, was confronted with a] European lady in bonnet and 
train.” 326  Over the course of the foreign visitors’ museum of life on an “entirely 
Turkish”327 street, one found it hard to “believe ... when a large car rolls gayly into sight 
over some tracks which up to that moment ... not noticed, filled with Turks and 
Europeans.” 328   Istanbul, lived, was inevitably more complex than Constantinople, 
imagined, hence the inconsistencies that permeate the accounts of those prepared for 
one version of the city. 
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One sees in the contradictory accounts of Europeans in Istanbul traces of their 
preconceived notions tainting their field of vision. Most such accounts of the Galata 
Bridge, connecting what is assumed to be Muslim/Turkish Stamboul to the ‘Frengistan’ 
of Pera are similar. They described a zone that was a visual carnival, 
…thronged with an endless stream of human beings of every race and country, 
passing to and fro unceasingly from morning till night.  It was like glancing 
through an ever-changing kaleidoscope to watch the motley crowd surging across 
it: Greeks, Armenians, Circassians, Arabs, Tatars, Persians, Albanians, 
Montenegrins and Turks, in every style of native costume or military uniform; 
some walking, some on horseback, others riding donkeys or mules, or driving in 
arabas or carriages.  Beggars lined each side of the bridge, exposing their leprosy-
covered limbs, while street dogs prowled around vendors of pistachio nuts and 
Turkish Delight.329 
Comparing the above description by an Englishwoman who lived in Istanbul for the 
entirety of the Hamidian regime with that of Edmondo de Amicis, one does not come 
across too many differences. Traversing the bridge of Galata, de Amicis describes what 
was laid before his eyes as “a mixture of race and dress you never conceived before.”330  
He noted Turks, Armenians, Bedouins, Greeks, dervishes, European ambassadors, 
Persian regiments, Druses, Kurds, Maronites, Telemans, Pumacs, Kroats, Hebrews, 
Catholic priests, Sisters of Charity, nuns of the Stigmata, Jesuits, African slaves, 
eunuchs, Albanians, Tatars, Jewesses, Maltese, a French “cocotte” [flirt], Russians, 
Circassians, Syrians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Egyptians, Tunisians, Wallachians, 
Ukrainians and Georgians.331 Each was clad in either traditional garb or the “latest 
phase of Parisian fashion…between the rich clothing on the one hand and the miserable 
rags on the other.”332 There were children and adults, both men and women; their colors 
of their skin ranged “from the milk-white Albanian to the jet-black slave of Central 
Africa.”333 The bridge was described as being occupied by “the beautiful and…the 
horrible…a pilgrimage of decayed races and humbled nations.”334 Each was passing the 
other without notice, acknowledgment, or a second look.335  
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Few visitors to the city noted diversity that was not racial. Mark Twain, who saw 
the city as an “eternal circus,”336 and, indeed, described it as such, saw more than an 
ethnic medley. He compared the deformities that were to be observed in the various 
cities he had visited in Italy with those in Constantinople, for example. He began with a 
hypothetical scenario, i.e. “[i]f you want dwarfs—I mean just a few dwarfs for a 
curiosity—go to Genoa,”337 and the stream of thought came full circle with  
[...] but if you want to see the very heart and home of cripples and human 
monsters, both, go straight to Constantinople. A beggar in Naples who can show a 
foot which has all run into one horrible toe, with one shapeless nail on it [...] 
would not provoke any notice in Constantinople. The man would starve. Who 
would pay any attention to attractions like this among the rare monsters that 
throng the bridges of the Golden Horn and display their deformities in the gutters 
of Istanbul? O, wretched impostor! [...] Bismillah! The cripples of Europe are a 
delusion and fraud.  
Twain then continued with the specifications of what he witnessed on the bridges and 
“the byways of Pera and Istanbul.” 338  Whatever diversity was described—Galata 
Bridge, or elsewhere—the problem was that these individuals who colored the travelers’ 
accounts were denied belonging in the city. They were not given a place, for example, 
in sections that described the inhabitants of the city. Residence in the sultan’s 
dominions was understood to be “residence among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, 
Turks, and Armenians.”339 Bulgarians and Albanians were a generous addition to an 
otherwise much narrower description of the city’s inhabitants. 
Contrary to the implications of the dichotomy existing between the two sides of the 
Golden Horn, the walk across the bridge (which is a passage, not a destination) 
represents an entry and an exit, from both Stamboul and Pera, of “human beings of 
every race and country.” 340 It therefore signifies the collision and mixture of diverse 
lives and identities on both sides of the bridge that individuals like De Amicis so easily 
assigned distinct identities to, because they did not disassociate what they saw in 
Istanbul from what they had expected to see. Deep-seated continental prejudices were 
also reflected in the harshness with which they approached certain communities. After 
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describing the neighborhood of Hasköy, an overwhelmingly Jewish neighborhood, de 
Amicis was not kind to the bearers of the burden of destitution; 
…on all sides dirty children covered with sores were rolling on the 
ground…men clad in long, dirty cloaks, with tattered handkerchiefs wound 
around their heads…thin, meager faces peered out of the windows as we went 
by…mud and litter everywhere…341  
Hasköy was where many of those who came to Istanbul to escape persecution in Spain 
had settled in the sixteenth century. By the nineteenth century, similar to other areas 
where Jewish residents constituted the majority, Hasköy had suffered a decline in 
prosperity to the point that one could see poverty and filth on its streets. For De Amicis, 
this dire condition was one that Jews had brought upon themselves, by merely being, 
whereas historians have suggested this dearth to be a consequence of “structural 
changes caused by increasing ties with Europe.” 342  These structural changes had 
resulted in tighter economic and political cooperation between the representatives of the 
Great Powers and Christian Ottomans, i.e. “Greeks and Armenians may have replaced 
prominent Jews in trade, fiscal and monetary matters during this century because 
Europe preferred to deal with Christians.” 343  It becomes evident that De Amicis’ 
interpretation of the Jewish ‘condition’ is more a reflection of deep-seated home state 
prejudices than an accurate representation of socio-economic circumstances within the 
Ottoman state.  
Home state prejudices were persistent in long-term Great Power nationals that were 
generation 1.5 residents of the city, as well. One comes across a similar attitude by 
Dorina L. Neave Clifton, an English resident of Istanbul, who had been brought to the 
city at a young age because her father had secured a consular job through connections 
with a Mrs. and Mr. Hanson. The latter were economic migrants, they had come to the 
city “as a young married couple, set out from England to seek their fortunes in the 
East.”344  Clifton was a British resident of Istanbul until her twenty-sixth birthday, 26 
August 1907, and wrote two ex post facto accounts of her impressions,345 which is a 
veritable testament to the persistence of home state metanarratives, and their ability to 
infiltrate and shape perceptions.  
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Clifton’s views and accounts of Istanbul and its residents are reflective of the 
impressions manufactured and consumed in Britain. Despite the fact that she spent her 
most formidable years in Istanbul, her understanding of Istanbul’s social dynamics are 
only slightly deeper than an ephemeral visitor who had never been exposed to Istanbul. 
This is not surprising, however, since her status and position in Istanbulite society 
depended on her maintaining her distinction from the local population. She lived in 
what she called a ‘colony.’ According to her recollection, the region of her family’s 
residence, Kandilli, was a favorite amongst the British. Kandilli was also home to many 
less-accounted-for Armenian and French residents. The settlement was on neither side 
of the Golden Horn, but on the Asian side of Istanbul, across the Bosporus. Clifton’s 
account does, nevertheless, demonstrate that the same foreigner perceptions of the city 
and its residents crossed land and water—and originated not in Istanbul, but across the 
continent. This is even more evident when one realizes that such Great Power colonies 
as Clifton’s were, indeed, more isolated than any other ‘segregated’ district of 
Istanbul—by choice.  
The pervasiveness of the Great Power metanarrative makes itself evident most 
profoundly in Clifton’s descriptions of Turkish women. She finds their condition 
agonizingly desolate and thereby reveals herself to be both influenced by the narrative 
of her home state and simultaneously unaware of its utility in diverting attention away 
from the social and sexual repression women were contemporaneously subjected to in 
Victorian England. There are contradictions here, as well. Her memoirs are flooded with 
disappointment about women being confined to the home, but simultaneously illustrate 
resistance by ‘Turkish’/Muslim women, who were “considered of so little account.”346 
Those Clifton writes of continuously challenge cultural demands and social 
expectations—from engaging in innocent flirtation with her brothers, to dressing her up 
in Muslim attire, to sneaking their ways into being photographed, and much in between. 
Clifton’s memoirs also affix to Istanbul the label of a segregated society without 
proving it. She recollects that Muslims and Turks were fearful being discovered in the 
company of foreigners and Christians. She explains, “under the sultan’s espionage 
system Turks ran the risk of being arrested if they received visits from foreigners or 
were even seen talking to them, or if they entered a foreign embassy or consulate.”347 
While it is true that Ottomans and foreigners were often placed under surveillance by 
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the sultan who ruled “with a rod of iron”348 there is little to support the assertion that 
interaction was crime enough for an accusation that would have ‘inevitably’ “entailed 
prison or death for the person renounced.”349 Abdülhamid’s spies do not seem to have 
deterred meaningful exchange, or even intimacy, between those who were Ottoman and 
foreign. This is proven by Clifton’ own recollections of the many Turkish friends whose 
company she kept—including the sultan’s nephew.  
Clifton’s generalizations about ‘Turks’ are based on limited exposure to elites of 
Ottoman society who navigated a different set of restrictions than those she extended 
their experiences as a general condition to. The same is true for the predominantly 
Christian Ottomans with whom she had a more intimate relationship, since they shared 
her quarters as her domestic help. Others she had limited exposure to were those who 
were associated with Pera. Her (preferred) foreignness in Istanbulite society allowed her 
common ground with others who shared a similar experience. Pera was an opportunity 
for Great Power agents and representatives. In it, they were able to maintain a self-
designated degree of anonymity all the while retaining their cultural supremacy. Despite 
the fact that many of them had ended up there for opportunities unavailable to them in 
their homelands, features of their identity that had previously contributed to their 
marginalization could allow for them to climb the social latter. Their superiority was 
reinforced by embellishments in Pera’s urban landscape. The atmosphere blissfully 
hovering over ‘Constantinople’ was homage, a validation for Great Power national’s 
self-proclaimed cultural claimed superiority. Progress could be observed in the cafes, 
theatres, and vice, the same symbols shunned by some contemporary Ottomans as 
symptoms of cultural degeneration. 
Pera was repeatedly compared to a European metropolis—be it Paris or Vienna—
while Stamboul was its Oriental other. The heavy concentration of foreign nationals and 
expatriates in Pera was not solely due to the perceived progress it embodied, however. 
Perhaps most importantly, it was because the embassies were located either in them, or 
within close proximity. Association with embassies guaranteed social and legal 
privileges for foreign nationals and foreignized members of the indigenous constituency 
capitulatory privileges. The social gatherings (e.g. balls) organized by the embassies 
were less significant than the fact that they symbolized the protection foreigners 
received by their home states whilst in Istanbul. In the words of one United States 
                                                






national in Istanbul, such protection included rights of each foreign community in 
Istanbul to have “its place of worship, its mill and bakery, its consul, and the right to be 
tried by the consul… The foreigner is also secured against arrests and domiciliary 
visits.”350 Thus, rather than being forced to rescind there, as consuls and their entourage 
had been in the premodern era, the high concentration of Great Power economic 
migrants in Beyoğlu in the nineteenth and the early nineteenth century was due to the 
fact that their monumental cores were their embassies, networks, and secular and 
religious schools. One can gain an impression of the level of one foreign community’s 
entrenchment into Istanbulite society, by evaluating such monumental cores.   
Cultural Imperialist ‘Colonies,’ the French Example 
Evaluating the presence of foreigners in the Ottoman capital in a manner that 
simultaneously tests the self-contained compartmentalization theory is through an 
analysis of the self-proclaimed colonies’ modes of existence. Many members of the 
Great Power national colonies in Istanbul were driven to the Ottoman capital by 
economic incentives. Eldem discusses the central place French traders and merchants 
occupied by in the Galata market after having ousted Italians from dominance in 
“Istanbul: from imperial to peripheralized capital.”351 In the dynamics of trade networks 
of Istanbul, the French were able to claim and maintain ascendancy in the struggle for 
power and autonomy between local forces and the foreigners until the French 
Revolution. 352  By the end of the nineteenth century, though Britain had come to 
dominate economically, both the British and the French began to face fierce competition 
by Germany—vying, as of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, for both cultural, 
political, and economic influence. Eldem’s study reveals that French traders had 
virtually no interaction with Muslims, and that it was “generally impossible for the 
French to communicate directly with them.”353In seeking evidence for interaction, one 
thus transcends the trade network to discover that other occupations made it more 
possible for Great Power subjects to collide and ‘communicate directly’ with ‘others.’ 
The French, were not just traders. They were, among other things, also agents and 
disseminators of French culture, religion, and technology in the ‘Orient’—in social 
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fields that, by the nature of their undertaking, necessitated contact.354 Due to Great 
Power competition, Istanbul became a zone of contestation. Britain was an economic 
and political forerunner, while the French and German dominated the cultural sphere.  
French and German investment in their ongoing battle for cultural supremacy in the 
‘Orient’ over the course of the Hamidian years was an enterprise that not only 
transported their nationals to the Ottoman domains and its capital city, but also made 
their agents’ collision with the local population (and, each other) a requisite of the 
mission. One sphere in which this can be observed is in education. The linguistic 
competition underway in the religious and secular, foreign and state-ran, public and 
private, schools, was one filed in which stakes for spheres of influence were being 
hedged. One can evaluate the level of penetration through reports that colonies printed 
on their own activities. An example is the 1907 La France à Constantinople report on 
(and by) the French ‘colony.’ It was originally printed in the Revue Commerciale du 
Levant (the monthly periodical of the French Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul),355 
which included a report on the colony’s educational activities. Records like La France à 
Constantinople are useful because they indicate the level of entrenchment of foreign 
institutional infrastructures operating within Ottoman domains, and therefore the 
presence of foreign administrators and educators. They are additionally informative 
because of what they reveal about the demographics, e.g. ‘foreign’ students were 
presumably attached to nuclear families settled in Istanbul. A French school does not 
prove to have been conceptualized into existence to benefit the French student, for 
example—they never made up a significant enough proportion of the student body. 
French entered the Ottoman curriculum under the reign of Mahmud II. It was the 
State’s initiative and was, at first, exclusively implemented in elite state schools. As the 
nineteenth century progressed, the language began to be taught in the classrooms of 
more and more secondary schools. By the time Abdülhamid’s reign, French had become 
a major language, in both the cultural and pedagogical fields. The Mekteb-i Sultani, a 
state school, offered a science degree for which the curriculum was entirely in French. 
The infiltration of French language and culture did not please the domestic constituency 
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unanimously, however, since according to some late nineteenth-century Ottoman 
critiques of ‘Westernization’ and the ‘Alafranga’ (e.g. Ahmed Midhat Efendi and 
Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem), it was also the language of pretension. Nevertheless, at the 
turn of the twentieth century, “a total of 62,336 students in the Ottoman state were 
recorded as learning French in various schools.”356 As previously stated, the French 
were not the only one of the Great Powers educating Ottomans and foreigners in 
Istanbul. The focus of this section being the French is simply meant to illustrate the 
degree to which they were successfully integrated into Istanbul’s cultural fabric, yet 
simultaneously assertive of their difference. It must be kept in mind that British, 
American, German, and Italian education and institutions were also visible and present 
in Istanbul and elsewhere in the Ottoman world—even if they did often teach/in French.  
The identity attributed to the target population is critical in the evaluation of 
language as a component of cultural imperialism. French educational institutions, both 
secular and religious, listed their student bodies in terms of nationality. These records 
reveal a noteworthy discrepancy between foreign individuals and their respective 
institutions vis-à-vis the indigenous population within the Ottoman dominions. They 
reflect the gap between the popular narrative dictated by the State and its apparatus to 
its populace, and the official discourse with which it conducted its affairs. In other 
words, while Great Power states geared their national individuals to regard members of 
the Ottoman constituency in ethno-religious and civilizational terms, their institutions 
categorized them in nationalized terms. It was not unusual, therefore, for a French-
operated school to count ‘Ottoman’ pupils and classify them without further distinction. 
Thus, despite the fact that the Ottoman Christian constituency was the one to have the 
most contact—and privilege—with foreign colonies, the ambitions of the institutions 
prove to be broader. 
Ottoman students constituted the greatest majority of pupils at each French school. 
As reported in the Revue Commerciale du Levant two years prior to the end of the 
Hamidian regime, i.e. 1906-1907, the French administered four secular and twenty-
eight religious schools in Istanbul. Between the years 1872 and 1907, these schools 
taught an annually average of over 8,000 pupils belonging to eighteen nationalities and 
split (unevenly) over eight denominations of the Abrahamic religions.357 Neither were 
                                                
356 Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 96. 





these statistics inclusive of a new organization that arrived in Istanbul in the nineteenth 
century: the French Roman Catholic congregation of les frères Écoles Chrétiens. The 
les frères initiated the process of establishing themselves in Ottoman domains in 1840. 
Their first branch was founded in Galata. By the end of the century, there were eight les 
frères schools dispersed around Istanbul (in Haydarpaşa, Pera, Feriköy, Galata, Taksim, 
Pancaldi, and two in Kadıköy). 358 By 1897, when les frères established their last school 
in Feriköy, the congregation was in charge of the education of 1,242 pupils in 
Istanbul.359 Of the 1,735 combined pupils in 1906, Ottomans pupils constituted 670 of 
them, followed by Italians who constituted the second most populous nationality group 
with 278 pupils.360 In fact, the 157 French nationals only came in fourth among the 
eighteen nationalities of the school listed (one was labeled ‘divers’). They followed the 
242 Greek students. 361 By 1907, the numbers had reached 1,800.362 The les frères could 
boast about impressive numbers and diversity of their student body, but they did not 
cater to the greatest number of pupils amongst the French institutions.  
According to the Revue report, one of the most populous French schools of Istanbul 
was the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) schools (with over 3,200 pupils in Istanbul 
at the turn of the century).363 Despite the overwhelming majority of their pupils being of 
Jewish heritage, “contrary to public opinion,”364 their student bodies included a meager 
sum of those who adhered to other faiths (e.g. the Galata branch had 39 non-Jewish 
students of a total of 760).365 The AIU set up its first committee in Istanbul three years 
after being established in France in 1860. Soon after, it began establishing schools 
throughout the dominions. The internal politics of the AIU serves as microcosm for 
Great Power politics as they were expressed abroad. A German branch was also 
established in Istanbul, largely through the funds of S. H. Goldschmidt, in 1895. The 
Franco-German linguistic competition carried out in their Ottoman schools eventually 
exacerbated to the point that in the post-Hamidian years; “in 1911 the German section 
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broke totally away from the A.I.U. because the latter refused to change the language of 
instruction to German.”366 This competition extended beyond the realm of linguistic 
education and extended to the militaristic, technological, and scientific fields. 
Germany carving itself a sphere of influence in the Orient in the years following its 
unification would not present a formidable threat to the French until the Young Turks 
Era, and the years immediately preceding the Great War. Over the course of the 
Hamidian regime they had become fierce competitors, nonetheless. This was observable 
from the struggle to teach German in Jewish schools to the symbolism inherent in 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s fountain inauguration in Sultan Ahmet, in 1901. German cultural 
agents in Istanbul were clear, present, and competing. Despite their level of investment 
in the battle for cultural influence, however, they were still unable to effectively 
submerge French ascendancy until the Hamidan era came to a close. Until then, the 
French community in Istanbul could still report with self-satisfaction (despite being 
fewer in numbers than they had been in the 1850s) that their language was the one that 
was “taught in almost all of the schools in the capital.”367 The Germans and the Italians, 
who tried to “vigorously spread”368 their languages in the ‘Orient,’ were left obliged, 
like their American and English counterparts, to also teach in French to be able to 
recruit pupils to their institutions.369 This did not necessarily mean that the Germans or 
other states were unsuccessful in circulating their languages in the socio-cultural 
marketplace of the Ottoman capital. Istanbul was a polyglot and polycentric city and 
“were it not for the ever-present turban or fez, one would hardly know he was in the 
East at all. On every side is heard French, Italian, and Genoese.”370 Nevertheless, the 
French had triumphed when they ensured that their language would reach beyond the 
limits of popular discourse and through the walls of education institutions to a greater 
degree than their continental neighbors. 
The French achieved parallel feats in the cultural-medical sphere with the arrival of 
the heirs of the Pasteurian revolution in Istanbul in the early 1880s. According to Anne 
Marie Moulin, the bacteriologists were agents of (a more noble) scientific 
imperialism—a form that she argues to have benefitted late Ottoman state and society, 
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and aided its eventual transformation into modern nation state.371 Much in the same way 
that the first French instructors arrived in the Ottoman capital nearly a century before, 
the Pasteurian doctors were invited at the request of the sovereign. Abdülhamid had 
reached out to them in the context of the 1893 cholera outbreak. Upon arriving in 
Istanbul, they built the Bakteriyolojihane-i Osmani (Ottoman Bacteriology Institute), 
and changed the medical field through actively leading research and public health, 
focusing on contagious diseases (e.g. cholera and rabies).372 The cultural framework 
that Pasteurian doctors operated under in Istanbul resembled was similar to their 
Alliance Israélite Universelle compatriots, as was their vision for their mission in the 
capital. Dr. Maurice Nicolle was in charge of the post at the Bakteriyolojihane, and had 
been urged to render his services in Ottoman domains, one of the “little civilized 
places… [since it would be] good for French influence.”373 The need to assert ‘French 
influence’ innately assumed the existence of a challenge, which, in the 1890s, took the 
form of German influence as well as the domestic, Hamidian, center.  
The culture of Istanbul was impacted by Great Power competition over spheres of 
influence with one another, along with the State that hosted them. Whether it was an 
increase in the number of doctors and engineers, or a linguistic shift, both those who 
were local and foreign had to adapt to dynamics that were perpetually shifting between 
the dominant, less-dominant, and non-dominant. The battle determined the number and 
types of people entering the Ottoman domains as agents of Great Powers. Once these 
individuals were integrated into the urban fabric of the city, they affected change in 
every aspect of what became a new collectivity, ranging from its mores to its financial 
capital. Competition within the Ottoman dominions, though often pervasive and 
exploitative, was also an opportunity for the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state could 
still benefit, more through choice rather than imposition, from some of the many 
‘changes’ put at its disposal by Great Power representatives. Even if they were 
ultimately driven by their own cultural and individual interest, their science and 
technology could, in turn, be utilized for the interest of the State and thereby shape 
Ottoman modernization.  
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The integration of French immigrants into Istanbulite society over the course of the 
Hamidian years was eased through the existence of established networks. Aside from 
the schools they could teach or have their children educated in, they had national 
hospitals (e.g. l’Hôpital Français Henry Giffard du Taxim) and expatriate societies. An 
example of the latter included the Chambre de Commerce de Française de 
Constantinople and the Société Française de Secours Mutuels (est. 1873), which had an 
Italian counterpart. The Société provided services in matters ranging from free 
medication for minor maladies to midwives to aid delivery for expecting mothers,374 to 
the self-proclaimed French ‘colony’ whose members were self-professed to be “active, 
organized, and economical”375 for a subscription fee of five francs per month (as of 
1907)376 The French also had a press in Istanbul, the Imprimerie Française.  
The press was a heavily contested zone. Given the dominance of French language 
and culture in Istanbul, active subscribers and regular readers of French newspapers 
included the domestic Ottoman educated elite. The British press was an active 
contender for power over information, and sometimes the two even shared the page, e.g. 
the Oriental Advertiser was a dual language production; circulation figures for the 
Anglo-French weeklies were 25,000, and, dailies, 20,000.377  German entry into the 
press of Istanbul occurred in conjunction with the assertion of German presence in other 
realms. The rise of German colonial ambitions in the 1890s occurred in conjunction 
with a boost in its press in Istanbul. German periodicals included Osmanischen Post 
(1890-1895), Konstantinopler Handelsblatt (1896- ), and Osmanischer Llyod (1908-
1919). Home state priorities were not only brought into the Ottoman domains in the 
form of news, however. They also took the form of currency. Transactions within the 
expatriate community, especially in Pera, could be conducted in French currency, and 
were not limited to an exchange of services but also included mutual aid societies, 
endowments and charities, some of which gathered donations and subscription fees 
from members to send back to France (e.g. Section Constantinople de la Dotation de la 
Jeunesse de France de Paris), indicating not only a sense of immigrant attachment to 
the home country, but also evidences that the French expatriate community in Istanbul 
was financially secure enough to spend on ‘causes’ in addition to subsistence. 
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The sense of attachment the French immigrants felt to their country of origin, i.e. 
‘long-distance nationalism,’ was also reflected in their lifestyles—e.g. eating and 
shopping patterns, the types of entertainment they sought, what they read, etc. The 
Grande Rue de Péra, from Taksim through Yüksek Kaldırım was lined with European 
shops. The French alone, catered to every possible need. The owned pharmacies (e.g. 
N° 116, la Pharmacie Parisiene run by M.J. César Rebou of the l’École Supériore de 
Paris), and shops that sold clothing (e.g. Madame Louise Rochet at N° 175 ), flowers 
(e.g. N°249, Leduc), jewelry (e.g. N°383, la Maison Vartan), French wine and food 
(e.g. N° 463, Société des Producteurs de France), confectioners (e.g. 76 Yüksek 
Kaldırım, run by W. Choré), and bookshops (e.g. 6 Rue Sagh, run by M. L. Roy). Such 
shops were not just in ‘Frengistan.’ They were also across the bridge that had come to 
represent the zone of demarcation between ‘Muslim’ and ‘infidel,’ and could be found 
in Stamboul—(e.g. M.A.N. Moussat at 25 Yeni Cami).378 Given prices being equal, the 
French residents of Istanbul preferred to purchase from their compatriots.379 
French immigrant presence reached far and wide in Istanbul, touching every layer 
of urban life. The French owned shops restaurants and hotels, worked in finance and 
banks (perhaps, most importantly, the general director of the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
was a Frenchmen, M. J. Deffès). 380  They were dentists, doctors, veterinarians, 
financiers, midwives, architects, lawyers, engineers, teachers, pupils, nuns, priests, and 
journalists. They served and were served. Culturally, politically and demographically, 
their presence certainly had an impact on Istanbul. Beyond that, however, like any other 
component of it—minority or majority, dominant or non-dominant—their presence also 
defined the city. Like every other community, they changed Istanbul, and Istanbul 
changed them. 
The City, Lived 
Nineteenth century Istanbul was a complex city of interlinked communities that 
were shaped by socio-economic, political, cultural, ideological, and international 
circumstances. Great Power nationals were one among many others—whether 
fishmongers, sex workers, or state bureaucrats—that made modern Istanbul. The above 
section has given particular attention to one foreigner niche within the city. The French 
                                                
378 “La France à Constantinople,” 6–11. 
379 Ibid., 11. 





experience that has been highlighted has illustrated that French nationals, expatriates, or 
exiles in Istanbul were living in a city that was hospitable to them on several levels. 
They had an existence in Ottoman lands that was both imposed and invited; they made 
an impact and were impacted. Capitulatory privileges guaranteed to them by their home 
state granted them the privilege to live above Ottoman law and avoid Ottoman taxes, all 
the while some among of them managed the Ottoman bank and Ottoman debt (through 
the Public Debt Administration, created in 1881). Their homeland associations also 
frequently elevated them above Ottoman society due to the civilizational narratives that 
were propagated to all, and subscribed to by beneficiaries. Those with capitulatory 
privileges traded at more favorable rates than Ottomans in their own lands. They 
educated Ottoman students at their own schools, and in their own language. Amongst 
themselves, members of the ‘colony’ who, at times, preferred the fictitious purity of 
their homogenous company spoke French, went to French doctors and dentists, read 
French newspapers. They bought French food and fashion from French shopkeepers, in 
francs. Most of them were concentrated in a particular area of the city—across the 
Golden Horn—because proximity to their monumental cores, e.g. their embassy and 
preexisting networks, guided their residence patterns.  
Visible French foreigners were heavily concentrated in Pera—an area that yielded 
subsidies for being visibly pseudo-/French. French residents of Istanbul, like any other 
component of the city’s demography, did not just live on one or the other side of 
Golden Horn, however. They were sought in Frengistan and therefore assumed to 
reside there. It thus follows that they were most easily observed in Pera and its 
surrounding regions. They also lived in Stamboul and across the Bosporus. Dorina 
Clifton’s memoirs attest to French residents in the English ‘colony’s’ settlement of 
Kandilli. De Amicis also writes about the change of demographics on the other side of 
the Golden Horn. Stamboul, 
… once entirely Turkish, [Stamboul] is assailed on all sides by settlements of 
Christians …[a] conquest … [of] churches, hospitals, palaces, public gardens, 
schools, and factories are rending asunder the Mussulman’s quarters, encroaching 
upon his cemeteries, and advancing from one height to another, until already, on 
the dismayed soil, there are sketched the vague outlines of another European 
city.381  
                                                





In the nineteenth century a new Ottoman middle class emerged from educational 
reforms that catered to a centralizing, rationalizing, and expanding bureaucracy. The 
schools of Istanbul, including those aforementioned, formed the new intelligentsia 
whose members were fluently versed in French out of necessity (e.g. if working at the 
Translation Bureau) and desire (e.g. if they were sentimentally attached to the culture). 
Some among them “looked admiringly to Europe and began to imitate European 
manners and to dress himself in French clothes in the name of progress.”382 For others, 
such behavior was a symptom of the disease of social degeneration. For the latter, the 
Frengistan of Beyoğlu had come to be representative of “a poison within the heart of 
Istanbul.”383 Regardless of their level of approval or disapproval or ‘Frenk’384 culture, 
however, what remains crucial is that core and non-core constituency residents of 
Ottoman Istanbul interacted with Pera and its cultural milieu, both directly and 
indirectly. Admirers and critics, alike, were residents of, visitors to, employed in, and 
contested over the space and formed the identity of this part of the city the ‘European’ 
memory of which has underemphasized their contribution to. 
Istanbul of the late-nineteenth century was a complex organism of interactions 
whose character was continually mutating according to the various negotiations 
occurring between and amongst a multitude of Ottoman and foreign identities colliding 
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within it. Understanding the human dimension of this interaction does not only give one 
a valuable impression of what it was like to be an immigrant to late nineteenth century 
Istanbul. It also forces one to reconsider some historical presumptions about the State 
and how it envisioned its relationship with its real and potential populace. The period 
covered here is only one section of a nineteenth century Ottoman Istanbul world that 
has been neatly divided into three well-defined epochs in the historiography: the 
Tanzimat, the Hamidian Regime, and the Young Turk Era have been associated with 
equalization, Islamization, and Turkification, respectively. Studying the lives of 
immigrants, who arrived in one epoch but remained through regime changes, will 
additionally provide a new lens from which to observe what remained constant and 
what was altered. The aforementioned identifiers of the epochs are not arbitrarily 
assigned, and each holds some credence. Nevertheless, an analysis Ottomans and their 
constructed others will inevitably blur some lines and complicate our understanding of 
the Ottoman government and the city that was its capital. The following chapters aim to 
achieve this through the ‘others’ of the visible ‘others’ who were the concern of the 
present chapter. Namely, the forthcoming focus is foreigners that have hitherto been 






 “The Muslim Woman... 
Is the veil an indication of women’s enslavement, or 
their freedom’s guarantor?”385 
Transcending Borders, Negotiating Identities: the Émigré Woman 
The previous chapter’s focus on the dynamics of the visible Great Power foreigners of 
Istanbul simultaneously established that migration into the Ottoman dominions was not 
gender-specific. In the ‘Age of Mobility’ with which the Hamidian era coincided, 
greater numbers of individuals were thrust into motion than ever before. The Ottoman 
territories were destination for voluntary migrants, seeking to better their lots through 
opportunities that existed beyond their birth lands, and a refuge for forced/involuntary 
or impelled migrants who were, ultimately, obliged to seek belonging elsewhere out of 
necessity.386 Those who are the subject of this research are voluntary migrants. Because 
of the Industrial Revolution’s technological developments, their numbers proliferated as 
travel became more efficient and affordable than ever before. Women’s migration was 
prompted by a number of factors—many were the same as those that inspired men. 
Among others, economic opportunity, a quest for anonymity, and missionary activity 
were sought in the ‘Orient’ by both genders. Some opportunities were more gender-
specific. Home education and sex-work, for example, were sectors that overwhelmingly 
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recruited women (though, not exclusively). Furthermore, industries like these often 
recruited women in solitude. What was remarkable in the nineteenth century was the 
density of women’s presence in foreign lands rather than the (timeless) forces driving 
their relocation. Those among them who were visible Great Power foreigners and chose 
to retain the ‘purity’ of their cultural identities by restricting their primary associations 
to self-designated and insulated colonies were able to reap material benefits from 
extraterritoriality. They simultaneously boosted their chances at social mobility because 
of the opportunities provided by being perceived to be the embodiment the superior 
‘difference’ their home states’ cultural mission. Visible Great Power nationals 
contributed to the making of Hamidian national image because the State had to account 
for the possibility of their integration into the Ottoman constituency—the Nationality 
Law gave them equal access to membership, though some did not find an appeal in 
being Ottomans. Not all resident-foreigners in the capital chose to maintain their home-
state allegiances as their primary identifiers, however. Many ventured beyond their 
‘colonies.’ They have left behind enough evidence to reveal their conditions and 
opportunities, both in their ‘home states’ and ‘host states.’ The State’s reception of 
single women who rejected their home states and adopted the Ottoman one, for 
example, further serves as a useful prism unto the State’s self-image as well as its vision 
for the future of its nation-under-construction—especially considering the fact that the 
Hamidian government provided for some of them with what can be categorized as 
‘citizen-benefits’ prior to their naturalization, anticipating their future legal assimilation. 
Great Power Women, Suspended 
Nineteenth-century Great Power women were suspended between their collective 
reality and a new ideal. The thesis of equality permeated the emergent ideals of the 
‘Revolutionary Era.’ Alas, the lives lived by the women who were members of the 
societies that championed this cause bore little semblance to its eventual, or even 
potential, manifestation. Meanwhile, they were asked to consume the myth of belonging 
to a superior civilization. The egalitarian discourse of the ‘Revolutionary Age’ led to a 
reconsideration of some of the basic features of ‘Western society.’ Perhaps the most 
significant and profound consequence of the shift was abolitionism—slavery could no 
longer be reconciled with the new intellectual and moral consensus. 387  Perhaps 
ironically, however, race theories found a new appeal in the same period. Furthermore, 
                                                





the same vocabulary was utilized to refer to almost all ‘natives’ of all of the different 
lands encountered in the ‘Age of Exploration,’ and beyond. In the post-abolition age, 
the generic ‘native’ characterization was still applicable to the manumitted, who were 
not described in terms much different from those describing their ‘nature’ when they 
were enslaved, i.e. “for the most part lazy, irresponsible, cunning, rebellious, 
untrustworthy, and sexually promiscuous.”388 ‘Natives’ retained their designated native 
features despite being transported via the transatlantic triangle to lands they ceased 
being natives in. Abolition was therefore an expression of the self-proclaimed moral 
aptitude of ‘the imaginary West’ rather than of the assumption that slaves were worthy 
of liberation. So far as can be observed, the ‘native’ could not be redeemed, only the 
liberator was redeemed for having inflicted; hence the persistence of institutionalized 
racism. The same rhetoric was employed for 
those whose subjugation to the ‘West’ did not 
manifest itself in the form of absolute 
subordination, i.e. colonial and semi-colonial 
polities, and their indigenous populations.389  
The (global) liberation of native women 
was the ‘Western’ moral venture to succeed 
abolition. This was a field where 
presumptions about innate racial and sexual 
traits (and their various pairings) evolved to 
merge as mutually reinforcing pseudo-
scientific notions that designated status within 
the hierarchical conceptualization of the 
human species—the objectification served to 
justify the subsequent subjugation of one 
society by another. As the nineteenth century progressed, the condition of women 
became one of the means by which civilizational progress could be measured, especially 
in regions where there were strategic political and economic interests. The scientific 
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minds of the Great Powers and North America created the rubric. It is now generally 
accepted that their exerted “power to observe,”390  was itself a demonstration their 
relative supremacy, and yielded the foreseeable conclusion that Muslim and other 
‘Oriental’ and native societies consistently fell short—based on discredited and 
essentialist assumptions that argumentation embellished with nature, organicism, and 
Social Darwinism lent credence to. Consequently, the preferred units for measuring 
progress and civilization in relation to the status of women were not applicable to 
Ottoman society, per se, because an Ottoman had neither race nor creed. One does not 
come across many ‘Ottoman women’ in Hamidian-era accounts. Instead, one frequently 
encounters women who are Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Turkish, Greek, Armenian, 
Circassian, etc. The degraded status of all Ottoman women was the culpa of the 
sovereign with whom Great Power agents were competing, for practical and ideological 
power: the House of Osman. Its sovereign had unambiguously been identified as an 
unenlightened (Oriental) despot by a great majority of Great Power politicians, press 
appendages, and witness-travelers. The women who were assumed to be in the most 
dismal and inferior position were the ones that mirrored his attributes: Muslims and 
‘Turks’391—two terms that were sometimes used interchangeably. Their condition was 
fused with their inferior race, which was conflated with their oppressive religion; the 
Turco-/Muslim woman was therefore oppressed by each of these factors. 
Over the course of the Hamidian years, the Great Power metanarrative expressed 
unequally distributed sentiments of pity for the women of the East. Istanbul was a 
favorite subject for romanticization by traveler and foreign-resident alike. Looking at 
late-nineteenth century Great Power nationals’ reflections on the city’s population, one 
observes suspiciously clear-cut yet self-contradictory descriptions and categorizations 
of Istanbulite women. Furthermore, many ‘types’ of women the historical record proves 
the existence of by other means (e.g. state records and newspaper articles) went 
unnoticed and unrecorded in these traveler and resident counts and were thus rendered 
invisible for their intended audiences. In the overwhelming majority of primary 
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accounts of Hamidian Istanbul, the city’s residents belong to one of five distinct (racial) 
groups: Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and members of foreign colonies. Bulgarians, 
Circassians, and the occasional Levantine are other groups that are also sometimes 
mentioned, in passing.392 The compartmentalized impression of Istanbul (elaborated on 
in greater detail in Chapter II: the City, Incomplete) was sometimes even rendered into 
ethno-cultural topographical maps, which, again, mostly represented the city’s 
population in terms of the aforementioned groups. This perception would remain 
unchanged, even in the post-war era. The “Nationality Map” featured in The Pathfinder 
Survey of Constantinople, for example, divides the city into zones divided amongst the 
same five groups of Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Europeans, while admitting 
“there is more or less intermingling of nationalities in every section.”393 Pera was the 
“European” zone, where it was assumed foreigners were willfully confined. 
The overwhelming emphasis on the previously mentioned five groups does not 
accurately provide a faithful representation of the city’s urban populace. Neither was 
Istanbul so neatly partitioned among them, with those who were attributed the 
questionable identifier ‘minorities and foreigners’ occupying closer quarters to one 
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another than the rest of the city’s inhabitants. As mentioned in the Introduction: Nation 
and Migration, the Dialogical Zone, ‘minorities and foreigners’ anticipates a particular 
identity for both ‘minority’ and ‘foreigner,’ and connotes an equally particular 
relationship amongst them. Among the five groups consistently considered to be 
inherent components of the fabric of Istanbul, the Greeks, Armenians, and foreigners 
were assumed to have more in common with one another than each with the Turks, with 
foreigners still elevated to the highest (cultural and civilizational) status. While 
‘minorities and foreigners’ remains a misleading identifier, it must nevertheless be 
acknowledged that the specific minorities that were assumed to share the same Greco-
Roman-Christian civilizational path as Great Power foreigners (rather than ‘foreigners’) 
were the ones to more frequently became indigenous foreigners by being granted 
protégé status, or adopting the nationality of a Great Power state. It was the women of 
these ‘minority’ communities who often married Great Power nationals, thus becoming 
foreignized from their indigenous Ottoman home-state through dependent citizenship 
clauses written into Great Power states’ nationality laws. A heightened fluidity between 
very specific ‘foreigners’ and very specific ‘minorities’ certainly cannot be ignored. The 
problem with utilizing this compound is that it generalizes a statistical anomaly. With 
respect to the foreign women of Istanbul, it perpetuates a myth. 
Pera provided the most visible women in the most exceptionalized part of the city. 
Foreign women’s association with this locality conjured images of ‘Western 
civilization,’ as it was presented to the Ottomans. Pera’s women—foreign or 
indigenous—were agents and transmitters of Great Power culture. Their form paraded a 
contradistinction. The Ottoman State had to accommodate them, and Ottoman society 
had to negotiate. These women were private teachers that taught young Ottomans their 
lessons and the habit of seeing a woman command authority in a public space. They 
were home educators and governesses whose languages and customs parents chose to 
expose their children to, with the ambition that it would elevate them and their 
prospects. They were shopkeepers who draped Ottoman bodies in the latest alafranga 
fashions. They were missionaries who had taken up the ‘burden’ to ‘save’ Oriental 
women’s lives and souls. Most of all, foreign women (seen in daylight, on 
thoroughfares) were those whose stories reinforced a narrative in the context of the late-
Ottoman state undergoing reform and modernization in a manner that brought Great 
Power customs, fashions, sciences, and languages into the Ottoman dominions, and, 





women who kept their national associations were the women enmeshed in the cultural 
project. They were in to be seen, and, along with their personal interests, they served a 
political role. 
For the Great Power woman who chose to maintain her ties to her home state, 
migration to Pera was relocation to a setting in which she did not need to adopt another 
identity. She could embellish her base identity, the features of which, though mundane 
in her home state, were novelties in the Ottoman capital. Her mother tongue was enough 
to secure her employment. She was not required to be skilled, but if she was, she was 
more competitive in a labor market that promoted her advantage. She did not need to 
adopt local customs or dress, or learn the language. On the contrary, as the image of the 
modern woman marketed to Ottomans, she was there to remind her indigenous 
counterparts that they should be adopting her dress, customs, and language. Ottomans 
were left to accept, reject, or negotiate this purported progress. Though driven there by 
her own interest and initiative, she was nevertheless a successful agent in her home 
state’s cultural mission in the ‘Orient.’ The fact that was muffled was that these women 
were driven to Constantinople by the assumption that their socio-economic position 
would be bettered in the Ottoman domains, because it provided for them opportunities 
that were denied in their Great Power homelands. The reinforcement of neatly 
compartmentalized identities suited the socio-political interests of both the Ottoman 
state and the Great Powers. Both could champion itself to be the protector of women, 
e.g. from Western decadence or Oriental barbarism, respectively. In this vein, each tried 
to unveil the other, to expose shortcomings. One way in which this was attempted was 
through the newly popularized consumer commodity: the printed word. 
Un-/Civilized Domains: Women of the Metanarrative, and their ‘Others’ 
 
The dehumanization of ‘Oriental’ women was a popular theme in nineteenth-
century Great Power Discourse. This was particularly true in Great Britain, where, by 
the period in question, there had developed a co-dependent relationship between public 
opinion and state policy. In line with other Orientalist rhetoric, the proliferation of the 
victimization of ‘exotic’ women gained momentum with increased economic, political, 
and, consequently, moral investment in ‘native’ lands by the Great Powers. Such 
characterizations of ‘native’ women were particularly pronounced and evident with 





century was the British “imperial century”394 and between 1815 and 1914, it gained 
26,000,000km2 and 400,000,000 subjects.395 At the height of the ‘scramble’ for “the 
conquest of the earth,” Joseph Conrad articulated the predicaments of imperialism, 
“[w]hat redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretense 
but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow 
down before, and offer sacrifice to.”396 While he was speaking through the example of 
King Leopold’s Congo, it is generally accepted that Conrad was referring to nineteenth-
century empire. In other words, morality came to be carefully affixed to territorial 
expansion and the ensuing exploitation of subject populations. Justifying the inflictions 
of imperial presence relied upon a dehumanizing discourse, the vestiges of which have 
been dissolving, however languidly, only since the post-modern era. 
Modern European colonial imperialism was, summarily, one of the many faces of 
Europe’s continental competition for global politico-economic supremacy. Measured in 
military and economic might, it was also synonymous with the subjugation, oppression, 
and exploitation of various native populations. The ‘idea’ that came to ‘redeem it’ was 
‘the Civilizing Mission’, or as famously put by British poet Rudyard Kipling: “The 
White Man’s Burden.”397 From Dr. Livingstone in the heart of the ‘Dark Continent’ to 
Indian and Chinese and Native American Missions, the nineteenth century witnessed a 
monumental increase in active efforts of white, European and North American, 
Christians to ‘tame’ and proselytize ‘native savages’ across the globe.398 According to 
the perspective of missionaries, their own “strength” was not “just an accident arising 
from the weakness of others,”399 neither did their success rest solely upon the fruits of 
the industrial revolution, e.g. of a mightier military, greater economic power, and 
technological superiority. Instead, their triumph in ‘conquest’ was explained by divine 
will, with the vocabulary of civilizational and moral obligation. The Christian was thus 
‘burdened’ with the ‘duty’ to ‘civilize’ and ‘save’ constructed, ‘native,’ others. Moral 
entrepreneurs determined that God subordinated those who were being described as 
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“half devil and half child” 400  to the self-presumed heirs of a superior civilization. 
Encroachment was not only justified, but necessary for the salvation of all. The burden 
conflated race and religion (or, lack thereof, for pagans). With respect to the Ottoman 
world, this is most evident by the term Turk being both a racial and religious signifier. 
Accordingly, both were presumed ‘terrible.’ 
The narrative disseminated in the Great Power media outlets, to be consumed by 
the domestic constituency to form public opinion, was by and large unsympathetic to 
Muslims, and pitted the crescent against the cross. It was in line with nineteenth-century 
British imperial realities and interests to propagate a negative representation of 
Abdülhamid as an unenlightened despot who was not only subjugating Christians, but 
also further repressing an already regressive Muslim population (for whom there was 
presented to be hope, if only...).401 It follows that representations of the Ottomans were 
unfavorable to the State’s core religion and society, in general, and to its sovereign, in 
particular. Otherwise, British presence in the Middle East would have been reduced to 
material motives and self-interest—which, especially in the case of Britain, risked 
negative public opinion, since the majority of its own home state constituency was not 
reaping the benefits of empire. Women were of central importance for those who 
‘mobilized bias’ through the merger of international policy, civilizational discourse, and 
moral obligation. 
Despite the Ottoman state’s efforts to build a nation of Ottomans, Muslim Ottoman 
women were often simply identified as Turkish women in the foreign vernacular. In 
describing Turkish women, special pains were taken to propagate their real and/or 
embellished one-dimensional victimhood. It has been established in the literature that 
Turkish women were presented as eroticized harem captives—forced to live in 
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ignorance and without agency. 402  Turkish women’s suffering was substantiated by 
testimonies of foreign (Christian) men and women. Though it is topically and regionally 
not limited to the Ottoman domains, the title of one of these works touches on nearly 
every element that was intended to be conveyed by such accounts: Our Moslem Sisters: 
A Cry of Need from the Lands of Darkness Interpreted by those Who Heard It. The 
answer to the question of who would be there to answer the cries was self-evident, and 
further justified the continued presence of the home states of those who ‘heard it,’ in 
‘Lands of Darkness.’  
Great Power media outlets articulated Islam to be the general culprit of the Muslim 
woman’s condition. Polygamy was regarded as one of the great evils of Muslim 
societies. While it had become quite rare in Istanbul by the end nineteenth century, it 
was still treated as a persistent social and cultural ill, and taken lightly only by a few 
outsiders. One of those who took it lightly was, again, Mark Twain. Twain often fell 
into the ordinary traps of generalization, but was nevertheless a relatively sharp and 
comical observer compared to his contemporary Hamidian-era travelers from the Great 
Power states. It is noteworthy that his description of Istanbul’s social and urban fabric 
was not compartmentalized into the five ethno-national groups, like those coming from 
the nearer ‘West,’ for example. He addressed polygamy within a description of Istanbul,  
Mosques are plenty, churches are plenty, graveyards are plenty, but morals and 
whiskey are scarce. The Koran does not permit Mohammedans to drink. Their 
natural instincts do not permit them to be moral. They say the Sultan has eight 
hundred wives. This almost amounts to bigamy. It makes our cheeks burn with 
shame to see such a thing permitted here in Turkey. We do not mind it so much in 
Salt Lake, however.403 
Twain felt the liberty to suggest the hypocrisy in judging Muslim polygamy, at least for 
a North American condemner who would not have passed the same verdict for 
Mormons. It is likely that he was not condoning Muslim polygamy, however, but rather 
judging the yet un-judged practice of polygamy in the United States through the 
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‘Turkish’ example. Regarding the veil, he described the slightly funny yet slightly 
bizarre and scary nature of the women’s appearance without adding much additional 
value to it, at one point suggesting “they look as the shrouded dead must have looked 
when they walked forth from their graves amid the storms and thunders and earthquakes 
that burst upon Calvary that awful night of the Cruxification.” 404  His associations 
differed from many other Christians who would have hesitated to place a Muslim 
woman in a pre-Islamic Christian context, even in a derogatory manner—they did not 
inhabit the same plane.  
For the average Great Power moralist, the veil deserved a category of its own. It 
needed to be exposed and treated as a material representation of oppression. Despite 
Muslims women not being the only members of the Ottoman constituency to veil, it was 
described as a uniquely Muslim tool of subjugation. In fact, some went further to claim,  
In Arabia before the advent of Islam it was customary to bury female infants 
alive. Mohammed improved on the barbaric method and discovered a way by 
which all females could be buried alive and yet live on—namely, the veil.405  
As for the answer to the question of “What can be done?”406 Saving ‘Moslem sisters’ 
was presented as being as simple as converting them to Christianity. Conversion was 
also an unambiguous tool to win a region in the cultural and imperial game. As claimed 
by one missionary in Egypt regarding the importance of women, “if you get the girls for 
Christ, you get Egypt for Christ.”407 Egypt for Christ was Egypt for the British Empire. 
The condition of Muslim women was used to pass judgment upon progress, which, in a 
cyclical manner, served, again, to reinforce the ‘need’ for Great Power presence in 
foreign lands. Thus a cause for Muslim women and a cause for empire were mutually 
reinforcing. The vocal debate about the condition of Muslim women was not restricted 
to non-Muslim lands. It was a topic that drew the attention of the Ottoman intelligentsia 
and was deliberated on at home, in the press, with com-patriot408 partners in progress.  
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Domestic Ottoman participants of intellectual debates that measured modernity and 
civilizational progress according to the condition of women approached the topic from 
various degrees of nuance. There was a healthy dose of retaliation, in kind, against the 
objectification of ‘Oriental Women.’ The British were not the only ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ of the nineteenth century, despite having greater reach. Ottomans also 
simplified, condensed, and thereby dehumanized their practical and ideological—and 
moral—opponents. Norms and ideals were disseminated for public consumption 
through the printed word in the Ottoman dominions, as well. One of the forms this took 
was through commodities new to the Ottoman lands: the short story and novel. 
Ahmed Midhat Efendi and Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar were two popular Hamidian-
era public intellectual writer-journalists, whose fictional works demonstrate the wide 
array of opinions and depictions of European society, and its women, circulating in the 
Ottoman intellectual space. It suffices here to briefly summarize the image of foreign 
women in two stories that represent the two extremes of the spectrum of impressions 
about foreign women: Ahmet Midhat Efendi’s Su-i Zan (1870). and Hüseyin Rahmi 
Gürpınar’s Mürebbiye (1889). These two stories are additionally useful, because they 
can be interpreted to be in conversation with one another. They are both moralizing 
tales that take the same basic premise of a story, but interpret it in fundamentally 
different ways. Given that much of the moral philosophy and political ideology of the 
era emanated from France, especially since the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” (1789), it follows that the literary 
representations of European society were often French women. In these two tales, they 
are Parisian. Midhat’s Su-i Zan is about Pauline and is set in a household on the 
outskirts of Paris. Gürpınar’s Mürebbiye is about Anjel and is set in an Istanbul 
household; the title takes its name from Anjel’s occupation, ‘mürebbiye’ means 
‘governess.’ Both Pauline and Anjel are assumed to be having simultaneous affairs with 
multiple men, in their respective households.  
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Midhat, also known as the “Hoca-i Evvel” (First Teacher),409 is remembered as 
having been consumed with the task of making “Europe known to the Ottomans” since 
the beginning of his literary career in 1870.410 Despite this, the ‘Europe’ of Su-i Zan is a 
shell with little essence—Midhat opens the story with a drift into a poetic diatribe about 
the weather. Paris is merely a backdrop in a dialogue-heavy cautionary yet comical 
moral tale about a common moral ground: one should not judge or condemn out of 
sheer suspicion. Su-i Zan means ‘false accusation’—a sin according to Islamic 
jurisprudence. Ahmed Midhat thus uses a purposefully unsophisticated Parisian stage of 
Su-i Zan to preach Ottoman-Islamic values. Playing on familiar Ottoman associations, 
the central character of Su-i Zan, Pauline, is suspected of simultaneously having 
relations with three men. It was acceptable (sometimes, promoted) to suggest that 
European women—and society—were morally decadent and lacked sexual mores. Su-i 
Zan’s Pauline being introduced to the Ottoman reader as an unchaste and promiscuous 
Parisian seductress without a sense of moral decency would have been banal. This was 
what readers were told, again and again, about Western society—it was the future to be 
feared for Ottoman women and society, in the event of ‘false’ Westernization. Tanzimat 
and post-Tanzimat literature is flooded with the woes of Westernizing without 
understanding the essence of ‘progress,’ as is Midhat’s ouvre. 411  The theme is so 
familiar that what is presumed about Gürpınar’s Anjel (superficially) closely echoes 
what is presumed about Midhat’s Pauline. 
In the Ottoman era of reform, infiltration of European values and modernity into 
the social sphere, alongside the modernizing apparatus, was interpreted as a danger. As 
such, it was also representable through fiction that assigned symbols to characters. 
While Midhat attempts to layer this ‘danger’ in his canvas, Gürpınar is more skeptical. 
He accepts the danger and exaggerates it. Much like Midhat’s Pauline, Gürpınar’s Anjel 
personifies the negatively perceived features of European civilization and morality. 
Anjel is suspected of the same crime as Pauline, namely of having illicit affairs with 
three men in the same household. Furthermore, her story does not take place in a distant 
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and vague European metropole of the imagination. Straight out of a Parisian brothel, 
pregnant with an unwanted child, Anjel is a second-generation prostitute that makes her 
way into what is presented as an honest and stable home in a very familiar Istanbul 
through trickery and deceit. Anjel stands in stark contrast to Turkish women, whose 
representations are intellectually and physically unflattering. Anjel’s beauty and appeal, 
however, is misleading. 
Pauline and Anjel, along with all they represent, are both, initially, a clear and 
present danger to the moral fabric of Ottoman society and its values. Mürebbiye is a 
cautionary tale about the need to insulate Ottoman homes and society from the influence 
of degenerated European morality. It is a direct warning for families who trust their 
children into the arms of foreign governesses that they should instead be protected from 
them. Through this metaphor, Mürebbiye is simultaneously an implicit warning for 
those who are who unable to distinguish what the author sees as inherent flaws of 
European civilization from an appealing façade.  
Pauline and Anjel toy with the same exact Ottoman cultural and literary intertext 
but convey diametrically opposed messages. When looked at in terms of civilizational 
judgment, what stands out is that Pauline is innocent. Thus, it is actually a defense of 
the falsely persecuted; that which is condemned without being comprehended or 
understood. In the Tanzimat context of Young Ottoman discourse, Su-i Zan could be 
read as a moralizing tale that challenges the critics of Europe and its women, with the 
doctrine of Islam. Pauline is not a vixen, she is more human than most—to such an 
extent that actions interpreted as her illicit relations with three men in the same 
household are, in reality, her desperate need to use the toilet. Midhat would be 
remembered as a critic of superficial ‘Westernization,’ but he did not propose 
insulation. Gürpınar’s antihero, on the other hand, is pregnant with degeneracy and 
arrives in Istanbul with the intention to deceive. Upon arrival she economically and 
morally exploits her hosts through an appealing façade, eventually throwing their 
household into a site of suspicion, competition, armed internal conflict, and disarray. 
Under circumstances in which the Ottoman state was both unable and unwilling to 
completely insulate against the presence of Great Power agents who upheld the illusion 
of their civilizations supremacy in various guises, Gürpınar’s Mürebbiye advises caution 





The difference in treatment of the French woman in the respective works also is a 
reflection of the times that saw their publications. With the advent of the Hamidian 
regime, Midhat was considered to be one of those who had “changed their opinions and 
who now ranged themselves on the side of despotism.”412 Though Su-i Zan was re-
published over the course of the Hamidian years, it was originally written when Midhat 
was “one of Midhat Pasha’s most ardent followers.”413 In fact, Ahmed Midhat Efendi 
was not only an admirer of Midhat Paşa when he wrote and published Su-i Zan but was 
actually working alongside him. They met each other in Tuna in 1868 and traveled 
together from there to Baghdad in 1869.414 In light of this, the cautionary tale against 
the false condemnation of Pauline takes on an additional layer. Midhat, the writer, 
produced Su-i Zan at a time when the argument was whether or not to adopt and adapt 
from European civilization and the dangers it might pose to society. He condemned 
those who rejected the benefits of European civilization, totally, without knowing it or 
realizing that it was not inseparable from degeneracy. Gürpınar published Mürebbiye at 
a moment when the Istanbul household he describes resembled the Ottoman dominions: 
economically and morally exploited (e.g. the Public Debt Administration, the Ottoman 
Bank, the capitulations, missionary schools and societies), a site of suspicion (e.g. 
conspiracies, spies, censorship), competition (e.g. amongst the various domestic 
constituencies), armed internal conflict and disarray (e.g. irredentist nationalisms). In 
1870, one could still wonder if Pauline was really all that bad. By 1889, it was quite 
clear that Anjel did not have the Ottomans’ best interest at heart.  
Ottoman debates about Ottoman women that had core constituent participants 
seemed to, for the most part, revolve around the need to protect women, and, through 
them, society at large. It was, of course, patronizing to assume that women could be 
corrupted by the ills of ‘civilization’ (the verb)—i.e. it would be a “tragedy...to civilize 
irrationally (God forbid!),”415 It was also culturally chauvinistic to assume Islam could 
do them no harm. Due to the manner in which Islam was debated in Great Power 
discourse, however, Muslims who were anti-imperialist could hardly criticize Islam, in 
print. Thus the overwhelming difference between the discussions about Muslim women 
that were had amongst Ottomans, on one side, and amongst their Great Power 
counterparts, on the other, was, indeed, the role Islam. For Muslim Ottomans, Islam did 
                                                
412 Midhat Bey, The Life of Midhat Pasha, 198.  
413 Ibid. 
414 Cüneyd Okay, “Ahmed Midhat Efendi.” 





not strike a dissonant chord with modernity—many male and female members of the 
intelligentsia addressed this in Islamic modernist terms. In a familiar tone, men and 
women defended Islam but criticized its practitioners. The presumption was that 
Ottoman progress would accommodate both Islam and women. This was demonstrated 
as a self-evident truth, made public, by the very participation of women in the 
discussion, like Fatma Aliye and Emine Semiye, the daughters of the Tanzimat-era 
bureaucrat and reformer Ahmet Cevdet Paşa. The audience of these individuals was not 
external, however. Thus the language in which they deliberated made their debates 
inaccessible to the consumers of the metanarrative that was the product of the alliance 
between the policy-makers and the media that had, and has, little room for nuance. 
Ottomans who sought to better the condition of women in the State spoke to an internal 
audience they charged with the responsibility of change. Others sought to make an 
impact by other means, by going abroad, for example, and participating in the Great 
Power component of the discussion.  
Exilic Ottomans who participated in Great Power discussions about women risked 
corroborating narratives that justified the imperialist ambitions of their host societies. 
They seldom publicly attributed the source of Muslim women’s problems to Islam. 
Young Turk Ahmed Rıza (whose religiosity has been questioned) is a case in point, 
since “in their open writings CUP leaders extolled and promoted Islam.”416 Hanioğlu 
reveals Rıza’s more critical private thoughts through his letters to his sister, Fahire. 
After expressing disappointment in the state of the umma and placing significant blame 
on “the fact that the Prophet’s words have been so misconstrued by our God damn 
ignorant imams and softas,”417 Rıza continues,  
Were I a woman, I would embrace atheism and never become a Muslim. Imagine 
a religion that imposes laws always beneficial to men but hazardous to women 
such as permitting my husband to have three additional wives and as many 
concubines as he wishes, houris awaiting him in heaven, while I cover my head 
and face as a miller’s horse. Besides these I would not be allowed to divorce a 
husband who prevented me from having any kind of fun, but would be required to 
submit to his beatings. Keep this religion far away from me.418 
As an anti-imperialist,419 Rıza was careful with what he publicly articulated to be the 
flaws of his society. In this field he presented Islam as something that could be “a tool” 
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to reform Muslim society.420 Ottomans who engaged in external debates about Muslim 
women articulated the same slew of unfavorable conditions as those itemized in the 
dominant discourse of Great Power societies. Rather than attributing flaws to Islam, 
however, over the course of the Hamidian years, exilic Ottomans generally laid the guilt 
of all societal ills upon the sovereign’s shoulders.  
Zeynep Hanım was another Ottoman who fled the Hamidian “régime of terror.”421 
She was also one of the heroines of Pierre Loti’s semi-fictitious Les désenchantées—the 
traveler and scholar Lucy M. Garnett, who is also noteworthy because she accepted the 
legitimate nationhood of the Ottomans and referred to them as ‘Ottoman’ and 
‘Osmanli’422 (rather than racializing the population), described the book as “presenting 
an entirely false view of the aspirations and ideals of the life of the educated Osmanli 
woman of to-day...[and suggested the heroines to be] frivolous and foolishly 
sentimental.”423 Be that as it may, Zeynep and her sister Melek’s published accounts 
were considered to be true accounts of women living under the Hamidian regime by a 
wide readership where they were published: England. In a series of published letters to 
the journalist and suffragette Grace Ellison, Zeynep wrote about the lives of women, 
under “the yoke of the tyrannical Sultan [Abdülhamid II].”424 While Zeynep described 
many reasons for why her “life was just one perpetual nightmare,”425 she let her sister 
Melek’s letter address the topic of the veil. For her, veiling meant  
...to be a slave like your mother, and your cousins, and your elder sister; to belong 
henceforth to the harem; no longer to play in the garden unveiled; nor ride 
Arabian ponies in the country; to have a veil over your eyes, and your soul; to be 
always silent, always forgotten, to be always and always a thing.426  
Melek echoed the Orientalist anti-Islamic rhetoric that was prevalent in Europe at the 
time—even, perhaps, too closely. 427 Melek simultaneously articulated the elite nature of 
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her concerns, e.g. veiling also meant she could no longer ride “Arabian ponies in the 
country.”428 This was symptomatic of the nature of the veil debate, in particular, and the 
beginnings of the women’s liberation movements in general. While the condition of 
Muslim women was abhorred as a collective infliction, it was initially most directly for 
the rights of elite urban women that elite urban men and women vocally fought for—not 
least because they had the literacy and resources for the cause.  
Fiction or not, Melek’s account of veiling mirrors the Great Power metanarrative, 
precisely. The symbolism in her account also demonstrates the dynamics between 
Ottoman and a Great Power woman, perpetuated by the latter, in public-opinion-
forming media outlets. European men, women, and morality were to save the Oriental 
subjugated ‘thing.’ Thus Melek sought salvation in the arms of their representative: a 
governess very different than Gürpınar’s Anjel (incidentally both ‘Melek’ and ‘Anjel’ 
mean ‘angel’). Melek’s English governess. Miss M., told her that “English women and 
children are free.”429 Melek responded that she, too, would go to England. She asked 
her compassionate guardian to take her; Miss M. told her she could not.430 This was the 
stuff that made a perfect metaphor: the caring, nurturing, and free woman of 
independent means represented England and its progress; and in her arms, her helpless 
Turkish other, whose condition was worse than death, since, death was “the only change 
to which a Turkish woman could look forward.”431 So far as those willing to accept its 
verisimilitude were concerned, an Ottoman-Turkish-Muslim woman had vouched for 
their version of truth in a pen that spoke to a European audience in a Euro-American 
language. Through participating in her own essentialization, the ‘Moslem sister’ also 
provided propaganda for the women’s liberation movement in Britain. A Turkish 
Woman’s European Impressions is simultaneously a declaration that British and 
European women were not free, despite having “the impression of being free”432—the 
declaration was made by a woman who would know what captivity was. 
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Conversations that essentialized women were an exchange. Both in the Occident 
and the Orient, respective ‘–alists’ simplified, essentialized, and dehumanized women in 
order to condense them into single-servings of simplified and digestible representations 
of their civilizational others. The women of the metanarratives highlighted what each 
party had left unaddressed vis-à-vis women in their societies, and thus would have to 
reckon with upon their illumination, especially by their civilizational others over whom 
they claimed moral ascendancy. The images represented were not false, after all. 
Instead, they were magnified, exaggerated, generalized, and packaged as an inherent 
part of a given culture, which, if mobile and transportable, was a contagious threat to 
the host state. Regarding Gürpınar’s story, for example, it was in the context of an era in 
which European women were less fixed to their birth-towns than ever before and, “[i]n 
France, each generation of nineteenth-century women was more mobile than the last; by 
the generation born in the 1890s, women were more likely than men to leave their home 
districts.”433 Unlike men, women’s mobility exposed their sexual vulnerability.  
Anjel was not alone in carrying an illegitimate and unwanted child in the streets of 
Paris. In fact,  
...[a]t the beginning of the nineteenth-century, almost 40 percent of all reported 
births in Paris and the surrounding area were illegitimate...[i]n the 1880s, when  
29 percent of Parisian babies were illegitimate, the figure for Vienna and Prague 
was 50 percent, 45 percent for Rome, 40 percent for Stockholm, 38 percent for 
Moscow, and 31 percent for Budapest. By contrast, only 4 percent of London’s 
babies were out of wedlock.434  
London’s figures for illegitimacy are relatively low when compared to other European 
capitals, but they were not always so, as “one index showed a 50 per cent fall in 
illegitimate fertility between 1870 and 1900.”435 It was at some point high enough for it 
to be considered an issue that should enter public law, as the drop in illegitimate births 
in Britain was connected to a series of legislations enacted in the nineteenth century that 
were increasingly protective of infant life and fiscally punished single mothers.436 Just a 
decade prior, in the 1860s, “illegitimate children suffered a very high rate of 
mortality,” 437  infanticide became the ‘national stigma.’ 438  The root cause was the 
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position women and families on the fringes of poverty found themselves in; infanticide 
was one way of responding to pressures of shame, destitute, and desperation. 
Great Power laws worked against the interest of women in the nineteenth century, 
especially in the realm of family and productivity. For instance, women could not 
approach the fathers of their offspring for assistance, as “French law explicitly forbade 
the single mother to search for the father of her child or hold him responsible for any 
child support.”439 In England the 1834 Poor Law, prior to which a single mothers could 
seek assistance from the father and the State based on her single mother condition alone, 
made “corroborative evidence of paternity” a requisite after its legislation, for a woman 
to be entitled to 
...obtain paternal maintenance, and public assistance was provided only in the 
dreaded workhouse. In 1844...for the first time, a woman was required to pay a 
summons fee and the expenses of the summoning officer if she wished to issue a 
paternity suit.440   
Neither did a drop in illegitimacy rates in the second half of the century impact the lack 
of protection single working women were subjected to in Industrial England, since 
“abortion was a significant factor in causing the decline in the birth rate, along with 
increased resort to contraception.”441 The social and sexual vulnerabilities of women 
persisted all the while Victorian society was protected from its evidence. Thus the 
predicament of Anjel—rather than the negative features of her character and intent—
reflected the reality of a significant component of Great Power states’ urban 
populations. Relocation gave women like Anjel the power and anonymity to change 
their circumstances. Single women relocating to a city like Istanbul meant that they 
were placed in labor market in which, due to something as simple as the language they 
spoke, they were competitive and more likely to work under more favorable 
conditions—like Anjel, for example, in a wealthy home as a governess. Furthermore, in 
the Ottoman state, those women who were the most stigmatized of all in Great Power 
states could expect to receive the social benefits that most women in need were denied 
in their home-states. 
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Beyond the Text, and in the Flesh: An Elevation through Relocation  
 
In the process of constructing civilizational metanarratives, both the Ottoman and 
Great Power states were confronted by those who challenged their simple propagated 
self-images. The problem with the dominant discourse in each respective side of the 
imaginary civilizational divide was that it type-casted and denied mobility to women 
who were actually surprisingly mobile, both spatially and socially. Istanbulite women 
occupied every step of the social ladder over the course of the Hamidian years. Some 
were forced into labor through imposed slavery or out of economic necessity;442 others 
were always served. They were educated at home, at public institutions, or not at all. 
They were ‘intellectuals with a social function’ who were given an immortal voice in 
ink and illiterates who were denied the vocalization of their thoughts. Istanbulite women 
both conformed to and defied social norms and expectations. Into their world and the 
complex social fabric of their native city entered privileged and humble migrant women 
from every extra- and intra-territorial direction.  
The foreign women that arrived in Istanbul’s docks or in its Sirkeci station were as 
diverse as their domestic constituency counterparts. There are a myriad of scales by 
which privilege can be measured, e.g. economic self-reliance and the power to dictate 
what to do with one’s own body. Istanbul’s foreign women who were economically and 
(therefore, often) socially privileged included wives of doctors, engineers, ministers and 
rabbis, and diplomats, etc. Humble were the governesses, domestic servants, prostitutes, 
and shopkeepers. Women’s level of dependence, however, was likely to be in negative 
correlation with their capital—both foreign and domestic. Undeterred by such an 
assemblage of diverse and mobile women that lived in the capital of the Ottoman state, 
the image of the ‘foreign’ woman as foil and binary of a harem captive has somehow 
endured. Furthermore, while inhabiting the same city, the Ottoman woman—who was 
not always granted the consideration of not being banally described with the all-
encompassing adjectival of either ‘Turkish,’ ‘Oriental,’ ‘Eastern, or ‘Moslem,’ against 
the greater efforts of the state to create an Ottoman national constituency—reportedly 
had no contact or commonality with ‘minority and foreigner’ counterparts, who were 
without exception assumed to be non-Muslim. The Muslim-Ottoman woman was 
therefore simultaneously subjected to the restrictions imposed on her by society, and the 
                                                





cliché her existence was reduced to for imperialist consumers. With increased mobility 
of the nineteenth century, she was a curiosity for some of the very foreign men women 
sharing her native city. 
The nineteenth century Muslim-Ottoman woman was a specimen to be observed. 
British and French women visitors to her city visited the museum of her ‘prison’ and 
reinforced the narratives of the power paradigms their Great Power states propagated, so 
far as the recordkeeping women were representative of the visible and also-recorded 
European woman who was associated with the idealized Pera. The latter’s gaze was not 
“uncontaminated by cultural conditioning or preconception.” 443  In analyzing the 
manner in which they intellectualized their designated others, Shirley Foster 
demonstrates in that women were not immune to Orientalist and racist jargon.444 In the 
Ottoman realms, they were critical observers who went so far as to almost demand the 
image they expected of the ‘Oriental’ woman they observed, for example. They were 
neither satisfied with local women wearing indigenous attire (which they ridiculed yet 
occasionally masqueraded in)445 nor its alternative, Western attire, which disappointed 
their expectations of what ‘Oriental’ women should look like.446 The Occidental woman 
described here had bought into the dominant narrative, and demonstrated through her 
testimony that “within the nation/class/gender triangle, gender is the least determining 
factor in female travelers’ responses to the harem.”447 She was a critic of the conditions 
that her sex was subjected to in the Ottoman domains and racially essentialized it—
which elevated her degraded status, only by placing another beneath her.  
According to common perceptions that were noted over the course of the Hamidian 
years, Great Power women and Ottoman women lived on different planes that could 
never intersect. This is what has been demonstrated in the above-section concerning 
metanarratives. Accordingly, few (or no) comments were made about the experiences 
the two sets of women, in fact, shared on a symbolic level. Indeed, their circumstances 
only differed in their outward manifestations. This is why it is so easy to entertain the 
proposition that Grace Ellison used Zeynep and Melek’s ‘stories’ to make a case for 
English women—they could not, according to their states, be ‘less free’ than ‘Turkish 
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women,’ or even compared. They could not share the same social inflictions, because it 
was demeaning to the women, and their states. Instead, the Orientalist woman often 
went along with disaffiliating herself from her counterpart’s ‘female experience’ and 
emphasized her belonging in conformity with her state’s narrative. Thereby, the myth of 
her civilization’s supremacy was perpetuated and her own position in society was 
secured (unless she married a Turk, at which point she would be discarded by the same 
civilization she desperately needed to belong to). In the end, then, it was hardly 
articulated at the turn of the twentieth century that both sets of women shared the 
experience of the universal subjugation of their sex. The spectacles in each society 
instead focused on one being a ‘Western woman’ and the other an ‘Oriental’—and each 
was better off than the other, according to the narrative manufactured by the to distract 
the disenfranchised from their own state (of being, and polity to be held accountable). 
The ‘Orient’ was an imaginary place where a woman who was denied agency in her 
own society could claim and assert power over others in the same predicament. The 
cultural intertext for Orientalists and the media-consuming public was that the Oriental 
woman was an exoticized, eroticized, slave and victim with no agency. The works 
dealing with women in the metanarrative section collectively surmise that a Muslim 
woman—wherever, whenever—was kept in ignorance and held prisoner behind the 
walls of her polygamous master’s harem in eternal confinement. Her birth was a tragedy 
and she symbolically died the moment she placed a veil over her head for the first 
time—a juncture dictated by the masters of oppressive patriarchy (e.g. a hoca). Her 
condition was accepted despite the objective fact that in terms of social and sexual 
repression and exploitation, women in ‘Western’ societies—a group described by Emile 
Zola to be the “whole bleeding corner of humanity”⁠448— sometimes fared better, often, 
the same, and, other times, worse than their Ottoman counterparts, upon whose image 
the agony of some of their own predicaments were projected by interested parties (i.e. 
those simultaneously invested in empire and benefited from the domestic status quo).  
Eastbound women who were sexually, economically, and socially vulnerable 
transcended borders of their states with newly-discovered national self-consciousness’ 
and crossed the rumored demarcation between ‘Western civilization’ and ‘Oriental 
barbarism.’ Their choice of the metropole of Istanbul rather than Paris, London, Rome, 
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or Vienna, is not only testament to the discrepancy between the perpetuated image of 
the Orient and the real condition of its women, but is also indicative of the 
contemporaneous currency of ‘Western’ moral and social supremacy that buttressed the 
rhetorical apparatus of Europe’s civilizing/imperial mission in its century of global 
hegemony. While the Great Power woman who maintained her national identity was 
marginalized in her own society, however, she nevertheless exploited being a part of it 
in the Ottoman dominions by claiming supremacy over the indigenous population. In 
relocating to Istanbul, she consolidated in her presence the strength she was theretofore 
denied and accepted her elevation among “inmates”⁠449 and “the most injured human 
beings …ever seen”⁠450 (i.e. not the actual slaves of Ottoman society).451 Despite the 
active part of some ‘Western’ women played in the perpetuation of a civilizational fault-
line, it is evident that they could not have been wholly convinced of it to begin with—
else they would not have evaluated it as being in their best interest to relocate. Thus, 
despite their part in perpetuating the myth, even they were aware of a discrepancy. 
Something was out of place in the Great Power narrative that emphasized a 
sensationally different mode of existence for the women of so-called uncivilized 
domains, articulated home state values in condemning such conditions, vocalized 
idealized conditions for (its) women, and then subjected national (and colonial) women 
to disparate practical circumstances. An obvious dissonance rang in the ears of Great 
Power women (and men).452 Regardless of the volume and circulation of messages 
advocating the superiority of her ‘civilized’ condition in her Great Power homeland and 
despite the rhetoric that took the higher moral ground and dictated how women’s lives 
should be improved in the Ottoman (and every other ‘native’) territory, there was a 
veritable gap between the condition she was assigned and the life she lived. Neither was 
this gap narrow enough to keep her from taking the risk of traveling into domains her 
civilization claimed supremacy over. Over the course of the Hamidian years, this 
entailed travelling into ‘uncivilized’ territories where darkness, despotism, and ‘terror’ 
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reigned. Undertaking such a journey was sometimes the only way a Great Power 
woman could benefit from her society’s rumored superiority. She was a tool for contrast 
in the cultural imperialist game. To help achieve the status she helped attain for her 
home state through her utility, she needed to make her contradistinction seen, which, 
ironically, only became her source of strength beyond its borders. 
The Great Power citizen, male and female, was swiftly and categorically assigned 
membership to a group that was differentiated from the presumed essence of the 
indigenous identity of the State into which s/he made a passage. Once they had arrived 
in the Ottoman capital, foreign women were categorized in the group that was populated 
by the distinct others of ‘native’ Turkish-Muslim-Ottoman women, i.e. aforementioned 
minorities. The artificial and imposed fusion has inadvertently contributed to the 
reinforcement of age-old categorizations that are counterintuitive to a maturing 
understanding of the complexity of Ottoman society (or any other), because neither 
‘minority’ nor ‘foreigner’ were accepted as truly belonging to the setting in which they 
were found—both were assumed antithetical to the Turk. Despite such contemporary 
and retrospective distributions of identities into categories determined by policy makers 
and their affiliates, as will be demonstrated, the actions and words of these women often 
spoke otherwise. They did not fit into the boxes designated by the civilizational 
opposite metanarrative that reinforced the interest of those dominating the higher 
echelons of the existing power structure.  
The most physical manner in which some of the foreign women who were Great 
Power nationals challenged this compartmentalization was through residence patterns. 
The assumed invisibility of the Turkish-Muslim-Ottoman woman and the oppositional 
visibility of her foreign (read, European) counterpart strengthened the legitimacy of the 
civilizational narrative. The stereotypical foreign woman associated with Pera was not 
hidden. Barring the underworld, the visible foreign women of Pera reinforced their 
state’s claims to possess the right to dictate on the ideal condition of women. The 
foreign woman could be a dentist, teacher, seamstress, governess, masseuse, and 
shopkeeper. Alternatively, she might be employed in one of the many industries listed 
in the aforementioned “La France à Constantinople/Revue Commerciale du Levant,” or 
in her personal advertisement in the pages of Istanbul’s press—both foreign and 
domestic. Above all, the foreign woman was ‘modern.’ Whatever her socio-economic 





with her assumed advantage of newfound anonymity. The sectors in which she was 
visible demonstrates that one of the links that was formulated between the foreign 
woman and the idea of modernity was that she was often associated with being a 
productive member of society, i.e. she was employed. 
The image of the Great Power woman in the Ottoman domains conveyed self-
sufficiency. She was a ‘free’ woman who dictated her own circumstances (often to a 
greater degree than she would in her home state); she was enough of a representative of 
her home state’s ideology to be able to challenge the norms of Ottoman society by her 
visibility—especially the place of women in it, she was provoking patriarchy. In her 
independent capacity, a single foreign woman could become a part of a community of 
foreigners, as an individual. If she should have maintained her home state allegiances, 
belonging to European civilization transpired in two degrees: primary and secondary. 
The contrast-perpetuating residents of each Great Power state considered themselves as 
individual colony; this was the primary association. The eastbound foreign woman’s 
secondary association was the larger Great Power community. She was given access to 
the greater Great community through occasions like embassy events that invited and 
catered to Great Power nationals (and alafranga enthusiasts). In addition to her primary 
and secondary associations, the Great Power woman also had access to elite households, 
the aforementioned minority groups, and the alafranga community of Istanbul.  
Great Power and Ottoman fiction and non-fiction dictated that the contacts and 
residences of European women were precisely chartable. It was in the interest of both 
narratives to keep the lines of segregation clean, as the positive and negative 
exceptionalization of the relevant groups was bolstered in this manner (which boosted 
the national interests of each respective state). The countless repetition of this 
sectionalized-city mythology did not make it true, however. Over the course of the 
Hamidian years, the Great Power women did not by default inhabit the ‘European’ 
section of the city, Pera, never crossing paths with their ‘Moslem sisters,’ who were 
assigned ‘Stamboul.’ Foreign and Turkish-Muslim-Ottoman women did not occupy 
different parts of the city, because there were not two sets of women.  
States were prepared for certain cases of transgressions in women’s identity. If a 
Great Power woman should cross the line by marrying an Ottoman, for example, the 
protocol was that she was rejected from her natural-born community and thenceforth an 





of the State of which her husband is;” 453  Great Power laws enforced dependent 
citizenship, the Ottoman law accepted it. Another expected phenomenon was a Great 
Power woman losing her economic self-sufficiency. Under such circumstances, if the 
woman appealed to her embassy for assistance, the cost of her ticket home would be 
paid, and she would thereby be removed from the Ottoman public’s eye. The British 
government interpreted the welfare of the ‘distressed’ national to be ensured by a return 
to the home state. The Consul General of Constantinople billed Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, £15 in January of 1878 “for the passage to Liverpool of Sarah Ellis, a 
distressed British subject.”454 The cost for the passage of a woman and her two children 
could cost £35.455 Indeed, there were enough British women and families that were 
distressed in Istanbul that the Foreign Office delivered the following dispatch as to the 
procedures of what should be done: 
...use discretionary power as to sending home without delay such English families 
as are totally deprived of all means of subsistence and who are without hope of 
gaining their livelihood in Turkey. Consult with Mr. Layard in any doubtful case, 
or when a question arises as to the best and most economical means of sending 
people home [emphasis added].456 
Once these individuals landed home, the State (which dictated where their home was) 
had finalized its obligation. Their condition seemed to cease to matter, once out of the 
foreign public’s eyes. 
The manners in which the cases of ‘distressed subjects in Constantinople’ were 
resolved shielded the Great Power metanarrative from assault. Individuals did not even 
necessarily need to be in distressed to be denied residence in Istanbul; it was decided 
without any particular explanation, for example, that a “William Daston wishing to 
reside again in Constantinople shouldn’t be acceded to.”457 The Great Powers’ authority 
and jurisdiction (to seize and deliver, for no apparent crime) over their (national) 
individuals extended into Ottoman territories. The State may have evaluated sending 
‘distressed’ subjects to the ‘home’ state that was, ultimately, considered responsible for 
their welfare, as being in the best interest of the individuals in question. While these 
individuals were likely to continue being ‘distressed’ at ‘home,’ it was—also—in the 
best interest of the State to have its more self-sufficient nationals represent its image as 
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civil ambassadors to the Ottoman constituency. What respective tailors of national-
images had to come to terms with, however, were those Great Power nationals who 
challenged their civilizational discourse by breaching protocol and rejecting their 
nations out of their own initiative. Their choices instead benefited the Ottoman state’s 
image through willingly adopting—and thereby debunking—the manufactured identity 
of their civilizational ‘other.’ The Great Power women who challenged the discourse of 
their home states most dramatically were prostitutes and converts. 
Out of One Echo Chamber and into Another: Prostitutes and Converts 
In an era characterized by Great Power competition for economic, political, moral 
and cultural supremacy in the physical and spiritual domains of the rhetorical Eastern 
Question, there were women who travelled to the Ottoman state and demonstrated to 
their host society the bankruptcy of their home states’ rivaling claims. While the 
narrative in the British metropole, for example, had for half a century been contrasting 
its presumably free female national against her previously elaborated on enslaved 
Oriental Muslim counterparts who were characterized as “inmates” ⁠458 in print media, 
i.e. “the most injured human beings …ever seen,”459 there were women who converted 
to Islam and disowned their countries to become Ottoman nationals. The Great Power 
women who challenged the civilizational narrative and rejected their home state' claims 
to morality also journeyed to the Ottoman state. Prostitutes also challenged the 
metanarrative; Malte Fuhrmann has skillfully demonstrated the extent of their impact.460 
While challenging Great Power claims about their own superiority, prostitutes provided 
their host State additional leverage by corroborating the Ottoman metanarrative so far as 
it pertained to European cultural degeneracy and moral laxity—the implications of 
Midhat and Gürpınar’s Pauline and Anjel. Thus, eastbound prostitutes and converts, as 
Great Power outcasts, became allies of the Ottoman state in the cultural imperial battles 
that were waged in the Hamidian lands.  
In line with Ottoman depictions of the region and its inhabitants, prostitution in 
Istanbul was concentrated in and within close proximity to what has been characterized 
                                                
458 Harriet Martineau, Eastern Life: Past and Present, 166. 
459 Ibid. 
460 See, among others, Malte Fuhrmann, “‘Western Perversions’ at the Threshold of Felicity, 
Fuhrmann, “‘I would rather be in the Orient.’ European Lower Class Immigrants into the 






as the European quarter of the city and the port of Galata. Though it was associated 
with, observed and remarked on in relation to this locality, prostitution was by no means 
limited to such particularized coordinates, especially since brothels in the city were 
legal establishments that were “subject to licensing restrictions.” 461  Fuhrmann’s 
research has focused attention on Austro-Hungarian prostitutes and “white slave 
traders” of the major underworld hub of late nineteenth-century Istanbul—women were 
supplied across the world, from Latin America to Calcutta.462 These Habsburg sex-
workers, who numbered 300 in one random bust,463 became a thorn in the side of their 
ambassadors as the Habsburg became more invested in carving their sphere of cultural 
supremacy in the Ottoman dominions. The embassies therefore attempted to extradite 
members of the underworld who were their nationals, in order to eliminate the proof of 
discrepancy between the cultural and moral supremacy they pretended to, and what the 
presence of sex-workers demonstrated in the streets and brothels of Istanbul. In the late-
nineteenth century, despite Western European meta-narrative criticisms of women’s 
conditions in the Ottoman Empire, the critics themselves came up short. The members 
of the Habsburg underworld “would rather be in the Orient.”464 According to Fuhrmann, 
they “claimed to have no home in the monarchy...They lauded Constantinople brothels 
as a place where they were materially better off, socially integrated and protected.”465 
When extradited to their designated homeland, they returned to their adopted homeland.  
Prostitution in Hamidian Istanbul was not any more devoid of danger than 
elsewhere. Neither is it likely that the Ottoman capital’s brothels resembled the quaint 
“sleazy [Galata] café” kept by the Italian “Madame [who] could speak every language,” 
which Pierre Loti “would enter by the main door, dressed as a European, and then leave 
by the door to the alleyway, a Turk.” 466  Roger Deal’s study of Istanbul’s ethno-
religiously diverse roughnecks [külhanbeyi and kabadayı] shows a much bleaker scene. 
Deal frequently consults the newspaper İkdam for glimpses into a culture characterized 
by “types violent behavior” unique to itself in Hamidian Istanbul. 467  As might be 
expected, it was a world that collides with that of the sex-workers; “the association 
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between prostitutes and kabadayıs and külhanbeys was a very strong one.”468  This 
contact often made itself evident in the crime section of the daily press, revealing that 
some of this violence was also directed toward prostitutes. Deal writes of Emine, for 
example, who was stabbed in an argument on 11 July 1898.469 A particularly horrific 
case is that of the manservant Arşak. Jealous of Camélia’s transactional relations with 
other men, Arşak not only slit her throat, but then her mother’s and her dog’s, before 
taking his own life.470 In sex-work-word violence, there was also collateral damage, like 
the American bystander, Mr. Andrews Struppe, who was fatally stabbed by a Mustafa in 
January 1895, in the latter’s attempt to prove to Pauline, the prostitute he fell in love 
with, that he was “brave and strong, a man who had proven himself.”471 Despite such 
publicized insecurities, which may have been evaluated as a hazard of the job, 
wherever, eastbound sex-workers felt secure enough to take up Ottoman citizenship to 
avoid extradition.  
Great Power women of Istanbul’s underworld community sometimes felt more 
‘free’ in lands that were reported in their home states as uncivilized domains. And they 
nationalized accordingly. Fuhrmann points out, by the second constitutional period, 
Istanbul’s foreign pimps “almost completely adopted Ottoman citizenship” along with 
many of the prostitutes.472 As he points out, this phenomenon is significant in light of 
the impact of these marginal women on the Great Power imperialist discourse. It is also 
important to note that the State allowed their legal assimilation and allowed them to 
become members of the nation-under-formation. Fuhrmann’s study demonstrates that it 
must have been clear to the Hamidian regime that granting its rivals’ underworld 
citizenship was an opportunity to claim sovereignty over a portion of his city’s resident 
foreign population—a tradeoff, since Great Powers were claiming Ottoman nationals as 
their own. In these women, the State gained unsuspecting allies in its attempts to 
retaliate against imperialism and simultaneously demonstrate to its own public the 
thorns of the elusive rose of Western civilization—Pauline and Anjel had long since left 
the text and were observable in the flesh. Above all, however, and most significant for 
this thesis, whatever the Hamidian regime imagined their role to be, the State had room 
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for Great Power outcasts in its national vision. They were not excluded. Instead, 
outcasts diversified the constituency and demonstrated the fluidity of Ottoman identity. 
Long Live the King, Long Live My Sultan! The Liverpool – Istanbul Connection 
 
The Ottoman state adopted women who were outcasts in Great Power societies into 
its forming citizenry. It took the same action with apostates. Thus, another sector of the 
Great Power constituency transiently and perennially living within the Ottoman 
dominions were those who had converted to Islam. The State developed a symbiotic 
relationship with both. While Great Power sex workers appreciated the Istanbul 
underworld and “Constantinople brothels as a place where they were materially better 
off, socially integrated and protected,”473 it can be argued their sentiments were echoed 
by Great power converts. One of the differences between the two groups was the level 
of mutual investment that existed between members and the State. Converts had allied 
with the Ottoman state and its sovereign vocally and unambiguously, and the State 
rewarded their loyalty by material and immaterial means. 
While Great Power and North American missionaries were trying to convert, 
civilize and ‘save’ the Muslims of the Orient, conversion to Islam became an 
increasingly growing phenomenon in their respective metropoles, especially in Britain 
and France, but also in the United States.474 Some who witnessed the growth of the 
native convert community were ambitious and hopeful, as one of the responses to 
conversion was to bring the Anglo neo-Muslims “back” to Christianity, the true 
religion.475 In general, however, convert individuals (later developed into communities) 
were adversely affected by the rhetoric that capitalized on difference, especially since 
the politics of division often translated into physical violence and persecution. In 
Britain, in particular, Islam was demonized in the process of legitimating (Christian) 
civilizational supremacy in the eyes of the public to attain consent over the subjugation 
of colonial subjects who had surrendered secular allegiance to the Crown. The sultan 
still commanded the spiritual loyalties of those who had become a part of the British 
Empire—so the umma was dehumanized. Given the plethora of negative representations 
of Islamic culture and societies reverberating from the metropole to ‘mobilize bias’ to 
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condone and attain positive feedback for imperial ambitions in Muslim lands, it is 
predictable that converts were marginalized. They were perceived as traitors and were 
condemned to be destined for hell.476  The false dichotomies of a divided and simplified 
world (e.g. the crescent versus cross, European civilization versus Oriental despotism, 
Christian progress versus Muslim savagery), expressed its social consequences in acts 
of ostracization and violence.  
Divisive politics in Great Power home states un/wittingly turned members of the 
constituency who converted to Islam into a marginalized minority. Their subjection to 
physical and verbal assault was nearly justified by the political-civilizational discourse 
articulated by politicians and the press. Social exclusion made them seek inter-
communal support through unity with the umma and alternative leadership beyond their 
national borders. Despite numerous attempts by internal and external opponents to 
delegitimize his position, the Ottoman sultan-caliph was still the undisputed spiritual 
leader in the eyes of the transnational umma. Over the course of the reign of the ‘Red 
Sultan,’ despite efforts by British diplomats to undermine his position as Caliph, 
natural-born British Muslim converts solidified their spiritual commitment and loyalty 
to Abdülhamid II. Thus the Muslims of the British Isles and the greater empire—
whether metropole citizens or colonial subjects—found themselves in a position in 
which they developed multiple allegiances: among other loyalties, their political 
allegiance was to the British government, but the sultan was the commander of the 
faithful. Abdülhamid used this leverage to promote a sense of extra-territorial 
Ottomanism that was able to render the States of his ideological (as well as political and 
economic) foes insecure with their own population. 
The Hamidian regime built a dialogue with and bargained for the loyalty of Great 
Power converts. Buttressed by his caliphal authority, Abdülhamid fostered a type of 
Ottomanism that promoted his position in the eyes of Sunni-Muslims (i.e. what has 
previously been interpreted as pan-Islamism). The rhetoric of the type of belonging that 
was disseminated to convert Great Power nationals transcended the Ottoman state’s 
borders. Upon closer inspection, however, the nature of the religious discourse directed 
out of Istanbul to the wider, global, umma reveals that it was unmistakably bound to the 
political authority of the Ottoman state. This specificity delegates the caliph’s appeals to 
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the evolving umma to the realm of exterritorial Ottomanism that was fostered as the 
State’s official ideology over the course of the Hamidian years. The successes of 
extraterritorial Hamidian Ottomanism are observable in the pages of the transnational 
umma’s press, especially in the convert and colonial ones, the former in Great Power 
states (i.e. where national essence and identity was often articulated through its Ottoman 
other) and North America. In these regions, nationals of the inheritors of ‘Western 
Civilization’ were ‘going Turk’ at rates that were alarming and for reasons that were 
inexplicable in the eyes of some of their compatriots. 
William Henry Quilliam was a convert from Liverpool who had embraced the 
Muslim faith about a decade into the Hamidian regime, probably over the course of an 
1887 trip he had taken to Morocco.477 Within a few short years, Quilliam established the 
‘Liverpool Moslem Institute’ and a press. He became the outspoken leader of a growing 
community of converts, personally converting approximately 500 Englishmen and 
women;478 the institute became “the most successful Islamic proselytizing group in 
England in the nineteenth century.”479 One of the reasons for Quilliam’s success—
particularly among women—can be attributed to his unapologetic articulation of the 
aforementioned gap between the visible economic and political strength of the British 
Empire on the global stage, along with the self-righteousness of its moral entrepreneurs, 
and the conditions that its lower-middle class citizens were living in. He articulated, in 
other words, the failings of Victorian England and Christianity to promote the welfare 
of society. An engaging speaker and avid writer, Quilliam claimed in his public talks, 
pamphlets, and the pages of his press that Islam was the religion to embrace to cure his 
English society’s ills—like alcoholism, prostitution, poverty, infanticide, child 
abandonment and destitute.480 Among other papers of repute and disrepute, he edited 
The Crescent and the Islamic World. 
The Crescent (1893 – 1908) was one of Quilliam’s press organs, and spoke on 
behalf of the Institute. It reveals the dual allegiances that existed in the hearts and minds 
of Liverpool’s Anglo-Muslim community. The link between Quilliam and Abdülhamid, 
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and the former’s reliance on the Ottoman sultan to reinforce his own legitimacy is 
evident from the fact that The Crescent stopped running in 1908, the year of the Young 
Turk Revolution, never to print another issue again. Liverpool Muslims were political 
members of their national community and adherents of Ottoman, Hamidian, Islam. 
They did not conceal their efforts to simultaneously belong to two communities, even if 
their home state had declared the two as one another’s contrasted others, and, therefore, 
utterly incompatible. They continually expressed their resistance to the metanarrative. 
For example, on the birthdays of their two sovereigns, they clearly articulated their 
multiple belongings: “May the Almighty serve our benign King Edward VII., our 
Sovereign ruler, and the Sultan of Turkey our seenar head for many years to come, 
Amen.”481 Far from apologizing for their loyalties, the Liverpool Muslim community 
made them more questionable in the eyes of the general public. 
Quilliam promoted his attachment to the Ottoman sovereign through symbols, 
ceremony, and rituals. An “Osmanli Regiment” 482  was instituted in Liverpool, for 
example. The paper brought attention to Abdülhamid’s promotion of the faith in distant 
lands and expressed joy and gratitude for his generosity in the cause, e.g. when the 
caliph “made a grant of £2,500 to defray the expense of the Muslim mission to China” 
in 1901.483 It was not just the hundreds of converts in the British port city of Liverpool 
who read about the Sultan’s deeds for the community, however, as in 1895, Quilliam 
claimed to have a global reach. Funnily enough, The Crescent advertised its circulation 
in an advertisement for advertising space. It claimed, 
...[t]his paper has already attained an extensive circulation in the British Isles, in 
addition to which thousands of the Paper are sent regularly abroad to subscribers 
in France, Spain, Switzerland, Morocco, Constantinople, Smyrna, Syria, Turkey 
in Asia, Russia, Morocco, Tunis, Algeria, Malta, Egypt, Persia, Beluchistan, 
Ceylon, Arabia, the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Zanzibar, Lagos, Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, the West Coast of Africa, Afghanistan, Penang, Singapore, China, 
British Guiana, Trinidad, Canada, the United States of America, and many parts 
of India, thus forming a capital advertising medium.484 
Quilliam, and therefore his press, was prone to exaggeration and a suspicious amount of 
caution. To counter doubt, The Crescent produced evidence to lend credence to some 
published claims that could have been assumed to have been fabrications. One of the 
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ways in which it resolved to prove that it had such a wide circulation was through 
publishing a list of the names of those with overdue subscriptions along with the states 
in which resided in. Subscribers presumably included those to whom Quilliam sent free 
issues of the paper.  
The space devoted to the Ottoman sultan and his territories in The Crescent is 
commensurate with “supreme mission of the renaissance” its editor said he was 
“granted” by “the Most High.”485 Abdülhamid was the Liverpool Muslim’s “Caliph of 
the Faithful, Emir-ul-Moomenen.” 486 Istanbul was articulated to be the center of the 
Muslim world, e.g. through the column “News from the Metropolis of Islam. (From our 
Special Correspondent at Constantinople).”487 The caliph’s birthday inspired “rejoicings 
in every part of the world in which Muslims dwell” and on the sixty-first “Anniversary 
of the Birth of His Imperial Majesty Sultan Abdul-Hamid Khan-as-Sani, Caliph of the 
Faithful...” what “gushes from the heart of every True-Believer,” was for “Allah grant 
to him many more years to continue to fill the exalted position which he now so fitly 
ornaments. Amin!”488 Above these columns stood the sultan’s seal and the Ottoman 
state’s coat of arms; a “special doa [prayer] was offered for the Sultan of Turkey and 
other Muslim rulers” for Ramazan. For the “Lesser Bairam” of 1903, “the felicitations 
of the British Muslims” were printed for the “Caliph of the Faithfull, His I. M. Sultan 
Ghazi Abdul-Hamid Khan, Emir-ul-Moomeneen.” 489  The Qajar monarch who also 
fostered a relationship with the Liverpool Muslim community, and had “presented 
[them with] $25,000 to form a home for destitute children,”490 and “the late Ameer of 
Afghanistan [who] went specially for prayers in the mosque, and made a gift of 
something like a thousand pounds to the finances of the community,” 491  were 
mentioned in passing. They were among ‘other [unnamed] Muslim rulers.’ 
The privileged place allotted to Abdülhamid in the Liverpool Muslim community’s 
imagination is undisputable. That their understanding of Islam was intimately connected 
to what was promoted by the Ottoman state (within and beyond its borders) is 
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evidenced, among other means, by the fact that Istanbul was considered the “metropolis 
of Islam.”492 It was not Mecca, the city of the Prophet and the Fifth Pillar, which unites 
the umma in mutual aspiration and obligation. Neither was Arabic often The Crescent’s 
language of choice, which, again, is the common reference point for Muslims in being 
the language of the Qur’an. Quilliam’s title of “İngiltere Şeyhülislamı” [Sheikh-ul Islam 
of England] was printed on his personal letterhead and transliterated in his press from 
Ottoman language.493 Religious days were Ottomanized (e.g. the press opted for “Lesser 
Bairam” over “Eid al-Fitr” or “Hari Raya.” The Liverpool Muslim community’s 
religious affiliation was Ottoman Muslim. This is proof that the argument of the 
Ottomanization of religion put forth by Deringil, had success far beyond the State’s 
borders. 494  Quilliam’s press helped fortify for its global readership the sultan’s 
ambitions to maintain his superior position in the eyes of the umma, in the language of 
its greatest challengers to the claim (English) in the metropole one of the largest Muslim 
empires (Britain). The sultan was the undisputed commander of the free and colonized, 
transnational, faithful. 
The Liverpool Muslim press stressed that the umma was unbound by nation, their 
spiritual community of faith transcended political borders. Their commander was the 
Ottoman sultan. The Crescent was joined by other British (and international) papers by 
the turn of the twentieth century in frequently mentioning that Quilliam was “also a Bey 
Effendi and Sheikh-ul Islam of the British Isles.”495 Other papers joined Quilliam’s 
press in publicizing a tight relationship with the man Gladstone called the “Great 
Assassin” 496 and William Watson described as “[h]ell’s regent sitting yonder, propped 
by thee, Abdul the Damned, on his infernal throne.”497 It was reported, for example, 
when the English sheikh “received a telegram from the Sultan requiring his immediate 
presence in Constantinople.”498 With his harnessed legitimacy, Quilliam was able to 
confront “sections of the British press were endeavoring to prejudice the minds of 
Britons against the present Sultan.” 499  Quilliam became one of Abdülhamid’s 
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international advocates. He joined contemporaries like P. Baudin500 when he elaborated 
on the progressive features of the sovereign who was otherwise presented to the general 
public as a tyrant who murdered innocent people upon suspicion.501 
It was fitting for Quilliam to build a 
persuasive defense for Abdülhamid. He 
was, after all, a talented solicitor. The 
messages that were conveyed in the pages 
of The Crescent, did, however, sometimes 
surpass ordinary lines of defense and 
suggested offense. It could be read, for 
example, that if Liverpool Muslims were 
prompted they would retaliate together 
with the umma. After expressing the 
desire and intent to “congratulate the 
Sultan on the anniversary of his accession 
to the throne of Othman,” for example, 
The Crescent printed parts of the 
proceedings of a recent lecture that 
Quilliam was a part of. At the lecture, it had been articulated that, “England, since the 
Azan had been given in Liverpool, was tacitly considered by most Muslims as Dar-ul 
Islam and it would be an evil day when it was forced to be declared Dar-ul Harb (loud 
applause).”502 Mr. J.R. Kadderbhoy, who was there “representing the sixty millions of 
Muslims in India,” continued with the declaration that an “injury to one was an injury to 
all.”503 The dual allegiances of the Anglo-Muslims of the Liverpool Moslem Institute 
was expressed through The Crescent, but the frequency with which such articles and 
snippets appeared in the first years of the twentieth century could have easily cast into 
doubt whether their loyalty to the caliph was beginning to dominate—a natural cause 
for alarm for the Great Power home state, given the dynamics of empire and the 
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accompanying metanarrative. The community’s bond with the sultan was further 
emphasized by the perpetuation of the notion that the caliph was accessible.504  
The caliph was presented to the readers of The Crescent as being personally 
invested in the convert community. The reporting of a fire at a North American Muslim 
home, for example, was also an opportunity to prove the sultan’s interest in the 
members of the umma, new and old, because the mention-worthy article of the home 
was “the copy of the Koran, presented to Brother Nabakoff by His Imperial Majesty the 
Sultan.”505 The Crescent also transmitted Abdülhamid’s personal messages that were 
specifically directed at the Liverpool community, e.g. the sultan had asked his 
“felicitations and homage of yourself [Quilliam] and the Muslims of Liverpool” to be 
made “known to the whole of the Muslim community of Liverpool.”506 The link only 
got tighter, until, in 1900, it became common to observe the community chant for the 
sultan using the same words of the (political and bordered) Ottoman constituency. With 
the call “Padishahim Chok Yarshah [sic]!” (Long live my Sultan), 507 on the paper’s 
cover in bold and capital letters, Liverpool Muslims had claimed Abdülhamid, not only 
as their caliph, but also as their sovereign. The community celebrated the Ottomanized 
“Courban Bairam” (“Eid al-Adha” or “Sacifice Feast”) in their Liverpool mosque, it 
would be the last time that all that The Crescent would be reporting that those present 
were seen to be “rising and shouting ‘Padishahim chok yasha’”508 for this religious 
occasion. It was the final year of the paper’s run and their sultan-caliph’s rule. 
Great Power nationals whose conversion was interpreted as a betrayal by their 
compatriots were ostracized in their home states. Most often, “infidel within”509 was 
either “exposed to persecution,”510 or became the target of re-conversion efforts—they 
would be ‘saved’ through being persuaded to go “back”511 to the “nobler and better 
religion,”512 i.e. Christianity. Alternatively, they could become a source of amusement. 
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Sections of a 1902 article on “Islam in England: Converting the British” in the Dundee 
Evening Post are worth citing at length, as they touch upon the emergence, 
development, and experiences of the Liverpool convert community:  
Does the reader realise that there are domes and minarets here in England ... a 
Moslem “conversion” of England has been in progress for the past few years...Ten 
or twelve years ago a Liverpool solicitor heard a lecture on Mohammedanism. He 
became a convert, embraced the faith, and from plain Mr W. H. Quilliam he 
emerged as Abdullah Quilliam Effendi ... He at once began lecturing, and in a few 
months he had some converts. A mosque was built, a school, a lecture hall, and a 
weekly newspaper called The Crescent, was founded to preach the doctrines of 
Mohammed. A great deal of this propaganda was done at Quilliam’s expense 
...The new movement made headway, but its upward progress was marked by 
scoffing comments, which at times ran perilously near to persecution. 
“Unbelievers” attended their meetings, and shouted jeering comments. Tin 
whistles and mouth organs drowned the devotions of the little band. The crowning 
indignity was reached one Friday in the mosque, when a man in the strangers’ 
gallery threw a parcel of black puddings and sausages right on the centre of the 
floor, in the midst of the Faithful. But as the novelty wore off the movement was 
left alone ... To-day there are over 200 members—nearly all of them Britishers 
and the inhabitants of the city have not only grown to tolerate them, but have 
come to take an interested delight in their holy days and fasts, their festivals, their 
marriages, and their burials ... Abdullah has got on, and he has a position of some 
importance in the Muslim world. To beign with he is the legal adviser to the 
Sultan of Turkey, who is the Caliph of the Moslem world, and he has frequently 
been summoned to Constantinople to see the Sultan on business matters. 
Recognising his zeal, Abdul Hamid has conferred upon him the title of “Sheikh-
ul-Islam of the British Isles,” that is to say, head of the Mohammedan community 
in this country.”513 
Before the Liverpool Muslim community became something that could be described as 
“picturesque ... a bit of the East transplanted into the West,”514 they risked assault. At 
the root of it was the metanarrative that summarized the Muslim community to be 
something quaint that belonged to “the East,” but was “transplanted into the West.”515 
In other words, it was inconceivable that both extremes could be indigenous, and 
negotiated within the natural-born British citizen. Anglo-Muslims were disadvantaged 
as a consequence of the divisive rhetoric of civilizational divides. In being denied the 
expression of their spiritual and political identities, equally and simultaneously, they 
were foreignized in their homelands. Having been made to feel that Abdülhamid was 
their generous, supreme, and just commander of faith, and was personally interested in 
their welfare, some sought to re-harmonize the division that was imposed upon them in 
the sultan’s ‘well-protected dominions.’ 
                                                







From Foreignized Convert to Naturalized Ottoman: A Single Woman in Istanbul 
In the final year of the Great War, the Foreign Office received a letter from a “M. 
M. Thompson” of 165 Salisbury Road, Everton, Liverpool. Her enquiry took the same 
form as others who were concerned about the welfare of relatives and friends who were 
British nationals, yet still resident in the Ottoman territories over the duration of the 
war. Thompson’s inquiry was about “a gentleman known as Ahmed Robinson;”516 she 
said it was her fiancée and that he had been working at the “Posté Centralé [sic] 
Péra.”517 The letter revealed that the Brighton-born Ahmet was “about 27 years of age,” 
and that his mother who was “married to a major in the Turkish army who is named 
Fahri Bey... [was] known at the British Embassy, Constantinople, as Mrs. Robinson.”518 
On the “fresh form” provided to her, Thompson wrote to Ahmed: “My dear, Where and 
how are you? Where is your mother and youngest brother? Is there any hope of your 
coming to England after the war? Love, Faithfully yours, May.”519 Ahmed had (at least) 
two brothers and a sister, they were all generation 1.5: their mother, Mrs. Fatimah 
Robinson, had migrated to the Ottoman dominions after they had been born.  
The Robinson brothers (Ahmet, Yakup, and Abdurrahman) became quite well 
known in certain circles within the Ottoman capital. They attended the prestigious 
Mekteb-i Sultani high school, were co-founders of the Galatasaray football club, and 
Ahmed, who sometimes signed his name as “Kaleci Ahmet Robinson” [goalkeeper 
Ahmet Robinson] in letters to his Galatasaray club friends,520 is even credited with 
introducing the country to scouting.521 Abdurrahman is commemorated as a “şehit” 
[martyr], as he was among those who attended Mekteb-i Sultan-i and went on to fight 
and die in the Great War. In fact, Abdurrahman had already died by the time Thompson 
had written. A doctor who had attended to him at the Bayburt Menzil Hospital wrote in 
his letter to Ahmet that his brother had passed away at 4, alaturca time, on 11 April 
1915.522 Yakup’s fate was different; a report that concerned his fate was circulated on 
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11 November 1916.523 The military tribunal had condemned him to death for treason; he 
was specifically guilty of committing espionage on behalf of the British government.524 
Documents in the Ottoman archives, including the briefing on Yakup’s death sentence, 
signal that the Robinsons’ story has been slightly mythologized in Turkish memory—
not the least because the briefing on Yakup’s wartime activities refers to him as 
Abdullah Quilliam’s son.525 
Ahmet Robinson was the only brother to survive the Great War. He did end up 
settling in the newly emergent Republic of Turkey. The fact that he was the president of 
the Galatasaray Football Club in 1926 locates him in Turkey in the early-Republican 
Era;526 though it is widely believed that he left the country in 1929 and emigrated to the 
United States in 1935.527 The mythological element of the Robinson biography becomes 
a cause for concern in light of the realization that Sara Korle’s New York interview with 
Ahmet Robinson, published in a 1965 issue of Hayat [Life] magazine appears to be the 
basis of the family’s history.528  Given the fact this research began with a scan of 
individuals listed in the İstanbul Ansiklopedisi who were born beyond the Ottoman 
domains and died in Istanbul,529 the near-repetition of Ahmet story in the two accounts 
is suspect. According to this traditional account, Ahmet is of noble lineage.530 His father 
is a Rhodes and his mother belonged to a family who had attained fame in the arts, 
sciences, and literature.531 His mother is said to have converted to Islam prior to leaving 
England for India, where his father started cultivating tea, and where Ahmet was born—
“on the skirts of the Himalayas.”532 His mother is said to have left India for Istanbul 
when her husband, and her children’s father, died there.533 Abdülhamid apparently took 
an interest in the family, gave them a home in the Akaret-i Seniye,534 which were 
newly-constructed row houses that were tied to the palace in the neighborhood of 
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Beşiktaş, a region that was more “upper-income” than it was “Muslim.”535 According to 
Ahmet’s 1965 interview, his mother, Fatemah,536 is buried in Üsküdar’s Sultantepesi.537 
The mystery surrounding the Robinson family is beyond the scope of this research, 
as it is a topic to pursue in and of itself. Unofficial theories include the possibility of 
Yakup, Ahmet, and/or Abdurrahman being the children of Quilliam, especially since 
Quilliam defended and practiced polygamy and kept his marriage to another women in 
Liverpool (and the five children that came out of it) a secret, “the mystery is how he 
managed to keep his two families out of the media spotlight considering the scrutiny 
that he was under in Liverpool from 1893 to 1907.”538  The possibility of the Robinson 
children being the result of another “liaison”539 can be considered, especially since 
Yakup is mentioned as the “son of Quilliam” in the aforementioned military tribunal,540 
an Ahmet (with given name Quilliam) who was mentioned to be the son of Abdullah 
Quilliam was registered at the Mekteb-i Sultani, with board and free of charge, in 
1899.541 Though some anomalies like these will be addressed, the focus here is on 
Fatemah. Her relevance in the context of this research is the State’s accommodation of 
her as a Anglo-Muslim convert. The question her story seeks to answer is space the 
Hamidian regime made for such individuals, according to its vision for the nation it was 
forming. 
Fatemah can be presumed to be one of those among the Liverpool convert 
community who found the accessibility and guardianship that was propagated by the 
Liverpool Moslem Institute and The Crescent more favorable than the prospects of 
living in her native city, which, by the time she had left it had not yet evolved into a 
society that found the lives and rituals of the converts to be a quaint spectacle, as it was 
mentioned to have become in the 1 April 1902 issue of the Dundee Evening Post.542 
Thus, Fatemah sought belonging in the ‘well-protected domains;’ “[t]he accessibility of 
the Sultan that extraterritorial Ottomanism propagated empowered the convert-migrant 
to appeal to his benevolence on the simple ground of having accepted the Muslim 
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faith.”543Once within the territorial Ottoman domains, converts sought the space they 
were led to believe they could claim. If a convert sought political membership in the 
Ottoman nation-under-formation, they had an advantage over others because Article 4 
of the Nationality Law that allowed the state to reserve the right to confer nationality to 
exceptional individuals who had not met other conditions was where the State’s “bias to 
attribute Ottoman nationality to those individuals who had converted to Islam” 544 could 
be expressed. Single convert women were doubly privileged, as they received what 
would ordinarily be considered citizen-benefits upon declaring their conversion, prior to 
their political assimilation as Ottomans. Fatemah’s appearance on in the Ottoman 
records corroborates these assumptions. Though it is unclear when she entered the 
borders of the ‘exalted state,’ exactly, it is certain that she was in Istanbul and in a state 
of destitute by 1892.  
Much like the British home state operating out of the Ottoman dominions, the 
Ottomans also had a procedure for responding to women in a state of financial need. 
The common course of action for the British was to cover the costs of a one way trip 
home, presumably for the same reason that Habsburg sex-workers were extradited: to 
prevent the image of the Great Power state that was becoming more and more invested 
in a cultural mission within the sultan’s dominions from being tarnished. Fatemah may 
have been in a state of destitute, but she was not interested in going back to England. 
Instead of appealing to her natural-born home state, she appealed to her host state. She 
described her circumstances in a letter that was composed in English and addressed to 
the Grand Vizier Ahmet Cevat Paşa, “I beg to throw myself and my little ones upon the 
mercy of the State in our present state of need. As we are absolutely without money.” 545 
She included with her letter a note for Abdullah Quilliam, along with the note that she 
would like a missive to be passed to him, if the State should find its contents 
appropriate. 546 Through mentioning Quilliam, she was able to establish herself as a 
potential link to Ottoman interests and image abroad, in the mainland that was the 
State’s greatest Great Power competitor. She could not only bolster the caliph’s image 
as it would be presented through Quilliam’s press, but she could also demonstrate to the 
British public that the sultan looked out for the welfare of the ‘free Western’ woman 
more than the Great Power states that assumed a higher moral consciousness. Her letter 
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was translated and forwarded as ‘perakende’ [distress]. Soon enough, she was living in 
the home described in Ahmet’s interview with Korle, at the Akaret-i Seniyye.  
The home that Fatimah was given by the State was no.107.547 The monumental 
cores of her district were the Ottoman palaces that symbolized the modernization of the 
State through their relocation across the Bosporus (Dolmabahçe, Çırağan, and Yıldız 
Palaces).548 Fatemah’s residential core was, essentially, the Ottoman state, since over 
the course of the Hamidian years, the palace held more importance than the Porte. She 
was far from what had been described as the Muslim section of the city, and much 
closer to the Frengistan of Beyoğlu. That Fatemah was also a short walk away from the 
sultan’s Italian court painter’s studio-residence is a testament to the status of the 
neighborhood she (and her connections) were seen fit for. Fausto Zonaro lived and 
worked on the same street, at no. 50. Zonaro’s visitors walked up the same street as 
Fatemah and included the likes of “Recaizade Ekrem, Şevket Cenani, Winston 
Churchill, Adoplhe Thalasso, Camille Flammarion, Alexander Nelidow, Ohannes B. 
Dadian, Max Olaf Heckmann and Marshall von Bieberstein, and the crown princes 
Abdülmecid and Burhaneddin Efendis.549 Aside from the home for which she was not 
obliged to pay rent, 550 the State also provided Fatimah a monthly allowance, which she 
on more than one occasion requested to have increased.551  
The accounts of who Fatemah was married to or how many children she had (along 
with the identity of the father/s) yield inconsistencies. The traditional account based on 
Korle’s 1965 interview claims that Fatemah was married to a member of the Rhodes 
family; neither this brief clipping nor (the even briefer) entry in the İstanbul 
Ansiklopedisi mentions how many children she had. In fact, it takes a lot of 
corroboration with alternative sources like state memoranda and newspaper accounts to 
realize that she also had at least one daughter. Ron Geaves, for example, gives the 
account of one of Quilliam’s Istanbul trips with his son, Ahmet, in 1899,  
... [a]n invitation to attend the Yildiz Palace arrived for the day after their arrival, 
but even before that event, several significant figures visited the Quilliams at the 
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hotel, including Fatima Hanoum, the former Mrs Robinson of Liverpool, who had 
renounced Christianity after marrying her husband Ahmed Bari, and officer in the 
Turkish army, who had already been highly decorated by the Sultan. Quilliam 
observed with approval that Mrs Robinson and her daughters were veiled.552 
At the end of the trip, Ahmed Quilliam remained in Istanbul and was enrolled as a 
boarding student at the Mekteb-i Sutlani, also at the State’s expense.553 It is claimed in 
the above section that the order of events in Fatemah’s life was that 1) she moved to 
Istanbul 2) she married Ahmed Bari, and, “after” these, 3) she renounced Christianity 
and converted to Islam. Instead, the letter to the Ottoman government says she is 
Muslim and penniless, but does not mention a husband, certainly not a Turkish one that 
was an officer in the Ottoman army (which would have made it unlikely that she was 
penniless, to begin with—though she did continue to receive an allowance from the 
state after marrying an Ottoman captain).  
It is highly unlikely that the story reported by Quilliam and referenced by Geaves is 
accurate with respects to Fatemah having converted after marrying a Turkish officer. 
That she was from Liverpool is accepted, however, especially since it also explains her 
relationship to Quilliam—regardless of the extent of its intimacy. Neither is ‘Ahmed 
Bari’ the name that is mentioned by Thompson in her letter to Ahmet Robinson.554 
Thompson instead mentions “a major in the Turkish army who is named Fahri Bey.”555 
One can take a moment and give Quilliam the benefit of the doubt, and consider that 
“Bari” may simply be a misspelling of “Fahri,” especially since Quilliam frequently 
misspelled Ottoman words, both in his press and in his personal correspondences. The 
cover of the 12 September 1900 issue, for example, exclaimed, in bold letters, 
“Padishahim Chok Yarshah!” A sample of a misspelling in his personal correspondence 
can also be found in Quilliam’s 1905 letter to Salonica’s Inspector General Hilmi Paşa. 
He expressed delight, 
 ...that frightful liar (yajurdji va haranzade) [Henry Noel] Brailsford has met with 
his deserts at last. He has been found conspiring with other persons to get false 
passports and give them to revolutionary individuals to enter Russia.556  
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Whether Bari is Quilliam’s version of Fahri, the way in which “yalurdji” is Quilliam’s 
version of “yalancı/yalanji” and “yarshah” was The Crescent’s version of 
“yaşa/yasha,” 557  what the Ottoman records show is that Fatemah was married to 
Kolağası [captain] Ahmet Bey, who may have also been Fahri Bey. This information is 
found in a report dating to November 1900 that refers to a 200 kuruş raise to the salary 
of the convert Fatemah who was living at Akaret-i Seniyye, no. 107, and was the wife of 
Kolağası Ahmet Bey.558 Given the conditions of her appearance in the Ottoman records, 
however, it is unlikely that she converted to Islam after marriage. Regarding her 
children, it is clear that she at least four, though may have had more from her new 
marriage to an Ottoman, or even from her previous one. What is clear is that the 
children were socialized as Muslims: the sons all had Muslim names and the girls were 
veiled.  
The generosity that the State extended to Fatemah was also extended to her 
children. They attended state schools, which were paid for by the Hamidian regime.559  
Along with Fatemah’s generous board and allowance, the free education of her children 
demonstrates that she was given citizen-benefits upon arriving to the Ottoman domains 
and declaring her conversion. The school that the boys attended (the Mekteb-i Sutlani) 
clearly articulated in its annual booklet of costs, curricula, students, and regulations, that 
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certain pupils could be awarded a discount on tuition. It also expressed, however, that a 
reduced cost of tuition was reserved only for Ottomans. 560 Modern education serves the 
function of benefiting the state through indoctrinating young minds, giving them a sense 
of association with the propagated official national identity and instilling in them a 
sense of investment in the cause of the Ottoman homeland.561 Here, the Mekteb-i Sultani 
seems to have either succeeded with the Robinsons or to have given them the tools to 
persuade Ottoman authorities that they were invested Ottomans, willing to volunteer for 
the Ottoman war effort against their former home state.562 As interesting as it this is and 
whether their motives were contrary to Ottoman interests or, instead, their devotion to 
the Ottoman state was genuine is beside the fact that the state treated them as Ottomans 
for a very long time. Though her children did not, Fatemah remained an Ottoman (and 
then became Turkish). Wherever the truth lies in Fatemah’s story, what is relevant in 
relation to the Hamidian vision of the national is that she could become an Ottoman. 
More significantly, she was given the benefits of being an Ottoman prior to 
naturalization. 
It is granted that Fatemah’s story is not an ordinary one—perhaps no story is every 
ordinary. Her associations with Quilliam, however, make it especially difficult to 
generalize the State’s accommodation of her as a rule for Great Power convert women 
who were single and destitute and arrived in the Ottoman domains with their offspring. 
She certainly exploited circumstances in a manner that would serve her best interest. 
Wherever the truth lies in her story and whatever her value was for Hamidian regime, 
she did share something both with other single convert women and with other Great 
Power women who had been marginalized in their home states. While the level of 
financial support she and her offspring received from the State was substantial enough 
to evidence privileged status, what set her apart from other converts was the quantity 
that she received, not the particulars of the care. The Hamidian regime protected single 
convert and born-Muslim women, both citizen and foreigner. When they addressed their 
grievances or state of destitute, the Sultan made little differentiation amongst their 
nation when he provided them social welfare. The State was not preoccupied with the 
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implications of giving single convert women citizen benefits when they were not 
nationals, since many of these women eventually became Ottomans through marriage. 
In fact, when they pleaded with the State, they asked for assistance until their eventual 
marriage. 
The stories of eastbound European female converts are analogous to the Austro-
Hungarian sex-workers that Malte Fuhrmann563 has written about in the realm of nation-
negation.564 In the end, the States that marginalized these women’s existence were 
unable to persuade them that birth land, descent, culture, and linguistic identifications 
(the raw material of nineteenth-century belonging as it was marketed to the 
constituency) necessitated uncontested belonging in their constructed nations. The 
natural-born status of women on either end of this traditional spectrum of morality did 
not serve their interests in the same manner that it served the stereotypical—and partly 
fictitious—Great Power woman that was living in Pera and perpetuating the status quo. 
The Great Power woman who was not an agent of her home-state’s cultural mission 
abroad, could feel sentimental belonging in Ottoman society, as a member of its 
constituency. For the Ottoman state to offer her protection that was denied her in a 
home state that was neither interested in the welfare nor the visibility of women who did 
not uphold their version of the civilizational discourse only confirmed the notion that 
they were foreignized from their own societies; “[m]arginalization, exclusion, and abuse 
had made it evident that Western promises, for them, were deferred in their 
homelands.”565 By seeking alternate belongings, the women reasserted power over their 
fates. 
The anonymity that Fatemah exploited in her relationship with the Ottoman state is 
an opportunity that is provided to every ‘foreigner’ upon relocation. When an individual 
relocates to a locality to which they have no ties, in the absence of individuals and 
records that are able to contest their versions of their identities, it goes without saying 
that they become the authors of their own histories; “transnational mobility granted 
individuals anonymity and allowed them to forge their identities on their own terms 
rather than be assigned one by states or rhetoric.”566 Sometimes, joining a State that 
one’s home state had announced its total supremacy over (social, economic, political, 
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intellectual, moral, civilizational) in the metanarrative yielded more dividends than 
symbolically ‘belonging’ to this higher civilization and perpetuating its myth. Great 
Power metanarratives presented a stark dichotomy between enslaved ‘Oriental’ women 
and their free ‘Western’ counterparts. Alternatively, upon the stark realization that, 
sometimes, “no one is more a slave than the man who thinks himself free while he is 
not,”567 it may have prompted the election of alternate national affinities. 568 Similar to 
Fuhrmann’s non-Muslim Great Power subjects who were linked to the Ottoman 
underworld, “European converts who independently migrated to the Ottoman 
dominions to claim a place in its nation were agents who claimed the active and 
determining function in the process of nation negation.”569 Social outcasts, by their 
mere visibility in the lands of their Great Power states’ cultural engagement, held the 
powerful potential to challenge their states’ narratives and to pierce the thin veil of a 
higher culture and morality.570  The marginalized outcasts of Great Power societies 
fulfilled this potential when they rejected their nations, and, in their transnational 
liminal state, found harmony between their sentimental and national belongings in 
opting to become Ottomans.571 
International power dynamics rendered some foreigners in the Ottoman dominions 
more visible than others. Often viewed as the personification of the nations of their de 
facto, natural-born, allegiances, degrees of visibility were often tied to the level of 
competition their home states presented to the Ottoman state in a variety of fields, e.g. 
social, economic, political. In the Hamidian era, it follows that Great Power citizens 
who maintained their nationalities acquired extra visibility because their home states 
were more fierce competitors than others. It was in the interest of some immigrants to 
capitalize on the legal status afforded by citizenship, and by extension, national identity, 
to secure a social position—the ‘civilizational progress’ their nations were associated 
with elevated them. Their relative visibility of Great Power subjects (elaborated on in 
the last chapter) was a pattern, though not a universal rule. One’s nationality did not 
always reflect his/her dominant identification or, even, primary attachment. If the were 
neither persuaded by their natural-born belonging, nor the perpetuators of their home-
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state’s rhetoric, Great Power nationals became invisible, as well—both to contemporary 
observers and in the historical record. Less visible, or, in some cases, in-visible, 
foreigners arguably have the potential to reveal more about the late-Ottoman state and 
its construction of national identity. A great component of the venture of nation 
formation is, after all, the building of “political and legal barriers to exclude all but their 
own citizens.”572 What exclusion was based upon is paramount in understanding the 
late-Ottoman state—especially for an era that is undergoing as much revision as the 
Hamidian. Great Power outcasts—either prostitute or convert— were not excluded. The 
Hamidian constituency grew when becoming an Ottoman presented itself as the best 
expression of harmony between their sentimental and national belongings.  
                                                





“The Persian colony in Constantinople have 
threatened to become Turkish subjects unless the 
Shah restores the Parliamentary régime in 
Persia.”573  
Multiple belongings, Long-Distance Nationalism: Iranians 
After having diversified the nature of the Great Power foreigner in Hamidian Istanbul 
with converts to Islam, it becomes necessary to diversify the nature of the Muslim 
foreigner in the Ottoman dominions. The cases under observation here concerns those 
who came from a non-Great Power state, specifically Qajar Iran. Iranian residents of the 
Ottoman domains have been used as a litmus test in the historiography for whether or 
not the Hamidian state was pan-Islamic and/or exclusivist. In these arguments, they 
have often been coupled with Algerians to prove that the State was not pan-Islamist, 
because certain restrictions were placed upon them—especially with respect to marriage 
and reproductivity (with Ottoman women). The consequences of not abiding by the 
rules set by the State were articulated to be banishment from the dominions. Thus, the 
cases of Iranians have supported the exclusivist theory: namely, “it was no longer 
enough to be a Muslim, or indeed a Sunni.”574 Though the historiography has evaluated 
the Hamidian state’s rhetoric against Iranians as exclusionary in nature, especially with 
regard to its intentions to prevent the spread of Shi‘i Islam in the frontier provinces,575 it 
is argued here that national interest took dominance (over other considerations, such as 
what the State identified as heterodox Islam). This did not translate into the State 
preferring the expulsion of Iranians from the dominions, instead, it promoted their 
naturalization. Regarding Iranians, the Hamidian state was expansionist rather than 
exclusivist. The significant Iranian population of Istanbul and its increase over the 
course of the Hamidian years, reveals a discrepancy between the Hamidian state’s text 
and praxis, as these pertained to foreign Iranians.  
The Algerian-Iranian comparison (corresponding to the insufficiency of the Muslim 
and Sunni identities, respectively) is justified by the demonstration that the two 
nationalized identities were, in fact, viewed in the same light by the Ottoman state, at 
least once. Using this instance, Deringil continues to elaborate on the insufficiency of 
the previously mentioned identifiers for the Hamidian state by stating that,  
                                                
573 “News in a Nutshell,” Hendon & Finchley Times (7 August 1908).  
574 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 55.  
575 See, for example, Kern, “Rethinking Ottoman Frontier Policies,” and Imperial Citizen, and 





...nothing illustrates this better than the case of the Algerians seeking asylum in 
the Ottoman dominions after the French invasion of Algeria. The issue which 
caused the Ottomans headache was the legal status of Algerians who had 
immigrated to the province of Syria, ostensibly escaping from the dar ul harb. 
Some of these elements worked to live in the Ottoman dominions while 
conserving their French passports, thus benefiting from the special privileges as 
French subjects living in Ottoman lands. On 20 November 1889, the Sublime 
Porte issued a decree stating that they would be required to choose within two 
years of their arrival whether to remain French citizens and leave, or to be 
automatically considered Ottoman citizens and stay. They Algerians of French 
allegiance would be forbidden to marry Ottoman women, and any Algerian 
contravening this regulation ‘would be treated according to the regulations 
pertaining to Iranians’ and would be forced to leave Ottoman soil.576 
The conditions imposed on Iranians and Algerians thus appear to be quite severe. It is 
significant in light of our understanding of the status of foreigners in the Hamidian 
regime, which has previously been characterized as pan-Islamist, that neither were 
given preferential treatment solely on account of their religious adherence. In her work 
on imperial citizenship in the late-Ottoman state, Michelle Campos uses the same 
nationalized identities to support a similar thesis. She coherently summarizes that it was 
not the aim of the late-Ottoman state to “expand its Muslim population at any cost.”577 
Elaborating on the essence and conceptualization of the texts that rationalized 
nineteenth-century identities, she argues that, 
...the Ottoman citizenship law was not broadly pan-Islamic, for at the same time 
citizenship also aimed to further mark the border between Ottoman and non-
Ottoman Muslims, playing a particularly important role in the eastern frontier of 
the empire with Qajar Iran, where the Ottoman citizenship law penalized Ottoman 
women who married Iranian men, requiring them to forfeit their citizenship. A 
similarly tough attitude was taken toward Algerians resident in the empire who 
sought to marry Ottoman women but refused to forfeit their French nationality or 
protection.578  
The non-preferential treatment of Iranians (and Algerians) has therefore been useful to 
support the argument that the State was ‘exclusivist’ in favor of Sunni-Ottomans, i.e. “it 
was no longer enough to be a Muslim, or indeed a Sunni.”579  Engaging with the 
dialogue initiated by Deringil, Kern, and Campos, this chapter poses for consideration 
the possibility that, in the final analysis, it was the Iranian’s (and Algerian’s)580 personal 
choice of national allegiance rather than his or her religion that was more consequential 
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for the Hamidian state in its nation-building process. Especially since an Iranian was not 
exclusively ‘Muslim.’  
The Turco-Iranian Zone: Push, Pull, and Shove 
The State was an absolutist dynasty ruling over an ethno-religiously diverse and 
polyglot populace. It was in the process of centralizing, modernizing, and attempting 
nationalization within a rationalizing framework. The regime’s administration of its 
natural-born constituency included the denial of newly idealized civil liberties. 
Constitutionalist ambitions that would have curtailed the absolutist monarch’s power 
were especially suppressed, the freedom of the press was denied, and dissidence was not 
tolerated. The Great Powers threatened the State’s command of its own citizens, 
autonomy over its domestic industries and ventures (e.g. through missionary schools, 
capitulatory privileges, and concessions), as well as its territorial integrity, all the while 
holding its economy and infrastructure hostage with incurred reparations and debt. 
These challenges were supplemented by a relatively ineffective military, which the 
State sought to ameliorate with the aid of the very same Great Powers, in whose interest 
it seemed to keep the development of its might beneath a certain threshold of strength. 
Among the Powers, the two that presented the State the greatest obstacles over the 
course of the late nineteenth century were the British and Russian—much of the State’s 
foreign policy relied upon playing them off one another. Due to these circumstances, 
this critical juncture has often been summarized as the State’s ‘decline’—imminent 
demise was on a bleak horizon. Given that the above description is fitting for both, in 
some ways, the Hamidian state experienced a similar reality to its Iranian counterpart. 
One was the topic of the ‘Eastern Question’ and the other the ‘Great Game.’ 
The Ottoman and Qajar trajectories of change and their impetuses for defensive 
modernization shared notable commonalities and relative synchronicity at the outset of 
the nineteenth century. In fact, the Qajar state is assumed to have attempted reform 
along an Ottoman model. 581  Due to its historical circumstances and un-tackled 
obstacles to its legitimacy, however, the Qajar state was a less aggressive centralizer. 
The Qajars were a new dynasty and had arrived on the historical-political scene after a 
century of turmoil on the Iranian plateau; “[b]efore Aga Muhammad Khan could place 
the Kayanid throne on his head in 1785, three generations of Qajars had lost their lives 
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in the struggle for the throne.”582 Perhaps more significant were the obstacles to the 
Qajar monarch’s ability to pacify internal opposition (e.g. the ulema-bazaari alliance) 
the way that the Ottomans had, by integrating the interests of its opposition into the 
interest of the State with the Sened-i Ittifak, for example—pacification was a 
precondition for effective centralization and reform.583 A series of defeats and territorial 
losses against their shared adversary, Russia, nevertheless made both states recognize an 
urgent need for change. In the aftermath of sobering wars that left each shackled to 
reparations and capitulations to different degrees, and faced with different realities, that 
change should begin with the military was recognized as crucial. In Azerbaijan, Crown 
Prince Abbas Mirza had locally initiated a Qajar ‘modernity.’ In the same vein as the 
post-Napoleonic models of reform undertaken in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt and by the 
Ottoman state, he had even established a ‘New Order’ (Nizam-ı Cedid).584 Due to the 
contrasts between his local achievements and the path taken by the central government 
after his death, Abbas Mirza has retrospectively been memorialized as the lost promise 
for the destiny of Iran. 
The reigns of Mohammad Shah Qajar (r. 1834 – 1848) and Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 
1848 – 1896) have suffered similar historiographical fates as the nineteenth century 
Ottoman sultans in terms of agency and complexity. Similar to the Tanzimat sultans, 
Mohammad Shah Qajar was seen as a puppet of foreign powers and bureaucrats; his 
coming to the throne was “assured thanks to diplomatic and military support displayed 
by the British, with the consent of the Russians.”585 His reign has been studied less 
under the light of reform than inefficiency, civil unrest, mob violence, widespread 
economic discontent, alienation of minorities, and religious persecution. 586  His 
successor, Nasir al-Din Shah, has traditionally been represented as mélange between the 
traditional historiographical representations of Sultan Abdülhamid II and his two 
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predecessors: a despot and a puppet, in one. His historical image was not aided by his 
reign being “inaugurated by formidable insurrections of the Bábís, Yezd, Níríz, Zanján, 
and in Mázandarán,”587 and the State’s harsh responses to each—especially the Babi. 
Similar to the Hanefization-Ottomanization efforts undertaken by Abdülhamid II in his 
‘Well-Protected Domains,’588 Nasir al-Did Shah continued the ‘Shi‘ization’ efforts in 
his own ‘Well-Protected Domains’ that had begun “first under the Safavids and later 
under the Qajars when Iran was facing the forces of Western hegemony in the 
nineteenth century.”589 Each campaign was met with great resistance from the local 
population on each side of the Ottoman-Qajar border (-zone),590 and thus became one of 
the major push factors for those resisting homogenization. 
Despite the difficulties that the religious homogenization of the core constituency 
presented to both the Ottomans and Qajars, the former dynasty still had an advantage. 
Namely, after their claim of the caliphate along with the conquest of the two holy cities 
in 1517, the Ottomans had achieved, along with religious legitimacy, the pretense to 
having the upper hand over the ulema—the caliph was the highest recognized authority 
in the Muslim world. The advantage was not guaranteed, however, as the Ottoman 
sultan’s position as caliph also meant that his right to it could also be continually 
challenged. Abdülhamid had ulema opponents from the outset to the end of his reign. 
He famously mistrusted the softas—they had not only collaborated in the deposition of 
Sultan Abdülaziz, 591  but also supplied recruits for the oppositional Young Turk 
organization.592 The fact that even the Şeyhülislam could present a threat was made 
evident in the months leading up to his accession, when Abdülaziz and Murad V were 
both overthrown by a fetva penned by Şeyhülislam Hayrullah Efendi (an individual 
more loyal to the Tanzimat bureaucrats, to whom he owed his timely promotion, than 
                                                
587  Edward Granville Brown, A Year Amongst the Persians: Impressions as to the Life, 
Character, and Thought of the People of Persia, Received During Twelve Months’ Residence in 
that Country in the Years 1887—8 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893), 61.  
588 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains.  
589 Abbas Amanat, “The Historical Roots of the Persecution of the Babi and Baha’is in Iran,” in 
Dominic Parviz Brookshaw and Seena B. Fazel eds., The Baha’is in Iran: Socio-Historical 
Studies (London: Routledge, 2008), 170. Both the Qajars and Ottomans referred to their states 
as being ‘well-protected,’ i.e. ‘Memalik-i Mahruse-yi,’ though the terms are the same, the 
Persian translation is more often ‘guarded’ than ‘well-protected.’ 
590 For the Ottoman state, the nomadic Bedouin and Yezidi were particularly targeted in the 
State’s Hanefization and Ottomanization efforts, see Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 41.  
591 Fortna, “The Reign of Abdülhamid II,” 42.  





the sultan-caliph).593 In his own capacity as the commander of the faithful, Abdülhamid 
was consistently faced with domestic and international efforts to delegitimize his claim 
and suitability for the caliphate.594 The British effort to promote an Arab caliphate to 
secure rule over Muslims in colonial possessions, specifically, India, but also in semi-
colonial Egypt, is an example of the latter. 595  Despite these challenges, however, 
Abdülhamid’s position was stronger than Nasir al-Din Shah’s, whose problem was that 
he had little religious legitimacy to begin with. 
Abdülhamid II made an effort to preserve the sanctity of his spiritual position in the 
eyes of those he sought allegiance of in a way that Nasir al-Din Shah was unable to. 
This was visible to even those who were actively laboring to discredit Abdülhamid’s 
religious authority, such as Wilfrid Scaven Blunt, “an ex-diplomat and self-appointed 
British agent in the Middle East.”596 Blunt sought the “return of the Caliphate to Cairo, 
and a formal renewal there by the Arabian mind of its lost religious leadership.”597 It 
seemed, however, that Abdülhamid’s “triumph” 598  of consolidating his image and 
authority in the eyes of his previous opponents would present a formidable challenge to 
such an ambition. Blunt noted his observations of a Selamlık procession in April 1893, 
…what interested me most was the large number of Mohammedan Sheykhs and 
dignitaries from distant provinces of the empire, who followed the prayer 
outside the mosque and took part in the procession.  This has been the triumph 
of Abdul Hamid’s reign...as late as 1881, at war with the Sultan, now they are 
his guests, clothed in robes of honor.599 
Abdülhamid had the benefit of being able to build on the centralization efforts of his 
predecessors in his ambition to achieve the complacency of former-oppositional 
religious groups, which made Blunt realize that the transfer he sought would occur 
either upon “the death of Abd el Hamid, or his fall from Empire.”600 The grip of the 
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State had already started being tightened—perhaps most severely with Mahmud II 
(1808—39). In addition to curbing the domestic religio-political resistance, Abdülhamid 
nourished, consolidated, and capitalized on his religious legitimacy in the eyes of the 
umma and “contested” 601  for the loyalty of those whose political allegiance was 
claimed by other states. For Shi’i Iranians, in particular, he could fashion himself as the 
custodian of the Atabat.  
Religious “Non-Conformists:”602 Qajar Heretics to Ottoman Residents  
 
In the first years of Nasir al-Din Shah’s reign, the sultan’s dominions became host 
land to a fresh influx of Iranians with grievances and ambitions to change their 
circumstances. The impetus was economic hardship as well as the (often connected)603 
suppression of religious and socio-political dissidence with which shah’s reign began. 
Among the most severely punished “non-conformists”604 were the Babi, who believed 
that the Twelver prophecy that the ‘hidden imam’ would reveal himself was fulfilled in 
1844, in the person of the “young prophet of Shíráz, Mírzá ‘Alí Muhammad,”605 who 
claimed he was the Bab [gate] to the ‘hidden imam.’ After gaining quick momentum, 
the Babi were declared as heretics by religious and secular opponents, whose position 
and authority the Bab threatened.606 Far from extinguishing the movement, however, the 
harsh reception it received by those with vested interests helped the movement grow 
“into open socioreligious messianic revolt.” 607 The established ulema, in particular, 
resolved to “vanquish the Bab” in 1848 with an “inquisitory trial.”608 Over the course of 
the trial, the Bab went a step further than assuming babiyat [gateship], and claimed that 
he “was indeed the expected Imam of the Age, the Mahdi himself, whose return had 
been anticipated for a thousand years.”609 The ulema demanded his execution. Feeling 
he could neither challenge the ulema nor provoke public unrest, the Crown Prince Nasir 
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al-Din sent physicians to attest to the Bab’s insanity, the penalty was reduced to 
corporal punishment.610 Execution was only postponed, however. Two years later, the 
Bab was hanged and placed in front of a firing squad.611  
Death only added to the Bab’s legend and contributed to his following. Even in the 
imagination and recollections of Great Power Orientalists, he was a slain prophet. The 
British Iranologist Edward Granville Browne narrated the martyr’s execution,  
...the Báb had disappeared from sight! It seemed, indeed, that his life had been 
preserved by a miracle, for, of the storm of bullets which had been aimed at him, 
not one had touched him; nay, instead of death they had brought him deliverance 
by cutting the ropes which bound him, so that he fell to the ground unhurt. For a 
moment even the executioners were overwhelmed with amazement, which 
rapidly gave place to alarm as they reflected what effect this marvelous 
deliverance was likely to have on the inconstant and impressionable 
multitude.612 
After thus escaping death, the Bab was re-suspended and fired upon, again. This time, 
“the body of the young prophet of Shíráz was riddled with bullets.”613 No-doubt the the 
saga added to the aggrandizement of the Bab’s cause and movement. It was clear that 
the Babi had resisted the regime’s pacification efforts when on the “morning of 15 
August 1852, a group of Babi militants, perhaps as many as six, attacked Nasir al-Din 
Shah just outside the Niyavaran summer residence...[it was] the first assassination 
attempt [on an Iranian monarch] by members of the public.”614 After the assassination 
attempt, “[t]he ensuing mass execution of suspect Babi conspirators set new standards 
for cruelty and sadistic frenzy...The 1852 incident was a turning point for it opened the 
door to sporadic but severe mass killings in the Iranian provinces and smaller 
communities in the following years and even decades.”615 The conditions they were 
subjected to in Qajar Iran pushed some of the Babi leaders and followers into the 
sultan’s territories. They became heavily concentrated in the Ottoman borderlands, most 
specifically around Baghdad,616 where the Bab received his religious education “with 
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the most learned of the Shi’i ulama in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in Ottoman 
Iraq.”617 The exilic Babi were by no means limited to this region. They were also in 
Istanbul and elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions. 
The phenomenon and visibility of religiously motivated Iranian migration to the 
Ottoman dominions predated both the emergence of the Babi movement and the 
commencement of the Hamidian regime. There is little to suggest that among the 
Iranian Shi’i residents, the Babi constituted a significant minority in the Ottoman lands. 
Babi numbers were often inflated in the Iranian public’s imagination, because they 
became convenient scapegoats, e.g. “whenever there are political problems and an 
oppositionary undertaking from the nation to divert attention, the statesmen clothe the 
affair with the garb of immorality and display it as a Babî [heresy].”618 Due to the 
mystery surrounding them, the Ottoman state was not immune to being suspicious about 
the Babi, either, especially given their associations with some Young Turk 
organizations, “for all that the Babî with their sparse membership were only a quantité 
négligeable in the Ottoman Empire.”619 The Babi community that has been highlighted 
above was one among many other members of the Iranian diasporic community within 
the sultan’s dominions, in addition to the long-time resident ‘non-heretical’620 ulema at 
the Atabat. Furthermore, hosting respected Shi’i clerics further presented Abdülhamid 
with the opportunity to employ them as his advocates to the Ottoman Shi’i constituency 
to achieve loyalty and to pacify Shi’i Ottoman resistance to national homogenization. 
Protecting the Iranian Shi’i ulema would have had the added benefit of presenting a 
counterweight to suspicions that the Hamidian state was persecuting Shi’i Ottomans. 
The Iranian Shi’i ulema residents of the Ottoman state were politically and 
economically independent from the Qajar sovereign. Their subsistence was partially 
sourced from “semivoluntary religious taxes paid by most bazaaris to the ulama, which 
did not go to the government.”621  They were also outside of the shah’s territorial 
jurisdiction. From beyond Nasir al-Din Shah’s reach and in the service of the Ottoman 
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sultan, they were able to sway public opinion about home state affairs, “[f]irst in the 
Tobacco Protest of 1891–92, 1902 onwards, and especially during the years of the 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–11), the mujtahids of the Atabat became 
actively involved in Iranian politics.”622 Beginning from the premise that “[i]n short, the 
Shiites were regarded as potentially disloyal,”623 much of the historiographical focus on 
Iranians within the Ottoman dominions over the course of the Hamidian era has 
concentrated on the conflict between Shi’i and Sunni Islam, e.g. the role of the il-
/legitimated religious clerics in the Atabat or on the Hamidian state’s attempts to halt 
the spread of Shi’i Islam through Hanefization-Ottomanization efforts that targeted the 
‘heretical’ borderland constituency, who are understood to be prone to being influenced 
by the resident Shi’i Iranians (with the intention to proselytize)—whether cleric or 
civilian. Such studies have inevitably resulted in assuming the motivations for local 
policies in the Atabat to the applicable to the overall Hamidian vision for the Ottoman 
state and constituency. It could be argued that while the state was certainly interested in 
ensuring a Hanefi-Sunni majority, that Iranian residents being Shi’i was a secondary 
concern for the State—especially since not all Shi’i Iranians’ flight from Iranian 
territories strictly motivated by religious factors, neither were all Iranians in the 
Ottoman dominions Shi’i. 
Other “Non-Conformists:” Cash-Crops, Famine, and Migration 
 
Aside from persecuted ‘non-conformists’ that resisted the Qajar state’s Shi’ization 
efforts and the Iranian ulema who were, in a way, perpetuating their state’s claims to the 
Shi’i Holy Cities, others were pushed out of the ‘well-protected domains’ of the Qajar 
state for political and economic reasons. While the Qajar-Ottoman border zone had 
proven itself to be religio-politically fertile soil for the ulema, others sought destinations 
that would improve their economic well-being or were intellectual and political centers 
rather than religious centers, i.e. such individuals did not seek association or 
legitimation with the Atabat. These individuals may have been Shi’i, but some may 
have been so in the same way that Ahmed Rıza was Sunni (i.e. not very). Much like 
Abdülhamid’s political opponents that had found the freedom to express their criticisms 
of home state policies through their press organs abroad, in Paris or Geneva, so, too, had 
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the shah’s critics—London was the base of Qanun and Istanbul printed Akhtar. As 
much as the Ottoman and Qajar historical trajectories of reform and modernization 
seemed to experience similarities, with domestic and international impediments that 
resembled one another, so, too, did the deliberations of the Ottoman and Qajar 
constitutionalist opponents of absolutist rule and imperialist exploitation of their home 
lands. To escape social, political, and intellectual repression of the Hamidian state, 
much of the regime’s Ottoman opponents found the liberties denied in their homelands 
in self-imposed exile.624 While the sultan’s opponents could find no liberty to express 
such sentiments in the Ottoman dominions, Nasir al-Din Shah’s critics flourished in 
Istanbul. 
A common source of discontent of Ottoman and Iranian critics of the nineteenth-
century condition of their respective States was the level of Great Power encroachment 
that was salient in their respective homelands. Each was laboring under a series of 
treaties that imposed unfavorable conditions for state and constituency. Nasir al-Din 
Shah’s polity’s degree of autonomy had become, according to some interpretations, 
“purely formal, as Iran did not dare to take a step that might seriously displease Britain 
or Russia unless it had very strong support from the other country.”625 Since the turn of 
the century, socioreligious and political resistance in Iran was, to some extent, born 
from the disenfranchisement that external imperialist powers had inflicted on the 
constituency. Nasir al-Din’s brief and inconsistent engagement with reform, e.g. 
especially those undertaken with the initiative of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir’s 
Ottoman and Russian example-inspired “urgency to undertake sweeping changes 
encompassing the bureaucracy, military, finance, judiciary, and education, 626  were 
overshadowed by the Shah’s inability to protect the State’s economy and industry, the 
constituency’s interests, and his inability to shield his image/prestige from the 
implications of his actions. Nasir al-Din Shah’s intentions as the first Qajar monarch to 
travel abroad may have been good and well, for example; their pretext was to observe 
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reforms to implement in Iran.627 Alas, each trip seemed to be paired with him delivering 
the constituency less agency and ownership in their economic fates.  
The Reuter (1872), Lottery (1889) and Tobacco (1891) concessions were forced to 
be withdrawn in response to broad sweeping discontent that ranged from popular 
resistance to palace revolts, 628  “or, as a Persian might say, patriotic forces in the 
country.”629 The Reuter Concession astonished observers. They were described by Lord 
Curzon, “himself a firm economic and political imperialist”630 in the following way:  
When published to the world, it was found to contain the most complete and 
extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into 
foreign hands that had probably ever been dreamed of. Exclusive of the clauses 
referring to railroads and tramways, which conferred an absolute monopoly of 
both those undertakings upon Baron de Reuter for the space of seventy years, the 
concession also handed over to him the exclusive working for the same period of 
all Persian mines, except those of gold, silver, and precious stones; the monopoly 
of the government forests, all uncultivated land being embraced under that 
designation; the exclusive construction of canals, kanats, and irrigation works of 
every description; the first refusal of a national bank, and of all future enterprises 
connected with the introduction of roads, telegraphs, mills, factories, workshops, 
and public works of every description; and a farm of the entire customs of the 
empire for a period of twenty-five years from March 1, 1874, upon payment to the 
Shah of a stipulated sum for the first five years, and of an additional sixty per 
cent. of the net revenue for the remaining twenty. With respect to the other profits, 
twenty per cent. of those accruing from all other sources, were reserved for the 
Persian Government. Such was the amazing document that fell like a bombshell 
upon Europe just before the Shah started upon his first foreign journey in 1873.631  
Reuter was eventually compensated for the cancellation of the 1872 concession through 
being granted another one—for the Imperial Bank, in 1899.632 Though its terms were 
not necessarily worse than the Reuter Concession, which “is indeed without historical 
parallel,”633 the Tobacco Concession of 1891 incited popular resistance to a degree that 
was also ‘without historical parallel,’ and had the solidarity of Iranian participants, both 
the local and diasporic. Baghdad clerics and local opponents kept in touch with one of 
the instruments of modernity that Nasir al-Din was able to effectively introduce 
(through less-contested concessions); the telegraph had “dramatically increased the 
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royal authority and presence throughout the kingdom, but also increased the foreign 
presence and allowed the shah’s subjects to contact each other swiftly, both at home and 
abroad.” 634  Early in its introduction the telegram had been a means of reporting 
grievances to the sovereign, i.e. during the Great Famine (1869/70-1871/72), “[i]n 
Isfahan, sayyeds and women clashed with police and besieged the telegraph office, 
demanding that a telegram of protest be sent to the Shah.”635 The Tobacco Protests 
demonstrated to Nasir al-Din Shah that the utility of improvements in communications 
and transportation in the Ottoman, Qajar, and every other modernizing state was 
simultaneously a tool for the State (to surveil the constituency), but had also evolved 
into a weapon that could be used for conspiring against the sovereign.  
Where the Reuter, Lottery, and Tobacco concessions failed, others had been 
succeeding since the first communication and transportation concessions of 1863. 
Similar to their impact on the Ottoman constituency, concessions, by and large,636 
“exercised a negative, detrimental influence on the country’s development, and at a 
great cost to the Iranian people.”637 Their negative impact compounded disadvantageous 
circumstances that domestic merchants and agricultural workers had already been 
subjected to due to capitulations. In both the Qajar and Ottoman states customs duties 
favored foreigners against native merchants. To gain an advantage, members of the 
natural-born population of either state was not immune to the temptation of taking up 
the nationality of one of the imperial powers that were exploiting their state, thus 
making up some of the members of the foreignized indigenous community that has been 
discussed in the Ottoman case. Those that took up foreign nationality and those who did 
not had to both operate within industries that were now responding to the global 
economy: their places within the marketplace were customized by external forces, often 
at their own expense, and in line with colonialist trends. Like their semi-/colonialized 
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counterparts in Asia and Africa, the designated function for the Ottoman and Iranians 
markets was as exporters of raw materials and importers of finished goods.  
Fertile soil being tilled for export crops in the semi-colonialized Qajar and Ottoman 
territories (e.g. cotton and opium) had an adverse effect on the population when 
agriculture could not supply foodstuff demands. In addition to the ebbs and flows of the 
free market, the productivity and profitability of crops were susceptible to natural 
disasters—in both cases, outside forces manipulated domestic industries adapting to 
new demands. The Qajar silk industry had already been decimated by European-
imported silkworm disease at the opportune moment that Britain had switched its 
reliance for cashmere on India’s industry, for example.638 Furthermore, the conversion 
of the land for the production of “export crops meant a decline in subsistence crops 
which, in times of export problems, could not be compensated for by foreign 
earnings.”639 Yet another adverse impact of the conversion was that the disenfranchised 
domestic constituency that was relying on external markets to dictate which crops to 
grow also began to incorporate the consumption of the same products into its culture.640 
When Lord Curzon’s described the region surrounding the Heart Valley, particularly 
Kain and Birjand, he noted that “opium is enormously grown and consumed here, and 
that hundreds are said to die yearly from excessive indulgence.”641 In sparse times, the 
land allotted to such could not be “reconverted in time of lower demand or a bad 
harvest, and the conversion of land from food to opium, although usually profitable, 
contributed significantly to the terrible Iranian famine of 1869-72.”642 In fact, these 
were the circumstances under which his minister, Mirza Hosayn Khan, had (perhaps 
‘naively’)643 urged Nasir al-Din Shah to accept the Reuter Concession.  
The Great Famine is an example of the great costs associated with Qajar Iran 
having become a semi-colonized state. The global economy, unequal terms and profit 
margins consistently favored Great Power states and concession hunters that dictated 
Qajar production priorities. The estimates for those who perished during the famine that 
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was intricately linked to converting the productivity of the land from subsistence to cash 
crops ranged from one tenth of the total Qajar population,644 with up to “almost a 
quarter of the population of the northern regions.”645  At some point in 1871, five 
hundred people were dying every day in Mashhad; places like Qom lost close to fifty 
percent of the population to the combined factors of famine, cholera, and, also, 
migration.646  The State was bound to suffer from the particularized repercussions of 
this specific famine for decades (e.g. “only in and after 1884 did the revenue from direct 
taxes surpass in nominal terms the revenue of the pre-famine years”).647 The scale of the 
Great Famine marked it from others that continued to ravage the population, which 
experienced a decline in the nineteenth century. Severe famine and its accompanying 
diseases hit the Qajar state, at least decennially, at least until 1926; important among 
“the causes of the famine were the shift from subsistence to cash crop agriculture, 
intervention by the imperialist powers, black market practices by the ruling classes and 
their merchant allies, and extra-tax oppression and expropriation of the peasantry.”648 
Such were some of the push factors that were driving Iranians into bordering states: 
Russia and the Ottoman dominions. 
Ottomans and Qajars who were adversely affected (e.g. famine and poverty) by 
their industries serving external demands at internal costs searched for economic 
opportunities abroad. Akram F. Khater’s studies on outward migration from the 
Ottoman state has articulated the incentives that promoted relocation for those who 
were economically and socially disadvantaged by the demands of the global economic 
market. The foreign initiative to achieve maximum capital out of Mount Lebanon’s silk 
industry (which also decimated local agricultural production) by manipulating gender 
dynamics within local patriarchal communities contributed Syrians temporarily or 
permanently abandoning their homes, and, among other places, being pulled into the 
Americas. 649 Thus many of the same factors that were pushing native Ottomans beyond 
their borders, were also pushing Iranians beyond theirs; “as early as 1880 there were 
well over 100,000 Persian migrants in the Ottoman lands and 90,000 in Russia...and in 
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1900 [the British Diplomat Sir Thomas Edward] Gordon put the number of Persian 
migrants abroad at up to 1 million.”650 The annual exodus rates would continue to 
increase monumentally, as, “in 1905, as many as 300,000 fled Iran to work in 
Russia.”651 Thus it stands that the social, political, and economic opportunities Iranians 
sought in the sultan’s dominions, having been marginalized in their homelands, the 
sultan’s also-marginalized citizens sought elsewhere.  
The historiographical focus on the (assumed) Shi’i attribute of Iranians resident 
within the Ottoman dominions has, at times, simplified both the host state and the 
migrant—e.g. the assumption that the Ottoman state was aiming to prevent their 
integration into the constituency because of their adherence to (or ambition to spread) 
Shi’ism and the State’s presumed disloyalty association has often come to be taken for 
granted. These assumptions are not wholly justified by the numbers of Iranians resident 
in the Ottoman territories; Islamic modernist-intellectual-ideologue-political agitator 
Jamal al-Din Assadabadi claimed in 1892 that “[a] fifth of the Persians have fled into 
Turkish or Russian territory.”652 Some of the escapes from the Qajar dominions could 
have been politically or religiously motivated. Afghani was, himself, was a political-
religious exile. The sultan hosted him in Istanbul’s Nişantaşı district (which later 
became his ornate place of confinement).653 In fact, Afghani was up the street from 
where the previous chapter’s English convert Fatemah Hahım was living, also rent-free. 
Like her, he also had the comfort of a stipend.654  The circumstances of the Iranians he 
observed and wrote about, however, were very different. He wrote in the Ziya’ ul-
Khafiqayn [The Light of the Two Hemispheres],  
...you may see them wandering through the streets and markets as porters, 
sweepers, scavengers and water-carriers, rejoicing in spite of their tattered 
garments, their somber countenances, and the meanness of their avocations, in 
their deliverance, and thanking God for sparing their lives.655 
Both Afghani and E.G. Brown, in whose account of the Revolution of 1905 the above 
quote can be found, designated a political character to what the ‘wanderers’ escaped 
from in Iran, i.e. the ‘the tyranny and exactions’ of the governing classes, who were also 
blamed by Afghani for the inability of Islam to “prosper.”656 While Afghani’s was 
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exiled on account of his religious and political writings, it is hard to accept that a ‘fifth 
of the Persians’ living beyond the Qajar dominions suffered the same fact. Considering 
the fact that politics and religion are often elite preoccupations, and their practitioners 
do not number in the hundreds of thousands, with the conditions that have only been 
elaborated on in the above-section, (i.e. the famine, disease, and poverty that manifested 
in Iran from the early nineteenth century onward) it is safe to assume that most of the 
migrants’ push was economic. In Istanbul, they found many opportunities—including 
those mentioned by Afghani. In the end, however, what mattered more to the Ottoman 
state was not so much their politics or religion, but their national identity. The host state 
sought the legal assimilation of Iranians, and expected their naturalization as Ottomans. 
The ‘Islambol’ Pull 
In light of the stress that Iranians have received in considerations of whether or not, 
or to which degree, the Hamidian regime was ‘exclusivist,’ it is noteworthy that the 
State did not count how many of them lived within its dominions, or in its capital city. 
To gauge what proportion of the city’s inhabitants were Qajar nationals, it is necessary 
to correlate the imprecise Ottoman censuses with the numbers noted by contemporary 
Iranian observers of the Iranian community—who seem to have been among the few to 
have taken written notice of this component of Istanbulite society. The Iranian notable 
Mirza Hosayn Farahani, for example, visited Istanbul in August 1885 en route to 
Mecca. The written account of his pilgrimage, Sayahatname-i Mirza Mohammad 
Hosayni Farahani, was completed and presented to Nasir al-Din Shah in 1886. His 
travelogue suggests that Iranians took a prominent place among the city’s immigrants, 
who constituted over half of the overall population.657 Farahani estimated there to be 
“approximately sixteen thousand Iranian nationals in Islambol and its surroundings.”658 
Given Farahani’s familiarity with those at the embassy, which was demonstrated by his 
detailing of their personal talents and responsibilities,659 one can assume the numbers he 
gives to be a fair reflection of official estimates of contemporary Qajar ambassadors 
who serviced resident and transit visas for their nationals. It has been noted above that 
there were already close to 100,000 Iranians in the Ottoman dominions in 1880.660  
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Despite the fact that the calculation would not account for fluctuations between the two 
years for which there are no exact numbers per variable (e.g. Iranians in the Ottoman 
territories and Iranians in Istanbul), one can still compare the overall number of Iranians 
in the Ottoman territories in 1880 to the density of Iranians in the Ottoman capital in 
1885, to surmise a rough idea about the volume of Iranians who had left Iran to seek 
opportunities in Istanbul. Accepting the inherently inexact nature of the calculation, it 
becomes possibility to conceive of Istanbul hosting 16 percent (plus margin of error) of 
the Ottoman resident Iranians, as of 1880, when Farahani visited the city, in 1885. 
The percentage of Iranians in the Istanbulite population is easier to ascertain, since 
there were censuses for the year of Farahani’s visit. Though the censuses do not have a 
reputation for exactness, either, the population of Istanbul officially numbered 873,575 
in 1885.661 According to the figures given by Farahani, Iranians would have made up 
two percent of the total population.662. Approximately seven years after Farahani’s visit 
through the Ottoman capital, al-Afghani became one of those residents. When he 
observed the community, his estimate was that Iranians constituted about five percent of 
the city’s population.663 The discrepancy between the two estimates can be attributed to 
many factors, ranging from misestimation in one (or both) to a new push factor serving 
as a catalyst for renewed wave of migration (e.g. Afghani’s relocation followed the 
Tobacco Concession protests), to the latter estimate including naturalized Ottomans—
this last possibility is a bit of a stretch, given that it is unlikely that such figures would 
have been available to al-Afghani. In light of the assumptions about the Hamidian 
reception of Iranians, the possibility that both Farahani and al-Afghani provided 
accurate numbers for Iranian nationals has the power to suggest quite a remarkable 
conclusion. 
The population of Istanbul was recorded to be 1,030,234 in 1894.664 In the absence 
of reliable statistics for 1892 one could generously assume that the city’s population had 
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already reached its 1894 figures in the year of Afghani’s arrival. Averaging in this 
manner has the flaw of assuming the city was more populated than it actually was in 
1892 while simultaneously denying Iranians within it the benefit of a corresponding 
population increase beyond the 1892 figures, thus it actually yields a deflated number 
for resident Iranians. If, for the sake of argument, one accepted such margins of error 
and additionally assumed the accuracy of Farahani and Afghani’s numbers, the number 
of Iranians in Istanbul still evidences substantial growth.665 Specifically, there is a three 
percent surge between Farahani’s visit in 1885 and the commencement of Afghani’s 
residence in the city in 1892. Since, in the former year, “almost 60 percent of the city’s 
residents had been born elsewhere, and ten years later the proportion of non-natives was 
even greater,”666 it is cogent that the city’s Iranian population should also grow—667 
especially given the fact that there were presumed to be a million members of the 
Iranian diaspora at the turn of the twentieth century. 668  The city’s population was 
witnessing a rapid increase, but the two hundred and fifty percent rate increase within 
this one specific nationalized community would have outpaced the city’s growth, by far. 
Whatever the push factors that accounted for the boost of Iranian residents in Istanbul 
was, the remarkable rise in their numbers suggests that the understanding of the 
Hamidian regime’s reception of them needs nuance. 
Whether Istanbul’s resident Iranians constituted two percent or five, they 
constituted a significant and visible component of Istanbul’s urban fabric—despite 
being rendered invisible in most Great Power and Ottoman accounts of Istanbul at the 
turn of the century. While push factors that prompt the departure of individuals from the 
sending state may be discerned with a certain degree of confidence, in general, the 
choice of destination is seldom explicit in the historical record and harder to discern. 
When looking at the nineteenth century Iranian and the Ottoman worlds with a 
comparative lens, the parallel experiences and existences that stemmed from the two 
having shared a very fluid border for centuries do emerge as pull factors. These borders 
were only nationalized in the nineteenth century with the aforementioned Nationality 
Laws—those who were identified as foreigners according to the Ottoman Law of 1869 
included Iranians. Furthermore, urban population diversity, language, religion, socio-
political and ideological currents, the debates surrounding tradition and modernity, the 
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role of Islam in rational reform, and foreign relationships and penetration are just a few 
examples of the familiarities that existed between the nineteenth-century realities of the 
two polities, that would have created enough common points of reference between the 
respective constituencies, to allow a relatively smooth transition and assimilation of a 
Qajar national into Istanbulite society. They were pushed and pulled by the same 
currents—and despite their different impacts on immigrant and natural-born citizen—
they were considerations that influenced relocating to familiar-unfamiliar localities. 
Ottoman Istanbul was a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, polyglot, and “convivial”669 
metropolis. There were elements within state and local traditions, however, that favored 
Iranian culture over others, making the city and its residents quite accommodating for 
Iranians. These elements included a conscious awareness of the shared features of the 
two societies’ contemporary circumstances, history, heritage, and culture—contacts 
between Turkic and Persian speakers extend to pre-Islamic times.670  The Turco-Iranian 
zone shared populations, i.e. the Qajar ruling apparatus was itself of Turkic origin, and 
“like virtually every dynasty that ruled Persia since the 11th century ... [it] came to 
power with the backing of Turkic tribal forces.”671 In fact their respective constituencies 
sometimes took advantage of their easy assimilation each side of the political border, to 
the dismay of both states, John George Taylor, archeologist, agent of the British East 
India Company, and British Consul in the Ottoman frontier city of Diyarbakır, had 
observed the fluidity of some regional identities in the following manner just prior to 
the passing of the Nationality Law,  
This mixed nationality of one family and the still unsettled state of the frontier 
cause interminable disputes between the governments of Persia and Turkey. The 
Kurds being equally at home in one country as in the other, cross the border 
whenever they feel inclined or suits their purpose, either for business or to evade 
proper punishment due to crimes committed in one or the other country. All 
attempts to levy taxes, enforce conscription, and arrest offenders are thwarted by 
hasty migration to Persia or Turkey, as the case may be.672  
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Despite the intentions of the Nationality Law, and the extension of the subsequent 
extension of foreign status to Iranians, to curb such tendencies, Lord Curzon noted that 
“hasty migration”673 for the purposes of evading State-imposed citizen obligations were 
still persisting when he wrote his account of Persia and The Persian Question, in 
1892—674that whether they were Shi’i or Sunni would have been a secondary concern 
for the State becomes evident with the detail that these non-sedentary ‘non-conformists’ 
resisters to national homogenization and administrative centralization were both.  
The similarities that existed in the Turco-Iranian border zone thinned out along the 
path towards the respective capitals of each state. Thus, the fluidity that was granted to 
the Kurds, for example, would not have been possible to the same extent in urban 
centers. Nevertheless, there existed an un-rejected shared heritage of social, military, 
political, linguistic and literary traditions that were a part of the each center’s identity, 
due to centuries of contact. The Turkic zone was the greater beneficiary of the literary. 
Persian texts dating all the way back to the fourteenth century emergence of the 
Ottoman state had become a part of the latter’s high-literary tradition through oral and 
written transmission. The works that had become a part of the Ottoman tradition that 
were Persian in origin included works on “theology, literary works, legends of saints, 
medical handbooks, guidebooks for hunting, books on the history of Islam and other 
didactic manuals…There was hardly an important Persian text that was not translated 
into Turkish.” 675  The influence becomes even more evident with later attempts to 
translate these texts into Ottoman, in order to achieve “emancipation from Persian 
literary dominance.”676 Translation did eliminate the persistence of the use of Persian in 
every level of Ottoman rhetoric ranging from the grandiloquent Divani poetry to daily 
vocabulary and colloquialisms. Without the Persian influence that became one of its 
defining traits, the Ottoman cultural intertext and civilizational discourse would have 
also ceased to be Ottoman. 
Linguistic influence in the Turco-Iranian zone was not a phenomenon that was 
unidirectional; there was much cross-fertilization. There existed in Istanbul some degree 
of familiarity and communicational access that was bidirectional between (at least) the 
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established state-educated resident and the newly arrived Iranian who, depending on 
where he was from in Iran, was, in turn, either fluent in Turkish (e.g. Azeri) or had 
some knowledge of it. The Iranian territories had a large, indigenous, Turkic-speaking 
population. This was so pervasive in certain regions that “[f]oreign visitors ... noted that 
spoken Turkish was so common among all classes in Iran as to be the lingua franca.”677  
It follows that many of those natural-born Iranians who arrived in the Ottoman 
dominions could be fluent in the Ottoman state’s official language to a greater degree 
than some natural-born Ottomans. If their destination was Istanbul, they had the 
additional benefit of being greeted by members of the Ottoman constituency who had 
been state-school educated and had therefore learned Persian as part of their curriculum 
(taught, most often, by Iranian expatriates). Therefore, Iranian exiles and expatriates 
coming to Istanbul not only had prior linguistic exposure to their hostland; many 
Istanbul residents also had linguistic exposure to their Iranian homeland. The Hamidian 
state was especially active in re-introducing Persian into the curriculum of secondary 
schools. Language is perhaps the most important element of culture for an immigrant. It 
determines the duration of one’s incubation in a compatriot-expatriate network before 
seeking membership in others. Language is a tool without which the individual cannot 
wholly integrate into the receiving state.  
A desire to remain in the ‘Adobe of Islam’ may have been one of the factors that 
contributed to Iranians seeking work in the Ottoman dominions over other destinations. 
That having been said, that religion may not have been the primary mover of Iranian 
exiles and expatriates becomes evident when one considers the numbers of those who 
ended up in Russia. The argument that Iran’s labor force was drained because of the 
outward migration (in addition to famine and disease) is persuasive.678  Since Tabriz, as 
a single point of departure, supplied 26,844 of Qajar Iran’s labor force to Russia in 
1891—figures kept climbing until they reached a dramatic peak in 1905, when “as 
many as 300,000 fled Iran to work in Russia.”679 Hooshang Amirahmadi’s study on The 
Political Economy of Iran reveals the rates and motives of Iranians who sought work in 
neighboring countries, but more closely observes the figures of those who ended up in 
Russia—probably due to the availability of statistics. Where Amirahmadi gives figures 
that allow for a meaningful comparison between migration to the Ottoman versus 
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Russian domains, those driven to the Ottoman lands are greater. Thus, the prestige of 
the Ottoman lands within the community of believers could have been another factor 
that pulled Iranian exiles and expatriates into the sultan’s dominions. For the Shi’i 
Iranian clergy, in particular, their relocation to the Atabat emboldened the legitimacy of 
their religio-political discourse directed at their homeland audience and its national 
sovereign.  
There was certainly a difference in the 
motivations of those who migrated to the 
shrine cities of Iraq and others who found 
new domiciles in Ottoman Istanbul. While the 
latter’s motivation might have been 
intellectual, political, or economically 
oriented, it is still noteworthy that among all 
of the aforementioned names of Istanbul, the 
Iranian exilic community was the only one 
that consistently used ‘Islambol.’ Despite the 
variations in push and pull factors, the 
emphasis for the city carried a religious value. 
‘Islambol’ was the city Farahani had visited 
on his way pilgrimage. Neither did he fail to 
remark on the city’s Muslim inhabitants’ religiosity, or lack thereof (e.g. he criticized 
their habit of sharing bathhouses with non-Muslims, because it entailed perspiring in the 
same space).680  Farahani’s judgment was simultaneously an expression his disapproval 
of the Ottoman’s corrupting what he considered to be shared core values—Farahani felt 
entitled to express criticism of Ottoman practices, because it was familiar and there 
existed common reference point. In similar vein, the Iranian community’s exilic organ, 
Akhtar, Persianized most of its contents, suggesting a sense of asserted belonging. The 
newspaper was printed out of ‘Islambol Han’ in ‘Valide Dar’ (i.e. ‘Validekapısı,’ in 
Turkish). In fact, ‘Dersaadet’ was only used to identify the parameters of the city and its 
adjoining districts for the purposes of price and circulation, which was more of an 
expression of the Ottoman state’s postal preferences—e.g. as of October 1893, the cost 
of the paper was four Mecidiye coins within ‘Dersaadet,’ and five elsewhere within the 
                                                






host state.681 The newspaper that was sold and circulated in ‘Dersaadet’ referred to the 
city as ‘Islambol’ elsewhere, however, e.g. an accident report describing Yüksek 
Kaldırım as “one of the neighborhoods of Islambol.”682 In other words, the Iranian 
exilic community did not hesitate to claim partial ownership of their host city. The 
manner in which they interacted with names and customs was one of the ways in which 
they demonstrated their sentiment of multiple belongings. 
Political Activism and Long-Distance Nationalism 
The most high-profile niche within the Iranian exilic and expatriate community of 
Hamidian Istanbul was the political exile, as enemies of the Shah often chose the 
Ottoman capital as a destination to provide them respite from persecution in the Shah’s 
lands. The city also provided them a platform to express their criticisms and grievances 
through newspapers like Akhtar. The avenues of exclusion of political exiles from 
Iranian society resemble one another. Much like their Ottoman counterparts, they were 
often driven beyond the borders of their home states as a consequence of one of the 
prominent features of their respective authoritarian governments: the denial of basic 
liberties and the repression of oppositional currents. The modes of the political exile’s 
assimilation into Istanbulite society, on the other hand, markedly differed. This is made 
evident by the experiences of individuals like al-Afghani on one extreme and Mirza 
Habib Esfanani ‘Dastaan’ on the other.  
Al-Afghani can be described as an anti-imperialist political activist. 683 Though he 
has been popularly eulogized as one of the prominent Islamic modernists and a pan-
Islamist, he has alternatively been memorialized as the “well-known agitator, whose 
treasonable teachings caused his exile from Persia in 1891.”684 After his departure from 
Iran, al-Afghani spent a brief time in London, where was continuing his cause with 
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“propaganda and attacks on the Iranian government as an oppressive autocracy.”685 
Soon after, he was in Istanbul after receiving an invitation from Abdülhamid, whom he 
had written to, essentially offering the caliph propaganda aid in Afghanistan.686 The 
sultan had refused a similar offer by al-Afghani in 1885, for a similar undertaking, in 
India. While in Istanbul, al-Afghani was considered a reputable figure and treated as a 
“permanent guest” [daimi misafir].687 As mentioned in the previous section, along with 
a stipend, al-Afghani was given a home—which the Qajar government had banned its 
nationals from visiting.688  
Afghani eventually fell out of favor with Abdülhamid. Whether because of his 
relationship with Wilfrid Blunt, who was actively promoting an Arab caliphate, or for 
something else altogether (e.g. contacts with the sultan’s other opponents, like Young 
Turks), 689  al-Afghani was put under watch within a couple of years of his arrival. 
Subsequently, he was “like a caged lion he growled to foreigners against his enforced 
confinement.”690 His circumstances had gotten even more severe when Mirza Reza 
Kermani who was “an emissary of the Sheikh Jemaleddin,”691 left the latter’s Istanbul 
home in 1896, and proceeded to Iran, where he assassinated Naser al-Din Shah on 1 
May. Due to the widely accepted assumption that al-Afghani was the one to suggest to 
Kermani the thought of killing Nasir al-Din Shah,692 almost immediately, the Qajar state 
began sending extradition orders for him,693 the demands of which were refused by their 
Ottomans counterpart—despite it having been clearly established (to all)694  that al-
Afghani was neither Afghan, nor British Indian, but an Iranian subject. This decision 
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may even have bordered on threatening diplomatic relations between the two states.695 
The foreign press speculated on possible reasons: 
With regard to the nationality of the Sheikh Djemal ad-din, who was believed to 
be a British Indian subject, it has now been established that the Sheikh is a Persian 
subject. Nevertheless, it appears certain that the Porte will refuse the demand of 
the Persian Government for his extradition. Djemal ed-din has intimate relations 
with Yildiz Kiosk, whence he receives a monthly allowance of seventy-five 
pounds, and has long worked to bring about the union of Islam, an idea which is 
supported at the Palace. For this reason it is feared by the Porte that were he 
handed over to Persia he might make revelations disagreeable to the Palace.696  
Abdülhamid never did extradite al-Afghani; the requests came to an end with the Qajar 
government receiving a dispatch on 31 December 1896 informing the State of al-
Afghani’s imminent death from cancer,697 which transpired on 9 March 1897. The fact 
that Abdülhamid did not extradite him did not mean that he had regained favor after 
possibly being “accused of plotting against the sultan.”698 After five years of residence 
in Istanbul, al-Afghani died in the city he had arrived to with great ambition. He was out 
of favor, under surveillance, and confined to house arrest. 
Not all opponents of the Qajar state suffered the same fate in the sultan’s dominions 
as al-Afghani. Mirza Habib Esfahani had also came to Istanbul upon forced-exile, in 
1866.699 Due to the more subtle nature of his political activism, however, he was able to 
navigate the city and its hierarchies in much more liberty than Afghani. Soon after his 
arrival, Esfahani began teaching Persian grammar and literature at the Mekteb-i 
Sultani,700 and died in the Ottoman territories in 1898.701 He also taught at the Persian 
school after its establishment in 1884; “many Akhtar journalists, some of them members 
of the Turkish academy, taught there, so that the school came to enjoy a very high 
standard.”702 During his time in Istanbul, Esfahani was clearly welcomed by various 
Istanbulite circles. His employment in both the State’s educational and its 
administration (i.e. the Ministry of Education) demonstrates the extent of his integration 
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among the Ottoman constituency. Over the course of his life in Istanbul, Esfahani 
maintained close contact and collaboration with the Iranian expatriate community, being 
especially close to two Iranian exiles who had arrived in Istanbul, together, in 1886/8: 
Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, who were Babis, possibly turned 
atheists—703 a not uncommon designation affixed to political opponents of the Qajar 
state who were members of the modernist intellectual wing of the Iranian exilic 
community of Istanbul, including Esfahani.704 Kermani stayed with Esfahani for the 
first two years of his time in Istanbul. 705  While Abdülhamid did not comply with the 
extradition order for al-Afghani, he did for Kermani and Ruhi. Both were returned to 
Iran in 1896, where they were hanged, upon the request of the Qajar government for 
their (alleged) role in the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah. 706 
Esfanahi’s extra-curricular causes for Iran found ample expression over the course 
of his life in Istanbul. His expression of his discontent against the Qajar government 
was well suited to his passions as a translator and grammarian. Thus he was a linguistic 
who expressed his grievances through the employment of metaphors he embedded in 
translations. Considering the many sources of revenue that Esfahani exploited, it can be 
assumed that his Istanbul life was one of comfort. Translation was an industry that was 
compensated well under Abdülhamid’s patronage than Nasir al-Din’s. Perhaps with the 
partial intention to shame Nasir al-Din Shah, the Iranian translators complained, “the 
Ottoman Sultan spends 3,000 liras equal to 90,000 tūmāns, every year, on a single 
European newspaper, the Shāh is reluctant to pay 200 tūmāns.”707  Esfahani has been 
assumed to be the anonymous (co-)708 translator Molière’s Le misanthrope (Guzārish-i 
mardum gurīz). His most famous translation, however, remains James Morier’s The 
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Adventures of Hajji Baba of Esfahan. Both were translated after Esfahani’s departure 
from Iran, and express criticism of the Qajar state. Despite being translated in the 1880s, 
the latter was only published in 1906, a critical juncture when “[t]he novels portrait of a 
decadent state and decaying nation fit perfectly into parts of the Constitutionalist 
rhetoric that adopted and promoted such an image in order to justify its claims for 
reform.”709 Indeed, presumably to achieve this desired effect, Esfahani had added pages 
of material that did not exist in the original text. 710  Homeland Iranians were not 
Esfahani’s only intended audience, however. That he fact that he renamed Molière’s Le 
misanthrope characters with ones “familiar in the Ottoman Empire—Luqmān Baik, 
Na‘īm Baik, Shāh Budāq, Nāsih”711 reveals that he also had Ottoman readers in mind. 
Esfahani contributed to the linguae-political developments of Iran in absentia. At a 
historical moment when language was becoming synonymous with nation, both the 
Iranian and Ottoman literary worlds witnessed efforts to render the written word more 
simple and accessible to the masses. Esfahani was very much a part of this movement. 
He sought to make Persian more comprehensible and ‘pure.’ For contemporary Iranians, 
purity meant a “return to the imagery and language of Anvari, Manuchihri, Farrukhi, 
Firdawsi, Sa‘di, and Hafiz.” 712  Esfahani’s works on the Persian language and its 
grammar are Dastūr-i sukhan, and Dabistān-i Pārsī, both were published in Istanbul, in 
1872 and 1890, respectively. The Ottoman state printed a state education-oriented 
version of Esfahani’s Persian grammar book, under the name Rehnuma-yı Farisi, with 
the “order to be distributed and utilized in the State’s high schools.”713  Simultaneously, 
Esfahani was an active contributor to the education of his new Ottoman homeland’s 
constituency and one of the shapers of his former homeland’s linguistic and political 
culture, as “his writings on grammar are historically important for he tries to formulate 
the rules of Persian language without being constrained by the traditional categories of 
Arabic grammar... a disassociation from Arab-Islamic culture and identity.”714 Indeed, 
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many Ottomans were laboring to free their literary tradition from the very same 
‘categories of grammar.’ A conversation that began in Istanbul in the 1860s also had 
members of the Turco-Iranian intellectual zone discussing releasing their languages 
from such ‘constraints’ by abandoning the Arabic script altogether.715 Istanbul allowed 
domestic and exilic opponents and proponents of tradition to debate amongst one 
another the material and immaterial futures of their past and present homelands.  
Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi has argued that nineteenth-century Iranian intellectuals 
who took an active role in the ‘Invention of [Persian] Tradition’ through hearkening 
back to a pre-Islamic Iran, in turn, constructed the culture, language, and history that 
would later be accepted as the unequivocal collective memory of modern Iran.716 The 
seeds of the fruit of Iran’s collective movement were sown with a literary movement 
that sought to canonize works like the Šhāhnāmeh. The aim was to write in a ‘pure 
Persian’ cleansed of Arabic fārsī-yi basīt or pārsīnigārī. The linguistic nationalism of 
the century gave fruit to notions of a glorious Iranian past, which had come to be 
corrupted by Arab-Islamic civilization. The same individuals who idealized an Iranian 
past were those who fought for a constitution whilst rejecting the traditional 
applications of the principles of Islam—e.g. segregation in a hierarchical society that 
determined rank according to religion. Esfahani was among those individuals who 
participated in both Qajar linguistic and the social battles, from his exile in Hamidian 
Istanbul. As early as 1885, he was “enjoying a comfortable life of teaching and 
scholarship and was known by most notables in the Ottoman capital as an accomplished 
poet and scholar, and as an ardent Persian patriot.”717  A member of the Ottoman 
intelligentsia, Esfahani was thus also privileged with the freedom to express dual 
allegiances through his active membership in the transnational literary circle that would 
write the language of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution.718  
It can be surmised that the Istanbul networks that Afghani and Esfahani had access 
to—in addition to the Iranian exilic community—were ones that allowed for their swift 
mobility due to their having come from privileged positions Iranian society, despite 
their very different fates. Iranian mobility in the politico-intellectual circles of Hamidian 
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Istanbul was not only accessible to social elites who had received a classical education 
in Iran and had already made a reputation for themselves as ‘intellectuals with a social 
function,’ before crossing the Ottoman border. There were others who came to exercise 
their function as intellectuals on the same platforms, but had come from more humble 
origins. Husayn Danish is an example, as father was a little-educated Iranian merchant 
from Esfahan who can be assumed to have been an economic migrant.719 Danish was 
born in Istanbul and grew up to have full access to positions within the Iranian niche of 
the Ottoman capital and took the common avenues for the literate Iranian intellectual to 
employment. He found employment in Iranian schools and in the exilic press. 
Additionally, like many with the same immigrant-generational background who had the 
benefit of more fluid movement in and amongst the expatriate and native realms, his 
self-identity was more prone to negotiation in determining where he fit. So, he actually 
launched his career as a journalist with contributions to the Ottoman press (such as 
İkdam and Servet-i Fünun) and was at one point private tutor to Ottoman princes and 
“chief government translator.”720 Later, he became an employee of the Ottoman Public 
Debt Administration (for 24 years).721  
Danish’s activities in the Ottoman press, schools, and administration in fact 
overshadow his involvement in their Iranian counterparts.722 He was a long-distance, 
linguistic, nationalist, similar to Esfahani, rather than a political activist like Afghani. 
He promoted Iran and demonstrated his sentimental attachments to the land of his 
heritage through his promotion of its literary arts, not only over the course of the 
Hamidian Regime, but also during the Second Constitutional Era and through the early 
Republic. Ultimately, however, he chose his association with his birth land as his 
primary legal-national identification while maintaining his designated and reflexive 
Iranian identity. Afghani, Esfahani, and Danish were members of Istanbul’s Iranian 
expatriate community who either arrived as or became self-made social, political, and 
intellectual elites. They were not alone in fitting this designation, as there were a slew of 
others who shared these variables. Neither was their place within Istanbulite society 
restricted to their ethno-linguistic niche.  
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What emerges in from the lives and interactions of intellectually and politically 
driven Iranians in Hamidian Istanbul is, first, that the circle had many contact points. 
Just from what has been mentioned in this section, for example, it emerges that 
Danish’s teachers at the Dabistan-i Iraniyan were Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Habib 
Esfahani, and Riza Quli Aqa Khurasani.723 The last among them was a friend of al-
Afghani,724 who had instigated the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah by Mirza Reza 
Kermani.725 This was a crime that Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani 
(the first mentioned among Danish’s teachers) had been extradited and had suffered the 
penalty of death for. 726  Kermani, who had upon his arrival in Istanbul, lived in 
Esfahani’s home for two years. 727 Esfahani, had left Iran due to his associations with 
former Ottoman ambassador—and, part-time Ottoman national—Mirza Malkom 
Khan’s ‘House of Oblivion.’728 Malkom Khan was in correspondence with Mirza Aqa 
Khan, once having corresponded with one another about the fact that that Iranians were 
forbidden from visiting al-Afghani. 729 Dissident relationships were not strictly limited 
to those who were ‘non-conformists’ in and amongst the Iranian community of Istanbul 
however, as al-Afghani was hosting Young Turks at his home. 730 Danish was not only a 
classmate of the future Young Turk Mizancı Murat at the Mekteb-i Mülkiye,731 but was 
later personal tutor to the Young Turk Ottoman princes Sabahattin and Lütfullah,732 the 
former of whom would actively support the efforts of Iranian constitutionalist exiles in 
Istanbul after the fall of the Hamidian regime.733 
Aside from demonstrating the tightness of the ‘non-conformist’ circle in Istanbul, 
what emerges from al-Afghani, Esfahani, and Dastaan is that the Hamidian state 
considered them as employable. The Hamidian regime was prepared to recruit them for 
its own cause. The State could always impose severe consequences if their alternate 
relationships and activities revealed potential damage to its own interests (e.g. al-
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Afghani). Another way that the State demonstrated its willingness to integrate Iranians 
into its population was through demanding their legal assimilation. The Hamidian 
regime ultimately sought the nationalization of Iranians within the Ottoman dominions, 
regardless of ideological persuasion, creed, or class.  
The In/Visible Iranians of Hamidian Istanbul 
 
The intellectual and political ‘non-conformist’ Iranians of Hamidian Istanbul were 
an exception and a minority. Though they were still ‘non-conformists,’ resisting the 
nationalization of the constituency efforts of the Ottoman and Qajar states alike, it is 
safe to assume that most of Istanbul’s Iranians were visible-invisibles, often driven to 
the sultan’s dominions as economic migrants. They were visible-invisibles, because 
they were there, but often unnoticed by outside observers and unremarked upon by the 
domestic population. It is less surprising that Great Power accounts that described the 
ethno-linguistic diversity of Istanbul over the course of the Hamidian years (and before 
and beyond) did not distinguish the city’s significant Iranian population, considering the 
fact that the pseudo-ethnographical studies of the city only and noted an urban culture 
whose makers were the aforementioned group of five: ‘Turks, Greeks, Armenians, 
Jews, and foreigners.’ Based on the assumption these were the only ‘groups’ that were 
assumed to exist, it follows that what was not sought was not found. It can further be 
argued that the Iranians’ shared cultural affinities with the Ottomans (not only Turk, but 
also Armenian and Jew) were pervasive enough to be missed by superficial observation. 
E. G. Browne pinpointed the precise nature of the underlying cause for the reason 
Iranians became invisible in contemporary and historical accounts of Istanbul, when he 
described the city itself, and reflected on his 1882 visit, 
... I have heard people express disappointment with Constantinople. I suppose 
that, wherever one goes, one sees in great measure what one expects to see 
(because there is good and evil in all things, the eye discerns but one when the 
mind is occupied by a pre-conceived idea) ... 734 
The salient feature of Great Power accounts of Istanbul was the compartmentalized 
representation of the city and its residents into five, distinct, artificially nationalized 
sections, and the related preoccupation with the foreignization of segments of the 
Ottoman constituency. The eyes of those Great Power travelers to Ottoman capital, 
coming from an environment in which they were exposed to this ‘pre-conceived idea,’ 
saw what they expected to see; their ears heard what they expected to hear.  
                                                





Browne had studied and had become familiarized with both Turkish and Persian 
before taking his first trip to Istanbul. In the Grand Bazaar, he could distinguish Iranians 
by headdress and language. Full of all the enthusiasm of the novice of a new language, 
Browne was eager to make contact and speak Persian with those recognized as Iranians. 
He wrote to his mother about how he approached Mohammad Ali, a carpet seller from 
Tabriz,  
...I picked out the most genial looking Persian I could, and went and confided in 
him that I wanted to talk Persian and did he know anyone that could teach me? He 
said there were plenty...When I said I should only be here about two weeks more, 
he said that it was no use beginning now—but I explained that I had read some 
Persian, and I sat there for some time talking to him...I liked the way he spoke 
awfully—quite sing-song—with rises and falls all through sentences.735 
Being able to identify and then approach Mohammad Ali opened for Browne the doors 
of the carpet seller’s room in Valide Han, of Ismail Aqa’s Persian bookshop in Sultan 
Beyazıt, of the Javad Aqa’s Persian teahouse.736  
The odds of the average short-term traveler who was a Great Power observer 
passing by the same Grand Bazaar corridors, and seeing and hearing what Browne 
heard were not high, if they were not familiar with either Persian or Turkish. This is a 
familiar scenario in present-day Istanbul, with Turkish and Arabic. For those who are 
unexposed to either, it is nearly impossible to distinguish a Syrian taxi or dolmuş 
[minivan] driver from a Turkish one, because of their firm command of the Turkish 
language. They are ‘Turks,’ unless a natural and fluid switch to Arabic occurs and is 
caught by one who is able to distinguish it—e.g. when they pick up the phone or are 
outside of the vehicle conversing with a fellow driver they are about to switch shifts 
with. For one who is able to recognize the linguistic shift, what is observed is 
intellectually set in a context that raises the possibility that the driver is a Syrian 
refugee. While this may be, other alternatives have not even been considered, for 
example, the existence of non-Syrian Arab identities and circumstances of Istanbul, or 
that the driver is an Arabic-speaking Turk. While these less common, yet possible, 
scenarios become ignored, other generalizations may emerge with the new association, 
for example, that taxi and dolmuş drivers in Istanbul are by-and-large Syrian (like most 
nineteenth-century Istanbulite foreigners being assumed to be European). The lack of 
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expected possibilities thus results in the categorization of the driver into pre-determined 
categories, which are not faithful representations.  
In the same way that an outsider observer may lack either the attention or the 
nuanced understanding to be able to distinguish ethno-cultural-linguistic identity of a 
taxi or dolmuş driver in contemporary Turkey (even less so recognize the possibility 
that not all identities may be aligned), so an outsider observer may have also missed the 
Iranian identities of many of the city’s residents in the Hamidian era. Passing by the 
very same stalls in the Grand Bazaar as Browne, one might not notice the relative ease 
with which those individuals were able to switch back and forth between the languages 
at their disposal, especially if what one was ‘expecting’ to see was a confirmation of the 
(read) fact that “[t]he crowd in the Bazars, consisting chiefly of ladies, renders it 
difficult to pass through them,” 737  or to see a place “where a Turk has the sole 
opportunity of surveying the lady of his love.”738 That accounts of the city that had 
compartmentalized it into regions only defined very (few) specific identities also 
eliminated the no room for the existence of others, in the visitor’s imagination. A 
Ministry of Education employee, State schools teacher, Grand Bazaar merchant, or a 
Bosporus macun vendor were not being conceptualized as possible Iranians, which 
resulted in their mistakenly being designated membership in alternative, more present 
and ‘dominant,’ group identities.  
Iranians who would perhaps have remained eternally anonymous without the 
sentence or two that detailed their encounters and dilemmas in newspapers or public 
records not only contributed to the making of the capital city’s identity, but also the 
considerations for the Hamidian vision of a nation. Furthermore, they are the ones who 
can be considered to have woven the fabric of their lives more tightly into that of the 
Istanbul than their vocal long-distance politico-intellectual activist ‘non-conformist’ 
compatriots. One of the newspapers that Danish worked for was İkdam—the 
aforementioned political daily that provides great source material for Deal’s Crimes of 
Honor, Drunken Brawls, and Murder. In describing roughneck culture Deal references 
reports of crimes that are inflicted on random unfortunates. Iranians are scattered in its 
pages both as perpetrators and victims. One reads of two Iranians who wound each 
other in a scrimmage, or an Iranian get assaulted by a nationally unidentified porter who 
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refuses to wait his turn at a fountain.739 Whatever the ‘case’ Iranian’s were involved in 
proves that they there to share and contest over space (both in the city, and in print). 
Even if in the same scattered manner, Iranians have a strong presence in government 
memoranda. Among other things, they are mentioned for opening printing houses 
without a license,740 for illegally distributing copies of the Qur’an that were printed in 
Iran,741 for receiving medals,742 and, most of all, Iranians are mentioned in response to 
the question of nationality. 
 Be Ottoman or Leave? Iranians and the Question of Nationality 
The Ottoman Nationality Law has been utilized to support the exclusivist nature of 
the Ottoman nationality construct.743 Specifically, that the State’s  “‘exclusivist’ tone is 
apparent in the very ‘Law on Ottoman Nationality’”744 has rested on interpretations of 
Article 8, which considered the offspring of those who become nationals of other states 
as Ottomans, yet does not automatically confer Ottoman nationality to the offspring of 
naturalized Ottomans has been expressed to be It is frequently referenced in conjunction 
with legislation pertaining to (presumed Shi’i) Iranians and (presumed Sunni) 
Algerians; the latter were living in the Ottoman domains as French citizens. In 
analyzing the State’s to Algerians who retained French status, Deringil states that they 
were essentially given an ultimatum in 1889: they would either have to accept being 
“considered” Ottomans within two years of their arrival or, alternatively, if they wanted 
to remain French, they could leave.745 Deringil considering the State’s exclusivism by 
coupling Algerian circumstances with Iranians arises from the fact that the same 
memorandum expressed that French Algerians could not marry Ottoman women; if they 
did, they “‘would be treated according to regulations pertaining to Iranians’ and would 
be forced to leave Ottoman soil.’”746  Deringil argues that this is an expression of 
Ottoman exclusivism, because the implication of the abovementioned memorandum is 
that the residence of both Algerians and Iranians was conditional upon their acceptance 
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of Ottoman nationality. Furthermore, he directly ties his interpretation of the 
exclusivism that was implied with Article 8, with the conditions imposed on Iranians 
and Algerians.747 The problem with this interpretation is that the “Hamidian response to 
Iranians and the essence of the Ottoman Nationality Law nullify one another. They 
cannot therefore both, together, support the notion that exclusivism was a component of 
territorial policies regarding naturalization.”748 Karen Kern’s studies of Ottoman-Iranian 
marriages demonstrate that the law that governed these unions was quite an anomaly.749 
Deringil’s argument that “it was no longer enough to be Muslim, or indeed 
Sunni,”750 is accepted—in fact, it is accepted unconditionally. The Hamidian state was 
interested in the nationalization of its constituency. Whether one was a Muslim mattered 
less within this context, because nationalization is also, ultimately, about extracting 
obligations from the citizenry. Since Muslims and non-Muslims had the same 
obligations under the equalizing rational framework of the Tanzimat reforms, it was 
more advantageous for the territorial State to be inhabited by a populace that was 
dominated by taxable and conscript-able Ottomans rather than foreigners. When the 
emphasis that has been placed upon the fact that “during the reign of Abdülhamid II ... 
the Ottoman caliphate launched a major initiative aimed at commanding a new basis of 
solidarity among its Islamic subjects,” 751  is combined with the State’s “effort to 
monopolize official sacrality”752 and its “Hanefization”753 campaigns, however, the sum 
could be interpreted as auxiliaries for the argument that the state’s exclusivism 
privileged Hanefi-Sunni Ottomans. The state’s approach, however, reveals no such 
preference in the zone of migration and naturalization—especially since the Ottoman 
Nationality Law that articulated who could or could not become Ottoman was ethno-
religiously neutral, neither could it evidence exclusivism at the expense of Iranians and 
Algerians, to whom it did not apply. 
The Ottoman State did not possess a unilateral dictate over the status of Iranians. 
Neither did their status solely depend on the Ottoman Nationality Law. In fact, 
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Nationality Law may not have even applied to Iranians for the first four years after its 
enactment. It was a 14 December 1873 Qajar-Ottoman treaty that addressed the issue; it  
… formally declared that the law on Ottoman nationality is applicable to Persians. 
Article 6 of this treaty also specified that despite their Muslim character, the 
Persians established in Turkey are foreigners. This here is the proof that the 
ancient Muslim law had ceded its place to the law of gens moderne.754  
 
While the Ottoman Nationality Law was an instrument for creating a citizenry, and 
“citizenship also aimed to further mark the border between Ottoman and non-Ottoman 
Muslims,”755 it seems that it took four years to officially reconcile the secular principles 
of the Ottoman nationality law with the formal delineation of national borders and 
identities for the umma. With the mutual acceptance of the nationalization of the umma 
that occurred between the Ottoman and Qajar states in 1873, Iranians who were under 
the allegiance of the Qajar state became unequivocally excluded from the Ottoman 
nation-under-formation, as every other national of every other state had been in 1869.  
A year after the Ottoman Nationality Law was extended to Iranians, the State went 
even further in seemingly excluding Iranians from its nationalizing constituency, as it 
“enacted on [7 October 1874] the Law Protecting the Prohibition of Marriage between 
Iranians and Ottoman Citizens.”756 Its three articles stipulated that (1) Ottoman citizens 
could not marry Iranian citizens, (2) those who violated the law by marrying them 
would be punished, and, most importantly, (3) “[If] a woman who is an Ottoman citizen 
marries someone who is an Iranian citizen against the prohibition, both the woman and 
her children will be considered Ottoman citizens and liable for conscription, military 
tax, and other financial obligations.” 757  This legislation has been interpreted as a 
punishment of “Ottoman women who married Iranian men, requiring them to forfeit 
their citizenship.”758 The final article of the ‘Law Protecting the Prohibition of Marriage 
between Iranians and Ottoman Citizens’ is the “similarly tough attitude”759 that was 
extended to French Algerians in 1889.760 Yet one more year later, in 1875, the Ottoman-
Persian Convention was passed, “a reciprocal agreement that accorded a capitulatory 
status to Iran and was similar to agreements with European states. The convention 
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confirmed that Iranian consuls had the same rights as their European counterparts.”761  
It can be presumed that by the end of 1875, there was no question as to the foreign-ness 
of the Qajar state and those who owed it allegiance, in the legal framework that 
rationalized Ottoman relations with the State’s ‘Muslim’ neighbor. On the other hand, 
neither the 1873 extension of the rules of the Nationality Law to Iranians, the 1874 ban 
on Iranian and Ottoman marriages, nor the 1875 convention, had eliminated the 
potential of those very Iranians who were nationalized in from eventually belonging to 
the Ottoman state. It only subjected their naturalization to a different set of procedures. 
There existed a gray zone in the State’s dynamics, between the laws that reinforced 
the official discourse and the actual implications of their enforcement. Those who had 
formulated the official justification of the 1874 marriage ban put the stress on religion, 
in other words, 
... [i]f these marriages were sanctioned they feared that many Ottoman Sunni 
women would convert to Shi‘ism and many more Ottoman Shi‘i children would 
be born [...] [and t]he loyalty of the male Shi‘i children would also be brought into 
question and threaten the integrity of the armed forces.762 
Assuming that these fears were substantiated, i.e. Ottoman women who married 
Iranians converted to Shi‘ism, gave birth to Shi‘i children, and the State was 
preoccupied with minimizing the number of Shi‘i Ottoman women and soldiers, then 
the manner in which Article 3 of the Marriage Prohibition addressed this issue was odd, 
the implications of its enforcement would not even have kept the numbers of Ottoman 
Shi‘i women and children constant. The application of the law would have only 
increased the numbers: if obeyed, then the conversion and offspring (potential 
conscript) issue was moot—and numbers were static, if disobeyed, those women who 
had presumably converted would remain Ottoman and their illegal Shi‘i born offspring 
would be adopted by the State into the constituency of the nation-under-formation. The 
only alternate possibility was for the Iranian husband to have naturalized as an Ottoman 
prior to marriage. The irony in this case is that result of abiding by the law and the 
punishment for breaking the law materialized with the same exact final outcome: the 
Ottomanization of the nationally mixed Ottoman-Iranian family unit that had formed 
within territories. 
Religion and nationality were not two parts of the same formula for the State, even 
if they were a part of the same conversation. This was not even the case for the 
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Hamidian state. It could not be, since the confines of the Ottoman nationality that had 
been inherited by the Hamidian regime were ethno-religiously neutral. The 
abovementioned laws and regulations were, on one level, essential for the State to be 
able to integrate the frontier into the center’s jurisdiction, especially since border zone 
identities were more frequently swapped to evade citizen obligations, as Lord Curzon 
had noted in 1892. Their even implementation throughout the territories only 
maximized the number of potential Ottomans. When the 1874 law was drafted, “there 
were 100,000 Iranians living in the empire and, if they marry as they so chose, there 
would be thousands of foreigners in the empire.”763 That they would be foreign was a 
greater problem than them being Shi‘i—religion was a secondary concern that the 
Hamidian state addressed with ‘Hanefization’ efforts. Practical jurisdiction was a part of 
the national formula—and was equally applicable to Sunni, Shi‘i, Jew, Christian, and 
presumed-/atheist. It was in the interest of the State to impose the nation-under-
formation on the offspring. Despite having deemed the children of Ottoman-Iranian 
marriages illegal, the State nevertheless demanded that these children be recorded in the 
civil registry (sicill-i nüfus) and given their Ottoman identification documents (tezkire-i 
Osmaniye).764  
 There was a great contrast between what state legislation hoped to achieve in 
regions it willed to have greater jurisdiction and where it actually had such jurisdiction. 
That the Hamidian state did not exclude Iranians from being potential members of an 
(‘exclusivist’) Ottoman nation becomes more evident in Istanbul. The capital had 
granted legal and illegal Iranian immigrants various degrees of integration and legal 
assimilation. Their numerical strength in the city’s overall population went hand in hand 
with the existence of all of the civil establishments indicative of a deeply entrenched 
expatriate ‘colony’ in Istanbul that would have been able to support its population in an 
exclusively Iranian manner—“during the last quarter of the twentieth century and the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, Istanbul harboured many active Persian civic 
institutions, including a school, a hospital, publishing houses, and newspapers.”765 The 
city even had a “Committee of Persian Women.”766 It was presumably the women’s 
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committee’s telegraphic appeal767 to King Edward VII during the Istanbulite Iranians’ 
protests for a Constitutional regime in their home state that had prompted a historical 
overview of the versatile community in Istanbul in the British Press.768 February 1909 
was not the first time the ‘Committee of Persian Women’ of Istanbul had appealed to 
the British government for their cause, however, as they had received another public 
acknowledgment from the Queen in September 1908, reassuring them that, “His 
Majesty’s government are already taking such steps as are in their power, consistently 
with the independence of Persia, to promote the restoration of order in Persia.”769 That 
the Iranians of Istanbul were not ‘forced to leave’ if they had not adopted Ottoman 
nationality also made itself evident in the Iranian constitutionalist struggle that was 
being waged out of Istanbul, after the July 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Namely, in 
early August 1908, “The Persian Colony in Constantinople have threatened to become 
Turkish subjects unless the Shah restores the Parliamentary régime in Persia.”770 The 
members of the ‘Persian colony’ that had been there to the very end of the Hamidian 
regime had yet to ‘conform’ to either the Ottoman or Qajar demands of nationalization. 
Despite Hamidian era ultimatums expressing that Iranians and Algerians would be 
“forced to leave Ottoman soil”771 if they did not adopt nationality within a given period 
of time, many within the Iranian community remained well past the requisite time 
allotted without applying for nationalization, or repercussions. Furthermore, those that 
did apply to become official Ottomans received their membership to the State that had 
been their host with relative ease. According to the Ottoman Nationality Law, 
foreigners could apply for naturalization after five years of residence. According to the 
additional regulations that inform Deringil and Kern’s studies, the regulations for 
Iranians differed: they were given two years. While some applied for naturalization, but 
it seems seldom to have been the case that the State was able to successfully 
‘automatically consider’ Iranian immigrants as Ottomans. If ‘possession’ of power and 
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its ‘exercise’ are accepted to be the “difference between potential and actual power,”772 
the Ottoman government had ‘potential’ power over Iranians. Often, it was either not 
willing or not able to translate this into ‘actual’ power through its ‘exercising’ it. Where 
the State did assert itself with great vigor was in the realm of marriage and family (to 
varying degrees of success).  
Iranian adherences to the regulations pertaining marriage with Ottoman nationals 
are as irregular as the State’s enforcement of them. Some individuals took it upon 
themselves to abide by the law. This did not mean that Iranian men did not marry 
Ottoman women. Rather, some Iranian men adopted Ottoman nationality in order to 
legally marry Ottoman women—all it took to have a sanctioned marriage between an 
Iranian and an Ottoman was the former’s naturalization. Feyzi Efendi, a Persian 
instructor at the Mekteb-i Sultani state high school in Istanbul (where Esfahani was his 
predecessor and the Robinson boys were students) was one such individual. The State 
expressed Feyzi’s marriage to an Ottoman woman to be inappropriate, because of the 
law that prohibits marriages between the two nationals. Feyzi disputed this on the 
grounds that he had actually already been naturalized, and the regulations therefore did 
not apply to him.773 Neither does it seem to have been very difficult for an Iranian to 
become Ottomans, since, in July of 1884, the Ministry of the Interior received a memo 
stating it to be a cause for concern that Iranian applicants were naturalized without the 
inquiries undertaken for those of other nationalities.774  Summarily, the state’s adoption 
of the illegal offspring of forbidden Ottoman-Iranian marriages into its emerging 
citizenry, the relative ease with which Iranians were naturalized, added to the fact that 
Iranians were not consistently ‘forced to leave’ within the timeframe articulated in the 
State’s ultimatum to them (and Algerians), collectively, indicates that despite the clear 
othering of the Iranian in the official discourse and legal theory, what occurred in 
practice was that the Iranian was encouraged to become an Ottoman.  
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The Hamidian Vision of a Nation 
After three decades of absolutist rule, on 24 July 1908, Sultan Abdülhamid II declared 
the reinstitution of the Kanun-i Esasi. The collective sentimental response of Ottomans 
of every race, creed, and locality, has aptly been rendered into text as “euphoria.”775 The 
July celebrations in Istanbul had the participation of “[t]housands of traders, 
industrialists, and other professionals of all confessions—Muslims, Greeks, Armenians, 
and Jews.”776 The domestic and exilic press, along with the foreign-language periodicals 
based in the capital,777 reported the impressions of the local population. Within days, in 
newspapers published as near the epicenter of events as Istanbul and as distant from 
them as South America, the Ottoman Constitution and Sultan Abdülhamid were both 
praised by the wider constituency. In Argentina, for example, the events had  
...provided a heady elixir of communal identification and a source of pride that 
was commemorated by the Syrian colonies ... [the Syrian-Ottoman Commission 
circulated a pamphlet in the press for a ‘patriotic event’ that] ... featured the 
Ottoman coat of arms and images of five key figures in Ottoman socio-political 
life ... The symbols were uniquely Ottoman, as opposed to Arab, Syrian or 
Lebanese.778  
When the State designated 10 Temmuz (Rumi) as a ‘national Ottoman holiday’ (İyd-i 
Milli Osmani) the following year, the nation was sealed for the first time. This had not 
occurred in a vacuum, however. If ‘nationalism engenders nations,’779 it follows that the 
ideological milestones that laid the foundations for the achievement of an Ottoman 
collectivity were realized over the duration of the Hamidian era. The topic of this thesis 
has been the features of the Hamidian vision for the Ottoman collectivity, observed 
through foreigners who the State admitted as members to the nation-under-formation. 
The Hamidian regime constructed a multi-faceted official nationalism and formed a 
malleable Ottoman nation that was in constant negotiation with foreign ‘others.’ It did 
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not, however, seal the nation by declaring its existence. This final act would have been 
in direct conflict with the interest of the House of Osman, because an explicit and 
formal acknowledgment of the nation’s existence would have necessitated a cathartic 
moment in which a transfer of sovereignty from the absolute monarch to the very nation 
it helped create would have had to occur. Accordingly, when the nation was finally 
declared in 1909, it accompanied the collapse of sultanic authority. So long as the 
nation was not officially sealed, however, it could also expand. Though the Hamidian 
regime did not seek the State’s territorial growth, it certainly promoted ideological and 
demographic expansion. Hamidian expansionism was constricted to navigate within the 
confines of yet another nineteenth-century transformation: modernization, as expressed 
in the centralization and rationalization of the State. 
The Ottoman government began to rationalize during the Napoleonic era. In other 
words, it began drawing up binding contracts between state and subject that clearly 
articulated their mutual secular obligations to one another. Each party became 
increasingly accountable and, ultimately, both were obliged to serve the greater welfare 
of the State. In a bid to restrain the ambitions of a small subject sample that had locally 
acquired legitimate authority independent of the State, the 1808 Sened-i İttifak was the 
charter that, with its evident limitations, initiated the process of directly weaving the 
interest of the sovereign and subject, alike, into the interest of the greater polity. Each 
ensuing contract proliferated the number of interested parties and, thus, gradually, 
shaped the conversion of subjects into citizens. The trajectory of this development is 
well documented and interpreted—both in the decline and revisionist narratives of the 
late-Ottoman history. It suffices to say that the State initiated a proto-nationalism by 
popularizing the signifier ‘Ottoman’ with the Hatt-i Şerif-i Gülhane of 1839, which it 
reinforced (at its own expense, in the context of the damaging Treaty of Paris)780 with 
the 1856 Islahat Fermanı. While an Ottoman was defined at the onset of the Tanzimat, 
Ottomanism did not transition from a proto-nationalism into an official nationalism 
until the State defined those who were not Ottomans with the Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye 
Kanunnamesi of 1869. Because rational precedence had set an equalizing tone, the legal 
Ottoman defined by the nationality law was not differentiated by culture, religion, or 
race. Nor could these variables be expressed as conditions for who could become an 
Ottoman, given the neutral definition. The Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi only 
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made a reference to ‘Ottomans’ and ‘foreigners.’ It defined each, and the conditions for 
swapping secular identities, without further ethno-religious qualifications.  
Equalizing membership in/to the polity challenged the historical source of the 
Ottoman dynasty’s legitimacy, theretofore exercised with the inherent compatibility of 
the merger (and mutual reinforcement) of divine and temporal authority afforded by 
pre-modernity. One of the ways that Ottoman sultans could previously demonstrate the 
extent to which they were the embodiment of temporal and divine authority was by 
offering membership to foreign Muslim converts, for example. In the Nationality Law 
there was no such privileged access. Only Article 4 had the potential to mask a ‘bias.’781 
Similar to other nationality laws of the era, it articulated that the Ottoman government 
reserved the right to confer nationality on individuals who had not met the articulated 
stipulations. Because the Nationality Law allowed foreigners born within the dominions 
the right to claim nationality within three years of reaching majority (Art. 2) and those 
born elsewhere the right to petition for it after five years residence (Art. 3), however, 
even if the State used Article 4 to privilege Muslim foreigners (who were not its only 
beneficiaries) the sole advantage they would have attained over non-Muslims would 
have been that their naturalization would be expedited. The Sultan’s ability to assert his 
role as the protector and spiritual leader of a transnational umma was thus moderately 
jeopardized over the course of the ‘reorganization’ of the State, until 1876.  
In order to maintain the House of Osman’s dominance in each realm it had 
previously monopolized power in, Sultan Abdülhamid II utilized the opportunities 
provided by the principles enshrined in the Kanun-i Esasi of 1876 (the declaration of 
which his accession of was contingent upon). 782  Abdülhamid’s suspension of the 
Constitution and dissolution of parliament in 1878 has allowed historians to dismiss the 
utility of the inter-/national legitimation of the Constitution’s principles by its mere 
textualization, along with the idea of Hamidian liberalism. It shrouds several nuances to 
accept that the Hamidian regime promulgated the Constitution and parliament as a 
political ploy and discarded both at the first opportunity that presented itself as a state of 
‘exception.’ The sovereign thus reigned for thirty years with absolute power, because 
the regime’s intention, all along, was to deny the constituency the liberties and 
representative government articulated in the Constitution. Even if the premise of this 
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argument is accepted, one has to come to terms with the fact that the Hamidian regime 
did not hide the Constitution from its constituency.  
The Hamidian state printed the Constitution every year in the Salname-i Devlet-i 
Aliye-yi Osmaniye. Thus the regime circulated each article it had violated, along with 
those it did not. Though historians may have, by and large, neglected the question of 
“what a state of exception might look like in the Ottoman context … [and have, instead] 
asked why it was that Ottoman constitutionalism failed,”783 the absolutist sultan who 
had suspended the ‘Fundamental Law’ nevertheless had to justify this action while 
simultaneously demonstrating to his constituency that he was loyal to its essence. 
Naturally, the essence could be contested. It could be argued that the Hamidian regime 
preferred to suggest that the essence of the Constitution laid in the secular and divine 
status it confirmed for the House of Osman and in the guarantees it promised the 
individuals—whose existence as a consequential entity had already attained a priori 
status in the modernizing state’s legal and political discourse. It thus tried to mobilize 
bias in favour of the sentiment that government could be for the people, by the (just) 
sovereign, i.e. the sultan would be their representative and authority. Clearly this was 
unsustainable and incompatible with what would be the interpretation of the 
constituency the moment it believed itself to be a nation. The ‘Ottoman’ collectivity 
was composed of individuals whose interests had come to be woven into the interest of 
the State. Perpetually persuaded to believe that they had a stake in the welfare of the 
State, the forming citizenry would inevitably mature to demand a say in its affairs as 
active participants. This could only be satisfied with representative government; for the 
people, by the people—even if only by semblance. ‘Individuals’ are not content with 
absolute rule. By giving the impression that the essence of the Constitution was adhered 
to, the regime was only able to postpone the cathartic moment in which sovereignty 
would be transferred to the people. The forming of the impression necessitated their 
awareness of the Constitution.  
The Hamidian state needed the Constitution to be suspended, not invalidated, 
because it confirmed the sovereign’s historical claims to legitimacy in the new rational 
framework. While the sultan discarded the articles 42—80,784 wholesale, along with 
many others, he would hardly deny the monumental importance of the first seven 
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articles. The introductory set of the canon acknowledged the territories to be inviolable 
and Istanbul as the State’s capital. The role of the Ottoman sultan and caliph of Islam 
were declared to belong (literally, to return)785 to the eldest (implicitly male) descendant 
of the Osman dynasty. The sultan who was the sovereign of all Ottomans was 
proclaimed as the guardian of Islam, his person was sacred, and the liberties of the 
dynasty were guaranteed. Finally, the Constitution articulated the explicit prerogatives 
of the sultan as sovereign, which, along with allotting him the right to prorogue the 
General Assembly and dissolve Parliament (for an unspecified duration of time until the 
election of new members), included carrying out the commands of the Shari‘a and 
law. 786  It was the Constitution that reinstated the sultan’s divine jurisdiction on a 
universal scale in the rational framework while simultaneously asserting the 
maintenance of his secular authority over a neutral Ottoman populace within a 
territorially defined state. The social existence of the Constitution and access to its 
principles (even with some being in a state of suspension) was necessary for 
Abdülhamid. The suspended Constitution allowed the regime not only to reclaim its 
relationship with its ‘core constituency,’ but also to bifurcate its official nationalism in a 
manner that allowed it to bargain for the allegiance of extra-territorial adherents. 
Furthermore, it was through the precepts of the Constitution that Hamidian policies that 
have been identified as ‘exclusivist’ in the historiography (but have here been argued to 
have instead been expansionist) were carried out. This facet of the Hamidian mode of 
government makes itself especially apparent in the State’s engagements with foreigners. 
The preceding chapters have observed this phenomenon in Istanbul, the capital city of 
the Ottoman state. 
‘Istanbul,’ the actual name(s) of the city itself, has been demonstrated as revealing 
an analogy for the construction of late-Ottoman national identity. How the Hamidian 
regime approached the circulation of the capital city’s many designators (even those 
whose connotations could have challenged its very possession of it) was how it 
approached citizens: the State indexed itself as the ultimate authority by ambitiously 
claiming all manifestations of identity. As mentioned, Istanbul has been chosen as the 
setting of this particular study of state-migrant interactions for three reasons. The most 
self-evident among them is that (1) it was the capital of the Ottoman state. It has been 
argued that because this urban center was the seat of the sultan-caliph and the governing 
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apparatus, it was the city in which the Ottoman government was able to most directly 
exercise power. It was also a competitive space, however, as it has also been claimed 
that Istanbul was where the (domestic and foreign sourced) limitations on the State’s 
power were the most direct, diversified, condensed, and exaggerated, i.e. Istanbul was 
where the Hamidian regime surveilled, while under surveillance. (2) The city that was 
this zone of contestation, between and amongst domestic and foreign elements, was 
where the State-dictated an ideologically malleable vision of the nation that was 
nevertheless restricted to the confines imposed by static legal definitions of identity that 
had been inherited by the Hamidian regime. In other words, Istanbul was both the 
supplier of the fabric and the atelier in which the late Ottoman social, political, legal, 
and ideological ‘self,’ was crafted—by contrasted ‘others.’ (3) Despite the plethora of 
literature on the Ottoman capital, the historical memory of the city remains incomplete.  
Social histories of late-Ottoman and Hamidian Istanbul have only recently begun to 
filter out the residue of decline and civilizational (oppositional) narratives that stressed a 
clear Muslim-non-Muslim division and favored the submission of a complex and 
interlinked city that was characterized by contact to the façade of a neatly 
compartmentalized and segregated one. It has been re-iterated that this preference was 
especially salient in Great Power accounts. In particular, Istanbul was subjected to the 
simplifying effects of the general acceptance that it hosted a community of ‘minorities 
and foreigners’ (a compound descriptive that has been argued to have foreignized of a 
part of the indigenous constituency). This precedence has condensed the impression of 
foreigners in Istanbul into Great Powers agents and subjects, and their protégés. The 
nature of ‘stereotypical’ Great Power presence has been discussed, as it is undeniable 
that it was an essential and pervasive component of Istanbul. It has also been argued, 
however, that the visibility of the ‘European’ was directly linked to the observer’s 
expectations of their presence. Not only were they expected to be seen, they were 
assumed to inhabit a particular district, wear a certain attire, and have a distinct attitude 
and character, etc. The simplified and emblematic Frenk has been overly emphasized in 
the literature of the nineteenth century and beyond—both produced in the ‘Orient’ and 
‘Occident’—for understandable reasons (due to the social, economic, political, but, also 
and especially, civilizational and symbolic ‘impact’ of what s/he represented). This 
overemphasis has had detrimental impact on those foreigners that were not seen or 






The Hamidian State’s interaction with invisible foreigners fulfills its inherent 
potential to challenge some very basic assumptions about the nature of the Ottoman host 
state, the immigrant’s abandoned home state, and the Hamidian vision for a nation. 
Following a sketch of common impressions of the city and its Great Power nationals, 
this thesis has questioned the connotations associated with the era’s Great Power 
nationals. By this means, it has contributed to recent literature on Europeans who were 
marginal in their homelands. Malte Fuhrmann, especially, has demonstrated the manner 
in which members of the Habsburg underworld—by their mere presence and 
visibility—disputed their state’s civilizational narratives and compromised their 
imperialist ambitions in the Ottoman dominions. Their lives did not evidence features of 
the cultural superiority their national cultures had claimed. The Hamidian state (and 
those following it) utilized the contradiction between the self-purported moral 
superiority of ‘the West’ (often the pretext for encroachment) by hosting and 
naturalizing the members of its underworld in order to parade the blemishes of ‘Western 
civilization’ in front of the eyes of the domestic constituency. Great Power residents in 
Istanbul were not a single collective whole, living within the invisible borders of the 
Frengistan of Pera and other ‘European’ districts. Neither were they solely agents and 
transmitters of their home state’s metanarrative—i.e. they were not necessarily reliable 
upholders of their home states’ cultural mission. There were those among them who 
denied the rhetoric of their newly-formed/forming nations and rejected the identities 
imposed on them. This idea has been developed with a marginal Great Power national 
who resisted becoming the living (and, willing) testament to progress and moral 
superiority associated with her designated ‘civilization,’ since Western promises were 
deferred in the homeland for social outcasts. 
This study has diversified the Great Power national in the Ottoman dominions with 
the study of a female English Muslim convert. Women—whose ‘condition’ in a given 
society was used as a rubric of ‘progress’—were both discarded and contested for by 
nineteenth-century states. It has been argued that sex-worker outcasts shared a similar 
existence to those who have generally been presumed to occupy the opposite end of the 
moral spectrum: converts. This argument has demonstrated that while an ‘Ottoman’ was 
an ethno-religiously neutral identifier in the secular-rational realm, Ottomanism, the 
official nationalist ideology as it was formulated by the Hamidian regime, was 
expansionist. It appealed to the transnational umma and recruited adherents. The role of 





the press—the British Muslim organ of The Crescent has been the case study observed, 
here. As the supreme commander and protector of the faithful, the sultan-caliph was 
presented to the readership as being personally invested in the welfare of the umma—he 
was additionally presented as being accessible. The success of the propaganda was 
verified, among other means, by the appeals that single and destitute convert women 
made, directly to the State. The Hamidian regime provided social welfare services to 
foreign women who had converted to Islam. It gave them benefits ordinarily reserved 
for citizens without them being nationals because their eventual naturalization was 
presumed imminent. Some letters expressed the need for the State’s help (e.g. stipend 
and shelter), until marriage. Upon marriage, Great Power women would become legally 
assimilated Ottomans. The irony was that this would occur as a consequence of Great 
Powers’ states’ nationality laws that ejected women who married foreigners from their 
nations. The national identity politics that were a part of the nineteenth century 
(international) legal framework have been approached from the State’s engagements 
with women both through what was (vaguely) articulated in the Nationality Law and 
supplemental legislation that aimed to keep natural-born women living within the 
dominions as members of the Ottoman constituency. 
The Ottoman Nationality Law and the status of Iranians (male) have come to be 
taken for granted as integral components of the debates that deliberate the Hamidian 
state’s ‘exclusivism’ and ‘pan-Islamism.’ These arguments have especially been geared 
to interpret the Hamidian regime’s ideology, despite the fact that the proof pre-dates the 
era’s commencement, i.e. the Hamidian state inherited the 1869 Nationality Law. The 
conclusions are thus bolstered by a new consensus that was established prior to advent 
of the reign of Abdülhamid—namely, the distribution of the transnational umma in (and 
out of) state borders and the designation of secular identities to its members. This was 
achieved with the rationalization and nationalization efforts of the Tanzimat reforms. 
They were verified with the Constitution that was declared (and, later, suspended) by 
the Hamidian regime. It has been argued in that religious considerations that have been 
given paramount importance in evaluating the Hamidian state’s engagement with the 
status of and regulations pertaining to Iranians should be seen, in fact, as a secondary 
consideration. An analysis of the discrepancies between the legal text and praxis has, in 
fact, revealed that the State prioritized its national interest. It was able to negotiate these 
priorities more assertively with the Qajar state than with the Great Powers. 





Ottoman state to dictate terms due to the simple fact that it had established precedence 
over the Qajar state in the timing of its nationalization. The contact zone of Ottoman-
Iranian marriages have demonstrated this phenomenon. 
The Ottoman Nationality Law did not articulate the status of Ottoman women who 
married foreigners. It only provided an entry back into the forming Ottoman nation for 
natural-born women who had lost their nationality after having married a foreigner 
whose home-state law had articulated that the nationality of the husband would be 
automatically extended to the wife and offspring. Thus, Great Power women, both those 
who were to be concealed from the Ottoman gaze and those who were discarded by 
their natural-born nations upon marriage to a foreign-national, joined natural-born 
Ottoman women whose inclusion the State was contesting over, in the making of 
Ottoman national identity. The argument in this section accepted some conclusions of 
the existing scholarship discussing the different set of laws that applied to Iranians. 
Summarily, it has accepted that the he marriage prohibition between Ottoman women 
and Iranian men is proof that the Hamidian regime was not pan-Islamist and, even, that 
it was, only partially ‘exclusivist.’ It also has challenged some assumptions, however, in 
arguing that because the punishment for those who married against the regulations of 
the prohibition was the imposition of Ottoman nationality for all, and that the State 
enforced the punishment more than it prevented the crime, with regard to foreign Shi‘i 
(and Sunni) Muslims, the State prioritized naturalization, which placed the individuals 
already living in the Ottoman territories within the State’s jurisdiction. Thus the 
importance of religion has been argued to be secondary to naturalization, as the latter 
was more directly tied to the national interest of the Hamidian state. The manner in 
which the regime was ‘exclusivist’ has been argued to not be implicitly in favor of those 
who exhibited the Sunni (-Hanefi-) Ottoman identity. Instead, the State’s efforts were 
channeled into Ottomanization. Naturalizing foreigners, regardless of their ethno-
religious identifications, was in the Ottoman national interest. Exclusivism could only 
operate within the confines of rational law, and thus favored neutral Ottomans within 
the secular domestic sphere—a redundancy. A Muslim bias was instead expressed in the 
transnational sphere, which was inclusive of the domestic, within the jurisdiction of 





The declaration of the Ottoman Constitution allowed for the bifurcation of official 
nationalism into two spheres: the territorial and the extraterritorial.787 It has been argued 
that territorial Ottomanism operated on the secular principles that were embodied in the 
Nationality Law, whereas extra-territorial Ottomanism was based on the sultan’s divine 
authority and jurisdiction—which had been reintegrated into the modernizing national 
framework with the Constitution. The Hamidian state’s accommodation of Muslim and 
non-Muslim im-/migrants into the ‘well-protected domains’ over the course of the 
Hamidian years has demonstrated this, through the State’s interactions with foreigners 
in both the domestic and transnational spheres. The development of Ottoman identity 
has hitherto been studied from within. While the capacity of this lens to illuminate 
features of the late-Ottoman state and the Hamidian regime has been monumental, it has 
also had its shortcomings. National identities are most essentially built in active 
negotiation with foreign outsiders, created by contrasts. It has been demonstrated that in 
the Ottoman case, the foreignization of indigenous elements has blurred the distinction 
between sentimental and legal foreigners. The historiography has assumed pre-Young 
Turk era sentimental foreigners to be overwhelmingly non-Muslim and has paired this 
with the argument that Sunni (-Hanefi-) Muslims had always been the core-constituency 
that Hamidian ideological legitimation policies were directed at. This has reinforced 
(and, perhaps, superimposed) a religious identification being the predominant national 
concern over the course of the Hamidian years. What has been argued here is the 
contrary: that religious identification was unambiguously a secondary concern. It has 
also been suggested that a religious-exclusivist designation for Hamidian legitimation 
policies has the potential to be misleading, as it was the outcome of the separate 
discourses of territorial and extraterritorial Ottomanism that only merged in being 
simultaneously directed at the numerically dominant constituency, i.e. natural-born 
Muslim Ottomans. It becomes evident upon the evaluation of the integration of 
foreigners into the Hamidian nation-under-construction that the two discourses of state-
propagated belonging were not fused but distinct (yet complimentary). 
The Hamidian regime was heavily invested in the project of nation-formation. In 
modernity, the relationship between the newly engendered politically consequential 
individual and authority became rationalized in mutually binding contracts that wove 
the interest of each party into the general welfare of the State. The Ottoman state was no 
                                                





exception. Even if he ruled absolutely, Sultan Abdülhamid II was as constricted by legal 
confines and precedent that he had inherited, as much as any other modernizing 
sovereign of alternate nineteenth-century nations-under-construction. Accordingly, a 
legal Ottoman was an otherwise neutral and static designator, which was only 
contrasted by the (equally static and neutral) quality of being foreign. ‘The’ Ottoman 
identity encapsulated, en masse and without differentiation, the multi-racial, multi-
ethnic, and polyglot natural-born constituency within the dominions (including those 
with irredentist ambitions). The Constitution had confirmed the essence of this identity, 
formally and officially in the making since 1839, when it declared, “all individuals who 
are under the allegiance of the Ottoman state, irrespective of whatever religion or 
denomination to which they belong, are, without exception, Ottomans.” 788  The 
Hamidian regime did not challenge the definition of an Ottoman. On the contrary, it 
used the ambiguity of Ottoman-ness equally as a tool of demographic and ideological 
expansion as well as for nation-building. Abdülhamid reserved the right to appeal to the 
sentiments of extraterritorial foreigners based upon the traditional religious authority of 
the House of Osman that was re-confirmed as his prerogative in a transnational, 
universal, capacity in the process of rationalization. Furthermore, the Ottoman 
sovereign actively solicited adherents to an extraterritorial Ottomanism that capitalized 
on his position as caliph and protector of Islam and Muslims, which consolidated his 
authority. The caliph was also prepared for the migration of new adherents, though it 
did not necessarily solicit it—those among them who were Great Power nationals, or 
their colonial subjects, provided the Hamidian regime political leverage against the 
ambitions of (social, cultural, economic, and moral) imperialist competitors, if they 
maintained their residence in their Great Power home states. If those who were 
ideological adherents did traverse the constructed ideological and civilizational divide 
and enter the sultan’s legal domains, where secular considerations took precedence over 
religious ones, however, they became the recipients of a different discourse, i.e. the 
same one that was directed at pre-existing territorial foreigners and the natural-born 
constituency, of ‘whatever religion or denomination.’ In the final stage, secular 
Ottomanism out bid all allegiances. In the interest of nation and state, their 
naturalization was expected. Thus the Hamidian regime’s vision was for the territorial 
state to be inhabited by an unsealed nation of Ottomans, exclusively. 
                                                






Image I.I: Image of page 14 in the 1909/10 [1327, Rumi Calendar] Salname-i 
Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye: Altmış Altıncı Defa Dersaadet: Selanik 
Matbaası, 1327 [1909/10] that memorializes the Ottoman nation by 
dedicating 10 Temmuz (Rumi calendar) as its national holiday.  
 Source: archive.org 
Image II.I: Image of the plaque of ‘Dersaadet Elektrik Şirketi’ (Dersaadet Electricity 
Firm).  
 Photo taken by the author.  
Image II.II: Image of the mono and bilingual pages of the 18 March 1909 issue 
(no.29) of Kalem [Pencil]. The monolingual Ottoman page on the left 
identifies the address of the proprietor to be in Beyoğlu. The city 
mentioned on the left side of the same page is Istanbul. The bilingual 
page indicates the proprietor’s address to be in Péra, Constantinople  
 Source: www.tufs.ac.jp 
Image III.I:  Image of the front page of the Istanbul-based Persian exilic newspaper, 
Akhtar [Star], 17 October 1893. 
 Source: www.tufs.ac.jp  
Image IV.I: The title page of Annie Van Sommer and Samuel M. Zwener (eds.) Our 
Moslem Sisters: A Cry from the Lands of Darkness Interpreted by Those 
Who Heard it. (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1907).  
 Source: archive.org. 
Image IV.II:  “Nationalities Map” featured in Clarence Richard Johnson (ed.) The 
Pathfinder Survey of Constantinople: A Study in Oriental Social Life 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922) 
  Source: archive.org. 
Image IV.III: “English police court lawyer becomes an ally of the sultan and is now 
engaged in teaching the religion of Mohammed: William Henry 
Quilliam, Sheikh-ul-Islam of the British Isles, spreading the creed of the 
Moslems, which, he believes, will solve the whole race problem,” The 
San Francisco Call, 13 December 1903.  
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